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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of problem

.

The problem of this study is

to identify, analyze, and summarize all existing decisions of

the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which govern in part, the

administration of the public school system in the State of
Maine.

The jungle of statutes relating to education with

which school administrators, school committees, teachers and
are
other school personnel must be familiar and by which they

governed, represents the mere skeleton of the law.

The inter-

pretation of these statutes by the courts is what adds the
real meat to the body of school law.

It is the judicial

their opinions
interpretation of the statutes by the courts and

legislature in enacting the
of the original intent of the
school officials and
statutes that is of real significance to
must make adminisprovides the guidelines under which they
operation of the public
trative decisions in the day-to-day
schools.
on a particular point,
In the absence of litigation
Attorney General's office.
opinions are often sought from the
or carrying the weight and
While not binding on the courts,
to the
these opinions are helpful
decision,
court
a
of
effect
additional guidelines on how the
providing
in
official
school
litigated.
should the question be
courts would probably rule

2

Consequently, all opinions of Attorneys General relating to

education in the State of Maine will be included.
Need and significance of study

.

The need for studies

pertaining to legal aspects of educational administration is
generally recognized by educators.

Until statutory enactments

have been given judicial interpretation, laymen can never be

certain as to the meaning of the law.

Furthermore, principles

of law are established by court decisions where statutes are

silent.

Ruling principles concerning public education resulting

from court decisions should be known to those who work in the
A systematic arrangement of the ruling legal prin-

schools.

ciples, as established by the Maine courts, should provide an

additional tool to assist those who serve public education in
the state.

Edwards believes that those persons responsible for the

formulation of educational policy should understand the position
of the schools in legal theory.

Those who assist in the work

and school
of the schools--school boards, superintendents,

principals

— need

their actions.

to understand the legal principles governing

Thus, he points out:

on the one
The relation of the school to civil society,
nowhere so
is
other,
hand, and to the individual, on the
rendered
decisions
well defined as in the great body of
It would
courts.
by the highest of our state and federal statesman and the
seem obvious that both the educational
practical school administrator should
operation of
fundamental principles of law governing the
our system of public education.
Pub lic Schools
^Newton Edwards The Courts and the
Press, 1953 ;
Chicago
of
(2d ed. rev.; Chicago: University
p. vii.

3

Bolmeier expresses a similar need for an understanding
of the legal aspects of school administration.

His opinion is

that an interest in school law is on the increase because school

board members, superintendents, supervisors, principals and
teachers need to know our legal machinery as it operates in the

control of public education.

Specifically, he says that they

must have an understanding of the legal principles emanating

from court decisions; they should be aware of the legal frame-

work of public school control; they must be in a position to
apply legal principles for the school and community welfare.

2

The only way such knowledge may be acquired is by an

exhaustive study of court decisions as found in law libraries.

For the layman, such a procedure would be difficult, if not
impossible.
the
The need for such a study in Maine is evident from

undertaken.
fact that no similar or related study has ever been
laws of the
Other than a periodic compilation of the school
Attorney
state and a partial summary of opinions from the
with the legal
General’s office,^ no publications dealing
exist.
aspects of the operation of Maine’s schools
operation and
That court decisions are affecting the

Principal Know
^Edward C. Bolmeier, "What Should the

D.C., April, 1955)

»

pp*

•

Generals
School Boards Association, Attorney Schoor
Education (Orono. Main^r-^aL
Boards Association, 19ooj*
^«itflte

administration of the public schools of Maine and, indeed, of
all of our states is becoming increasingly apparent.

Both the

number of such decisions and the multiplicity of the subjects

with which they deal have increased within recent years.

New

statutes relating to education are being added at an increasing

rate to cope with the major problems of our time including
school district reorganization, finance, school construction,

church-state relationships, liability, collective bargaining

for teachers and many others.
identify,
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to

Maine
analyze and summarize all existing decisions of the
education.
Supreme Judicial Court relating to public school
important legal principles,
In the absence of court rulings on
are included
opinions from the office of the Attorney General

where available.

Leading court decisions from other state

vital questions which
jurisdictions are cited if they deal with
courts of this state. Rulings
have not as yet come before the
Court which negate existing Maine
of the United States Supreme
educational policy within the state
statutes or otherwise affect

are also included.
provide, under one cover,
The completed project should
revised
Maine School law which can be
a useahle reference to
decisions
as new statutes and court
and updated in future years
this study
It is also hoped that
supersede the existing ones.
reform
areas where legislative
identifying
in
helpful
be
might
is needed.
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Delimitation .

This study will be limited in scope to

public elementary and secondary education.

It will be further

limited to a survey of decisions rendered by the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court, although decisions of courts of a lesser juris-

diction may b© referred to if within them are embodied important
legal principles which have not been ruled on by the Maine Supreme

Judicial Court.

Where court decisions apply to statutes or to

sections of the constitution no longer applicable, because of
changes in the law or because of amendments to the constitution,

such decisions generally will not be a part of this study.
An analysis and evaluation of the Maine statutes on

education currently in effect are not a part of this study.
Observations pertaining to the organization of the statutes
and outdated or ambiguous language will, however, be included

in the summary chapter.

Related studies .

Althou^ many studies have been made

dealing with various legal aspects of education, only a very few
have given their major enqphasis to a consideration of the inof court decisions in the formulation of educational

policy.

Among this latter group, a major contribution in the

author
field of legal research was the study of Newton Edwards,

of the textbook. The Courts and the Public Schools .

In his

accomplish two
study, Edwards stated that his purpose was to
things

principles underlying
(1) to make clear the fundamental
education;
(2) to reduce to
the relation of the state to
case or
systematic organization the principles of the

6

common law which are applicable to practical problems of
school organization and administration
Lee 0, Garber has been another significant contributor
cr

to the field of school law.

His school law yearbooks'^ have

provided an up-to-date review of court rulings of significance
to education, covering all of the states.

A recent publication

by Drury and Ray, Principles of School Law ,^ presents many of
the more important principles of school law and many leading

court cases.
A number of studies have been made based upon court
n

rulings of selected states.

Stephenson' conducted a study of

court decisions in Indiana in 1929, for the stated purpose of

establishing principles of school law for teachers and laymen.
A similar study by Campbell® was made for the State of Kentucky

in 1937, for the purpose of determining the extent to which

principles of public school administration had been shaped by
the courts.

used
The primary related studies which the author has

^Edwards, op. cit ., p. vii.

^Lee 0. Garber, The Yearbook of School
since 1959 )•
Interstate Printers and Publishers, annually
111 .:
of School
^Robert L. Drury and Kenneth Ray, Principles
19o5j.
Law (New York: Apple ton-Century-Crof ts ,
School
Frank R. Stephenson, Handbook of Indiana
The Benton Review Shop, 1929).
(Fowler, Indiana:

L^

7

are Johnston’s "Judicial Decisions Affecting the
Administration
of the Public School System in Pennsylvania,"^ and Earl

Lightcap’s

Judicial Decisions Affecting the Administration of

the Public School System in Maryland."^®

These dissertations

have been followed closely in format and organization although
the content chapters will vary.

Johnston, for example, omitted

chapters on pupils and teachers, since these areas had been

treated in other research studies.

Lightcap did not include a

chapter on school district reorganization.

Method of procedure .

The procedure used in the solution

of the problem is known as the case or common-law method.

The

writer has followed, in general, the approach used by Edwards
and Garber in their discovery and organization of principles of

law by the study of court decisions.

The sources for the data

have been the decisions of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
as found in the Maine Reports, Attorneys General opinions and

miscellaneous policy statements and by-laws of the Maine State
Department of Education,

^Paul H. Johnston, "Judicial Decisions Affecting the
Administration of the Public School System in Pennsylvania”
(unpublished Ed.D. dissertation. Graduate School of Education,
University of Pennsylvania, 1957).
^^Earl J. Lightcap, Jr., "Judicial Decisions Affecting
the Administration of the Public School System in Maryland"
(unpublished Ed.D. dissertation. Graduate School of Education,
University of Pennsylvania, I960),

8

CHAPTER II
THE STATE AND PUBLIC EDUCATION

Introduction
The responsibility of providing for the education of

youth is a governmental one.

All civilized countries provide

a systematic, formalized procedure for educating their citizens,

particularly children.

The responsibility for this vital

function is vested with the highest level of government to be
found in the country or with some political subdivision of
government, depending upon the form of government.
It is important that school personnel have a clear

understanding of the division of responsibilities with respect
to education in this country.

It is the purpose of this chapter,

therefore, to delineate these responsibilities as they are

legally constituted at the national, state and local levels.
The Federal Government and Education
no specific
The Constitution of the United States makes

mention of education.

Any power over education which the

implied power. The
federal government has is, therefore, an
power with respect
only clause in the constitution from which
general welfare clause.
to education can he implied is the
the power "to lay and collect

This clause confers upon Congress

9

Tsixes, Duties,

Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide

States.”^
for the Common Defence and General Welfare of the United
clause
Prom the very start, the interpretation of this

has given rise to conflicting views.

The opposing points of

Hamilton, have been widely
view, first enunciated by Madison and
power to tax and
reported and need not here be repeated. The

finally established
spend under the general welfare clause was
years preceding
by the Supreme Court during the depression
and in Helvering v.
World War II. In United States v. Butler^
proceeds of taxation for
Davis^ the Court sustained the use of
Act and Social
particular purposes (Agricultural Adjustment
authority under the general
security Act) as an exercise of

welfare clause.
of Congress to tax
While no case involving the power
education appears to he on record,
and spend in support of
welfare
Congress under the general
there is little doubt that
authority to make any reasonable
clause would be accorded
education if challenged.
appropriation for the support of
power
its taxing and spending
While congress cannot use
it

to the states,
of some matter reserved
.0 purchase control
the
states to cooperate with
the
induce
to
power
.ay use this
is nationsome social need that
meeting
in
government
.ational
national
education is a matter of
certainly
scope,
in
wide

lu.S., constitution. Art.

I.

sec. 8.

56 3. Ct.. 312
2 nnited States v. Butler . 397 U.S. 1.
901^ (
O.S. 619, 57 3. Ct.
3 Helvering V. Davis , 3°!

10

concorn*

It would seom, therefore, that the national government

in sponsoring a host of federally supported programs for public

school education is not invading the reserved powers of the
states by en5>loying its taxing and spending power to collaborate

with the states in the promotion of education.
It would seem that the Tenth Amendment, passed in 1791,

was intended to reserve to the states matters of education,

among other things.

The Amendment states, "The powers not

delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-

hibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people."^ Nevertheless, there are limitations

provided by the United States Constitution which are applied to
public education in various states and, in some cases, to all
states.

One such limitation is the clause which prohibits any

state from passing legislation impairing the obligation of

contracts.^

In the case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v.

is a
Woodward, the Supreme Court held that a college charter

later be
contract between the state and the college and cannot
is a related
changed. Of more interest to school personnel
an act of a
decision in which the Supreme Court held that
tenure was so worded
state legislature providing for teacher
as to constitute a contract.^

^,S,, Constitution

,

Amendment X.

^U.S., Constitution , Art.
^

95

(

I,

sec. 10.

3. Ct.
state ex rel. Anderson v. Brand , 58

1938 ).

lOl-S.

303 0.3

11

A second limitation upon the power of the states is

found in the First Amendment,

It reads:

"Congress shall make

no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
•7

The Supreme Court has hold that

the free exercise thereof,”

the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment providing that "No state

shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges

and immunities of citizens of the United States" makes the First

Amendment applicable to all states.®

The Supreme Court has inter-

preted this amendment as establishing a "wall of separation" be-

tween church and state.

Specifically, it has been interpreted

as a denial of authority of either the national government or

the government of any state to appropriate and spend moneys
As was

raised by taxation in support of sectarian instruction.
said in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education

,

"No

tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any

religious activities, or institutions, whatever they may be
practice
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or

religion.
protecting
The First Amendment also goes very far in
official censorship
the right of the individual to be free from
Thus, in a
spirit.
or control in the realm of intellect or
*^U.S.,

Ewing

Constitution

,

Amendment I,

Township of
^Eve rson v. Board of Education o f the
330 U.S. ^1, 67 sTctT 962 (194-7
)

,

^ minois ex rel. McCollum v.
-^>i ( 194-y)*
333 U.S. 203, bB s.ct. 4

•

Board of Education,

12

far-reaching decision, the Supreme Court has held as unconstitutional a state law making it compulsory for children in the public
schools to salute and pledge allegiance to the flag of the
10
United States.

Another limitation upon the powers of the states is contained in the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which provides
that no state may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."

This means that no state

may enforce legislation which discriminates in favor of one
class of citizens over another.

In the historic 1954 decisions

of the Supreme Court it was ruled that racial discrimination in
the public schools is unconstitutional.^^

While public education

is considered a state function, state legislators must exercise

their responsibilities in such a manner as to be consistent with
the provisions of both state and federal constitutional pro-

visions.
•Education as a State Function
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, the effect of

matters perthe Tenth Amendment was to reserve to the states,

taining to education.

The courts have consistently upheld this

^^Board of F-dncation o f West Virginia v. Barnett^
319 U.S. 624., ^>3 S. Ct. Il7b Cl543r
^^Brown v. B oard of Education , 347 U.S. 4^3 74
»

686 , 98 L. Ed. "873 (1954) I ^£2^
U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753. 99 L. Ed. 653 (1955T.

,

^

13

doctrine.

In State ex rel. Clark v. Haworth ,

12

education is a function of the state government.

it was held that

Furthermore,

it has been held by the courts that the state legislature has

plenary control over educational matters within the state, sub
ject to whatever constitutional provisions may affect the

exercise of legislative authority.

13

Article VIII of the Maine Constitution adopted in 1820,
places the responsibility squarely on the legislature for pro-

viding for public schools in the several towns.

The Article

reads as follows;
A general diffusion of the advantages of education being
essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of
the people, to promote this important object, the legislature
are authorized and it shall be their duty to require the
several towns to make suitable provision, at their own
expense, for the support and maintenance of public schools;
and it shall further be their duty to encourage and suitably
people
endow, from time to time, as the circumstances of the
of
seminaries
may authorize, all academies, colleges, and
grant,
learning within the state; provided, that no donation,
legislature to
or endowment shall at any time be made by the

which may
anv literary institution now established, or
of making si^ch
time
the
at
unless
hereafter be established,
have the right
endowment, the legislature of the State shall restrain any
or
to grant any further powers to alter, limit institution, as
literary
ot ISrpoweL vested in, any such
best interesi;
shall be judged necessary to promote the
thereof
time to time by
This Article has been challenged from

Supreme Judicial Court has
local municipalities but the Maine
education is basically a
consis ently upheld the premise that
H.E.
In state ex rel. Clark v. Haworth , 122 Ind. 462, 23
946 (isgo):
211 Ore. 360 , 315 ?
13Monagl^ V. School Distr ict No. 1,
(2d) 797 (1957).
^^Maine, Honstitution , Art. VIII.

V,

11+

state function and that the legislature, under Article VIII, has
the authority to pass legislation to ensure compliance with the

intent of the Constitution.

In an I 878 decision,

stated that the law of

establishing a school mill fund,

I 872 ,

the Court

was authorized by Article VIII of the Constitution, empowering
the legislature to make "suitable provisions" for the support

of public schools, and a general tax on the property of the state

could be imposed therefor,
A 1912 decision^^ declared that Article VIII is mandatory,

and not prohibitory and that the word "suitable" is an elastic

term depending upon the times and subject to the legislature's
discretion in determining what is suitable.
of 1959

,

In the Squires case

the Court stated that:

The state educational policy cannot and must not be
interfered with by any subordinate governing body. In
enacting the laws pertaining to education, the legislature intended that no municipality should regulate
by ordinance or order any subjects which would affect
or influence general education unless permitted to do
[T]he con.
,
so by an express delegation of power,
stitutional provision imposing the duty upon the
legislature to promote the cause of education, in effect,
is in the nature of a constitutional mandate.^'
,

Finally, in the McGary case of I960,
that:

151 ,

16

the Court held

"Under constitutional provisions stating that it is the
^

Opinion of Justices , 68 Me. ^62

16

Sawyer v, Gilmore, 109 Me. 169, 83 A. 673 (1912).

(I 878 ).

^"^Squires v. Inh abitants of City of Augusta , 155 Me.
153 A. id 80 (1959)'."'

18

McGary v. Barrows , 156 Me. 250,

I 63 A.

2d

7i+7

(I960),

15

duty of the legislature to require towns to make suitable pro-

vision at their own expense for the support and maintenance of
public schools, the responsibility rests with the legislature."
Evidence of the desire on the part of the state to take
an active role in the control of educational affairs occurred
as early as 1825.

At that time, an act was passed that required

the selectmen of the several towns and the assessors of the

several plantations to make a return to the Secretary of State

showing the number of school districts within their respective
towns and plantations, the number of children in each district,

and the amount of money raised and expended for the support of
schools.

Although the returns secured under these laws were

it
of little value, the statute was of great importance since

marked the beginning of the supervision of the state over its
schools.
In 1835 ^

agency of state control appeared in the

first instance of
form of a Board of School Commissioners, the
in the state. This
the appointment of special school officers
and passed during the
was brought about by a resolve introduced
evidence is to be found
legislative session of that year.^° Ho
resolve was repealed in I836)
that this board ever existed (the
to establish some sort of
but the attempt of the legislature
was significant. Ten years
agency of control at the state level
Ill, sec. 5^^Maine, Public Laws (1825), c.

^^Maine, Resolves (1835)

»

*73*
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later, in

I8I4.6,

a committee appointed at the first meeting of

"teachers and friends of education" held at Augusta, presented
a

memorial to the legislature which strongly recommended the

establishment of a State Board of Education as a means of

correcting the evils in the school system.

The committee on

education and the governor supported the measure.

The result

was that "An Act to Establish a Board of Education" was enacted
by the legislature and approved by the governor on July 27 ,
1814.6.

The elected board was:

[A]uthorized and required to collect and
disseminate information in regard to the location and
construction of school houses; on the arrangement of school
districts and the use of the best school apparatus; to consult with superintending school committees and school
agents on the best and cheapest method of introducing
uniform school books and on the practicability and expediency of establishing school district libraries; to inquire
and report upon the advantages of normal schools or schools
for the education of teachers; to consider the best method
in aiding and promoting education in the new settlements
of the State; to devise improvements in teaching the
branches of instruction now pursued in the common schools
Sind for the introduction of such other branches of useful
knowledge as may then be practicable. 21
.

,

.

It might be supposed that with the establishment of the

Board of Education accomplished, with the work of its members
and its secretary presenting more and more information to the
some
people, and with the importance of state supervision in

would
measure duly recognized, this agency of state control
being unable to
meet with general favor. But the politicians,
did not favor
control the elections of the members of the Board,
^^Maine, Public Laws

(1814.6),

c.

195 •

17

this form of administration.

The result was that, in 1852,

the State Board of Education was abolished.

The same legis-

lation which abolished this form of state control established
another type of supervision by providing for County Commissioners
of Education.

22

Under this system, each county had a Com-

missioner of Common Schools whose duties were as follows;
It shall be the duty of each school Commissioner

to spend at least fifty days (during the term of the
winter school) in visiting the towns in his county,
for the purpose of promoting by addresses, inquiries
and other means, the cause of common school education,
and annually to make a report to the Legislature of his
doings under the act, of the character of the teachers,
and of the order and condition of the schools and school
houses in his county, together, with all such other
information and suggestions as his experience and observations may enable him to offer, calculated to advance the
cause of popular education. 23

Pew records remain of the work of this commission and
years.
its existence was for a brief period of two

It is

Education
evident that the Board of County Commissioners of
state; nor did it
did not meet the educational needs of the

receive popular approval.

This is shown by the fact that the

that commission
legislature in iQSk repealed the act creating
establishing the office of
and in its place enacted a law
This law, with some
State Superintendent of Common Schools.
No
at the present time.
changes and amendments, is in effect
educational legislation has ever
more important or enduring
date, the people of Maine
been enacted in Maine. From this

^^Maine, Public Laws (l85D»

^^Ibid.

357. sec. 1.

18

ceased to experiment with the different forms of state control
and devoted their efforts to the expansion of the office.

Be-

cause of the significance of the legislation, it is here quoted

in full.
There shall be appointed by the Governor and Council a
Superintendent of Common Schools who shall be duly sworn
and whose term of office shall continue for three years
from the first day of May next, and on the expiration of
said term or the occurrence of a vacancy in said office
by death, resignation or removal, a new appointment shall
be made for a like term of three years.
He shall devote his time to the improvement of common
schools and the promotion of the general interests of
education. He shall investigate the operation of school
laws and collect information in regard to the arrangement
of school districts. He shall familiarize himself with
the location and construction of schoolhouses and the use
of the best school apparatus. He shall consult and advise
with the Superintending School Committees on the selection
of textbooks adapted to the wants of the schools and in
methods of ascertaining the qualifications of teachers for
their duties.
He shall examine the returns made by the Superintending
School Committees to the office of the Secretary of State
and obtain from them such facts and statistics as may be
useful, and in general procure information from every
available source for the' improvement of common schools.
It shall be the duty of the Superintendent by correspondence with teachers, school officers and others, and
by public addresses from time to time in diff erent parts
of the state, to disseminate the information he may have
acquired and endeavor to awaken a more general interest
in public education.
«
session
The Superintendent shall annually, prior to the
and
of the Legislature, make a report to the Governor
investigations,
and
Council of the results of his inquiries
including
and the facts obtained from the school returns judgment
such suggestions and recommendations as in his
schools. ^
will best promote the improvement of common
,

of the original
It is noteworthy that most, if not all,
Education were assigned to the

duties imposed upon the Board of

24}{aino, Public Laws (1854)>

sec. 11 .
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new Chief State School Officer*

Commensurate with the wider

scope of influence of the office, the title of the Chief State

School Officer was changed in 1923 to "State Commissioner of

Education.
Today, the dutiea and powers of the State Commissioner
of Education are definitely prescribed and backed with such

specific methods of enforcement that the office carries a great
deal of authority and responsibility.

A partial list of his

duties as prescribed by law follows:
"l.

To exercise a general supervision of all the public
schools and to advise and direct the town committees
and superintendents in the discharge of their duties;

"2.

To compile and distribute, in pamphlet form, to the
municipal and school officers of the several towns,
copies of the amended school laws of the State;

"3.

To prescribe the studies to be taught in the public
schools . . . and approve any coxirse arranged by the

superintending school committee;
'Ij..

To cause an inspection to be made under the direction
of the board and to report to the school committee and
to the board, his findings and recommendations when
petitioned by 60^ of the parents of, the children of
any one sc^ol

”5*

To supervise the state colleges;

"6.

assigt
To appoint supervisors whose duty it shall be to
and direct elementary and secondary teachers. . . .

strengthened
The office of chief state school officer was
1

authorized to employ
in 1909 when the State Superintendent was
Further
schools.
a deputy and an inspector of secondary

^^Maine, Public Laws (1923)

>

c*

^^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated
sec. 101.
27jiaine, Public Laws (1909) » o* 125*

(

196 I .), c. 5»
1

J

V
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authority was granted in 1911 when the State Superintendent
was authorized to enqploy a general agent for the purpose of

administration and supervision of schools in unorganized territory.

At this time, nearly one-half of the total area of the
26
state was classified as unorganized territory.
In 1916, the

office was further augmented by the addition of two specialists
in the field of rural education.

The State Department has con-

tinued to grow and expand its services through the years.

The

most recent state directory lists 69 professional and/or technical positions in the State Department of Education.
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Maine, like most states, has a state agency known as
the State Department of Education.

This agency includes a

State Board of Education of ten members appointed by the

Governor, with the consent of the Governor's Council, for five-year
terms; a Commissioner of Education appointed by the Board; and
a staff of professional,

technical and clerical personnel

appointed by the Commissioner.
Since education is a state function, the courts have

held consistently over the years that the legislature may
empower the State Department of Education to supervise the
state system of education.

This means, in the ultimate, that

provide a program of
if a local administrative unit fails to
the State Department
education which meets minimum requirements,
^^Maine, Public Laws (19H)>

127*

Education_^
^^State Department of Education, Maine
ivoo).
Education,
of
Directory (Augusta: State Department
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or Education may takd any reasonable steps to cause sucb a pro-

gram to be provided, including withholding of state subsidies
or failure to accredit schools.

Included in this broad authority are certain specific

responsibilities such as certification of teachers, approval
of building plans and general responsibilities which include

While many

professional assistance and supervisory services.

additional responsibilities have been added in recent years,

especially since the advent of federally supported programs,
there appears to be sufficient constitutional and statutory

authority to permit such expansion.
As a policy-making body, the State Board of Education

has the authority to adopt bylaws which have the equal force
and effect of statutes.

The exercise of this vital power has
It has been

not been tested in the state’s highest tribunal.

held in other Jurisdictions, however, that bylaws having been
formally adopted by the State Board of Education have the force
of law.^^

Existing policy statements and bylaws of the Maine

included
State Board of Education have been reviewed and are
important
where applicable as part of this- study due to their
5

school system.
implications for the administration of the public
t

Local Control of Education
to the history of the
A review of material pertaining

^^ Roard of School Commissioner v. Manning, 123 Md. 169,
90 A. 839 (1914)*
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Province of Maine reveals no records of any schools prior to
the time when this Province was united with the Massachusetts

Bay and Plymouth Colonies under the Charter of William and

Mary in 1692.^^
As early as 1652, the Massachusetts Bay Colony contended

that, according to the provisions of its charter, since it

embraced all lands

”...

within the apace of three English

miles, to the northward of the River Merrimack and to the

northward of any and every part thereof
of Maine belonged to its jurisdiction.

,
.

.

.

"

the Province

From that date, Mass-

achusetts attenq^ted to enforce its laws upon the inhabitants
of that section.

Among these statutes were the famous school laws
enacted in

161^2

and 1647 requiring the education of all

children and the establishment of schools in towns of 50 and
100 families.

There is little evidence that the residents

of the Province of Maine took these laws seriously during the

seventeenth century.

During the eighteenth century, under the

settled government and the better conditions in the Province of
Maine brought about by the Charter of William and Mary, towns

began to establish schools.

This was especially true of those

towns which were located in the southwestern section of the

Province and which had been among the first to submit to the
3^Charles Augustus Snow, The History of the Development
(Orono;
of Public School Supervision in the State of Maine
^-13
University Press, 1939)^ PP •
School
32Robert L. Drury and Kenneth Ray, Principl es of
4.
p.
ts,
1965),
Law (New York: Appleton-Century-Crof
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jurisdiction of Massachusetts.
The records of the early schools in Massachusetts Bay

Colony show that the three forms of local control

— the

town

meeting, selectmen, and school committee --had been used con-

secutively as means of controlling education.

In Maine, al-

though the above sequence may be traced in some towns, for
the most part each town chose the form which seemed to meet
its need or was most familiar to the inhabitants who had come

from Massachusetts towns.
Following the practice of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony, the people of the Province of Maine began gradually
to change the method of management of their school affairs,

giving more extensive power to a special group or committee.
The use of special committees to meet some situations of

unusual importance or one requiring detailed attention repre-

sented the groping for a new means of control.

It was this

conidea, born of necessity, which later gave rise to the

of
viction that education, being one of the proper functions
beat be
government, is of such nature that its interest can

municipal
served by holding its direction apart from other
the purpose of
It is evident from the records that
affairs.
the duties which
this general eommittee at first was to assume
selectmen.
had hitherto belonged to the town meeting or

They

concerning wages, to
were to agree with the school master
and to set the duration
determine the location of the schools
to the above duties.
the school terms* Later, in addition
of
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the committee was empowered to examine the teachers in regard
to their ability to teach and to test the quality of their

work by due inspection of the schools*
Every governmental function of the state and of its
political subdivisions has its origin in the state constitution.

Under the constitution, the state, through its legis-

lature, may authorize its cities, towns, and plantations to

assume certain duties and obligations not repugnant to the

general law.
The needs of the people make it necessary for a state
to delegate much of its authority under the constitution to

one of its several divisions in order that the common good

be served.

This delegation of power in the field of education

was extended to the towns of Maine in 1821 *

In compliance

with Article VIII of the Constitution which directs the
legislature to

”.

•

•

require the several towns to make suit-

and mainable provision, at their own expense, for support
passed in 1831
tenanoe of public schools ..." a statute was
as the legal
creating school districts and establishing them
gave authority
unit of education in Maine. 33 This legislation
determine the number and limits
to each town and plantation to
or sections were thereby
of school districts. These divisions

sue and be sued, to take
made bodies corporate with power to
personal, for the purpose of
and to hold any estate, real or

33Maine, Public Laws

{

1821 ), c. 117 , sec. 8
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agreeschools and to apply the sace
supporting the school or
money
the Act independently of the
ably to the provisions of
purpose. In addition the inraised by the to«n for that
qualified to vote in town
habitants of any school district
money for the purpose of
affairs were empowered to raise
and
or removing a schoolhouse
purchasing
repairing,
erecting,
land for the same and equipment
for the purpose of purchasing
to determine the location
authorised
also
were
therefor. They
admitted
which pupils might be
at
age
the
and
of the schoolhouse
to the schools.

of
under this district system
AS a means of control
and plantastipulated that each town
1821
of
law
the
schools,

superintending
should choose a
meeting
annual
its
tion at
more than
less than three nor
not
of
committee
school
procommittee were expressly
this
of
duties
persons. The
school
were to examine the
They
statute.
vided for in the
wit^n
to teach school
proposed
who
masters and mistresses
provided that
and it was further
plantation,
or
the town
or> mistr
any school master
dismiss
to
be empowered

..

...»

earning the
and also give

-

“•

in effect in eacn
Totiona and discipline

,,,
ee

It was

influence and best
committee
the
also the duty of
districts
the severs
of
youth
the
that
endeavors to the end
authorised to direct
regnlsrly»
attend the schools
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and select school books to be used in the respective schools.

This act further provided that at the same or annual
town meeting, a second official, a school agent, be chosen

for each school district to share with the committee in the
control of the schools.

The agent's duties as stated were

"to hire the school masters and mistresses and to provide the

necessary fuel and utensils for the schools."
The statute of 1821 laid the legal basis of Maine's

public school system and from it all the subsequent educational

legislation has had its inception.
The structure of a public school system as expressed
in the Massachusetts Law of 1789 was duplicated closely in

the Maine Law of 1821.

The practices followed in the control

no
of schools and legalized by the enactment were basically
was
different from those formerly followed in Maine when it
a part of Massachusetts.

Committee control, which had been

by the
legalized by the Law of 1789, was simply augmented
had begun in a
addition of a district agent, a practice which
first part of the
few towns in the Province of Maine in the

nineteenth century
new statute of
The joint plan of control under the
agent resulted in a division
l8ai by comnittee and district
evident in regard to teachers.
of authority. This division is
to examine the teacher as to
It was the duty of the committee
the appointment of the teacher
his ability to teach: but since
district agent, the committee
was the responsibility of the
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could not demand that any particular qualified candidate be
employed.

Such division of authority resulted in continual

difficulty, the district agent often usurping the rights of
the town committee in an autocratic fashion.

A very early court case, now of historical interest

only, confirms this weakness in the original legislation.

In

Moor V. Newf ield ^^ plaintiff Moor was employed to teach in

District No. 2 in the Town of Newfield for the month of April,
18214.,

at the agreed upon salary of fifteen dollars.

He was

hired by one of the three elected school committee representatives of the district.

Upon completion of his assignment ho

sought to recover his wages but the Town of Newfield refused
to pay on the grounds that he had been illegally employed.

Judge Mellen, in -holding for the defendant, ruled that a

school committee of three, elected by a district, had no

authority to hire a school master; the power was vested in
the school agent.
It is interesting to note that although the district

system was the intended plan for the entire state under which
schools were to be conducted, it did not meet with universal

favor and, as a result, the legislative session of 1822
of
exempted the Town of Portland and placed the control

committee.
schools in that town under one general school
^ ^Moor V. Newfield ,

^^Maine, Public Laws

Me. Mi

]+

(

(

1826 ).

1822 ), 0. II6, sec. 1 .

an
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In 1828, Bath followed the action of Portland and secured from

the legislature the right to elect a superintending school com-

mittee which was to have full control of all public schools

within the town.^^
These trends in school legislation point to the desire

on the part of the people, in a few of the larger communities,
the
to place the control and supervision of all schools in

hands of a local committee at large.

This feeling increased

with the passing years and finally reached fruition in 1893
in the abolition of the district system.
its
One wonders how the district system, with all

period of
obvious defects could exist for such an extended
is
perhaps the reason for this reluctance to change
time,

best expressed by Coe, who stated:
on so long because
The old district system probably held
of centralized^
suspicious
the early New Englanders were
school district
The
cover^oL in either Church or State.
i”
self-government,
was an example oT extreme local
often
were
results
It was so l^oal in character that the
and
bL^ardLss in teaching methods
until 1B93
not
was
it
of schools, and
dispelled o
sufficiently
was
of centralized government
system.
permit abolition of the district
control of schools appeared
A new policy in the local
provided that any town containing
in an 1850 enactment which
elect
more might, if it wished,
or
inhabitants
thousand
two
who
an inhabitant of the town"
some "competent Individual,
c.
3^Maine, Public Laws (1828),

(New York
Vol. II, P* 702.

U.75>

ae°-
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should be constituted a supervisor of the public schools of
the town.

This supervisor of schools, when elected, was

clothed with all the authority, privileges, and duties of the

superintending school coranittee in place of which he had been
elected.^®

This statute was the first concerning a local

supervisor or superintendent of schools that can be found in
the history of the control of the public schools of the state.

The legislation was permissive rather than mandatory.

1895

»

In

the act was amended and thereafter it was the duty of

the school committee to elect a superintendent of schools.

Local control of schools was enhanced again in 1897

The legislature, not without violent protest, enacted

supervision law.

a

union

The law provided that two or more towns,

having not less than twenty-five nor more than fifty schools,

liO

might unite in the employment of a superintendent of schools.
The school committees of the towns of a supervisory union were

empowered to unite to form a joint committee for the purpose of
electing a union superintendent, to fix and apportion his

salary among the several towns, and to determine the relative
amount of service to be performed by the superintendent in each
town.

Maine, Public Laws (18^0 ), c. 193 > sec. 2.
Maine." Public Laws (1895), c* 120.

^^Since most schools at this time were one-room, onesynonymous
teacher schools, the terms school and teacher were
within the context of the statute.

^Maine, Public Laws (1897 )»

296, sec. 1.
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The supervisory union plan, despite several amendments,
is still in existence in Maine today.

The current statute re-

quires in part that:

Supervisory unions shall include not less than
35 nor more than 75 teachers unless the commissioner
shall find upon representation of any school committee
that owing to geographical situation or other reasons
it is to the advantage of the State and of said towns
that a uniori shall include fewer than 35 or more than
75 teachers . 42
.

.

.

The latest and by far the most significant legislation
in
affecting the local control of public schools was enacted
Known as the Sinclair Act, it provides for the formation
1957
size to proof school administrative districts of sufficient
.

pupils.
vide a more equalized educational opportunity for all
will be disThis Act, and the litigation it has precipitated,

cussed in detail in Chapter IV of this study.
Judicial Decisions and Education
are three
Under our system of government, there
and judicial. Courts
branches: the legislative, executive,
the principle of separation of
are very zealous in maintaining
interfere with the
powers , and generally will refuse to
Interference
agency.
ministerial acts of an administrative
has
an administrative agency
by the courts results only when
arbiits discretion in acting
acted unlawfully, has abused
manner or acted without authority.
trarily or in a fraudulent
«•
liSMaine, Wevlsed Statutes (1954).

1’>

^
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Courts also refuse to substitute their judgment for that of the

legislature or for boards of education, because with respect to
acts of the legislature, it is not the province of the courts
to decide the wisdom of the laws, and insofar as school boards

are concerned, it is not for the courts to pass upon the wisdom

of their acts, nor attempt to operate the public school system.
A great portion of the actual law of the United States

has been predicated on court decisions nevertheless.

It has

been said that the law of the country is not what the state

legislatures or Federal Congress may provide but rather it is
their action as construed, applied, and interpreted by the
courts.^*'

As stated in the introductory chapter, laymen can

never be certain as to the meaning of the law until statutory
enactments have been given judicial interpretation.
It is the primary objective of this study, therefore,

to identify, summarize, and interpret the decisions of the

Maine Supreme Judicial Court pertaining to education in order
to discover the basic intent of the statutes as constructed

by the legislature.

Decisions of the lower courts are not

generally included since, not being courts of record, the information is not usually available.
There are a number of school law questions which have

not been adjudicated before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.

Many of these questions have been referred to the Attorney
General of the state for his opinion.
I

^Drury, op. cit ., p. 329.

Consequently, on a large
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number of important legal questions in education, school personnel are guided by interpretations from this office.

such opinions are included where applicable.

All

It should be

called to the attention of the reader, however, that as a
general rule, while such opinions are considered authoritative
as representative of the opinion of the chief law officer of

the state, they are not to be construed as pronouncements of
the law with the same effect as court decisions.

Summary
This chapter has described the division of responsi-

bilities for public school education at the federal, state and
local levels.

While the concept that education is a basic

responsibility of the state has been well established, the
delegation of this authority to the local level started almost

from the beginning of Maine's statehood.

Beginning with the

district system in 1821, the supervisory union system in 1893
and finally the school administrative district system of
1957 »

"the

intent of the legislature has been clear in that

local matters pertaining to education should be controlled
and administered locally.
At the same time, recognizing that a central state

agency is also necessary to promote consistency and uniformity
over
in certain matters of state-wide concern, the legislature
this
the years has provided the .necessary machinery for

important function.

33

Prom the earliest attempts to develop school supervision at the local level in Maine, school committees, representative of the immediate will of the people, have held

a

high and important place in the total educational structure.
Very few of its prerogatives have been changed or taken away
over the years.

On the contrary, such prerogatives have

generally been expanded.

It is a tribute to the good sense

of the people of the state that there has never been any serious

conflict in law or in practice between the two agencies.

In-

deed, no court cases involving a dispute between these two

arms of government can be found in the decisions of the Maine

Supreme Judicial Court.

CHAPTER III

SCHOOL DISTRICT ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL
Introduction
This chapter will consider the legal status of school

districts, which are established by the legislature to carry

out locally the functions of education, as well as their

governing board of officers, known in Maine as school committees or boards of school directors.

The legal status of

the local chief school officer, the superintendent of schools,

will also bo explored.
Much of the school litigation in Maine has centered

around the authority and power of the original school district

organization and the school agent, both of which have long
since been replaced by other forms of control.

A review of

court cases in connection with the district and/or agent

generally will not be a part of this chapter since the study
is not essentially a historical one.

Appropriate references

are included for the interested reader.
The series of court cases precipitated by the recent

legislation commonly called the Sinclair Act is of such far-

reaching importance and concern to present-day school authorchapter
ities that it will be treated in depth in a separate

on school district reorganization.
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School Districts

Authority and power

.

While public education is a

state function, legislatures generally establish
agencies of
the state known as school districts to carry
out locally the

functions of education under powers expressly or impliedly

granted to them by the legislature.

A school district is

purely the creation of the legislature, with such authority
as may be conveyed to it.

School districts have identities separate and apart

from private corporations, from municipal corporations, or

from other units of government, such as townships or counties,
even though the territory of the districts may be co**extensive

with other units of government, or lie within territorial
limits of other governmental units.
School districts under statutory provisions or
judicial decree are generally considered to be corporations

or bodies politic.

While they are not held to be corporations

in the usual sense, they have been considered to be quasicorporations, or quasi-municipal corporations.

These general legal principles have been confirmed in
Maine through a series of judicial opinions dating back to
I8I4.3.

In Whitmore v. Hogan^ the Court held that the statute

of 1821, to provide for the education of youth, made each
^

Whitmore v. Hogan , 22 Me.

(9 Shop.)

561*.

(l8i*.3)*
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scliool

district a "body corporate."

An

181).9

decision^ held

tovm clerk and
that the statute of 1824 made the selectmen,
corporate, and
treasurer, of every town in the state, a body
funds, with power to contrustee of the ministerial and school
It was stated in an 1865
vey lands belonging to those funds.
In
quasi-corporations."
decision that "School districts are

held that the legislature
the McSary case of 1960,*^ the court
quasi-municipal corporations for
has the authority to create
distinct from municipalities.
educational purposes separate and
ruling in 1959 stated that A
Finally, an Attorney General
is a quasi -municipal corporaschool administrative district
for
purpose of providing education
tion sat up for the limited
municipalities, therefore, it
the children of two or more
c

agoncy of

tlio

State #

of
as a state function, is
The concept of education,
the local
governing the relation of
in
importance
extreme
school
municipal corporation. A
local
the
to
school district
but
the same territory
exactly
comprise
may
district and a town
with its own
legal entities, each
distinct
usually
are
they
case in Maine on
perform. The leading
to
functions
peculiar
this case
Brunswick. The facts of
v.
Kellei
is
this point
but.
needed a new hi^ school
Brunswick
of
Town
follow. The

Shep.)
Stetson, 30 Me. (17
of
T„v.„^^tants
2warren v.
-564 (1843 )•
, na Ins
Vin.pr
6
3
. . n,,t. Ko.

es^

^

54 Me. 5 oTTIH55T:“^
15& Me. 2i>0, ^
l^
McGary v. Barrows,
(1959-60), p.
5 .«.^.„^nev Gen eral Report

^..

2d 747 (i960).
7.
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due to existing indebtedness, was constitutionally prohibited

from borrowing the necessary funds under the five per centum
limit.

The town officials sou^t and were granted, from

the Legislature of 1935> a special act creating the Brunswick

School District.

The essential part of the act reads as

follows;
[T]he inhabitants and territory within the
town of Brunswick are hereby created a body politic
and corporate under the name of Brunswick School
District for the purpose of acquiring property within
said town for school purposes; erecting, enlarging,
repairing, equipping and maintaining on said property
a school building; and for the purpose of maintaining
a secondary school, with the right to lease or let
said property to said town; all for the benefit of the
inhabitants of said town , . • when the money shall
have been repaid, and every indebtedness of the district discharged, the property is to be transferred to
The trustees shall then cease to function,
the town.
the district itself becomes legally defunct, and all of
the duties, management, care and maintenance shall revert
to the school board of the town of Brunswick.
.

.

.

Ten individual taxpayers and inhabitants of the town
instituted a suit against the district, and its trustees, to
test the validity of the act.
1.

2.

3.

Their contentions were that;

The act did not incorporate a district separate
from the town; that the district must depend on
the town, not only for pupils but for teachers;
The act had no other purpose than to permit
accomplishing, indirectly, what, because of the
five per centum limit, the town of Brunswick
could not do directly;
school
The town was undertaking to purchase a
installment
the
building and to pay for it on
plan; and

^Kelley v. Brunswick School Dist^ .
703 (1936).

•

,

13k-

Me.

1^7 A
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Under the act the town would become obligated to
raise money by taxation to pay a present debt
which it could not lawfully incur.

I4..

The Court dismissed the case and declared the act to

be valid and the district legal.

In writing the opinion,

several statements were made which reinforce the doctrine of

education as a state function and the separate legal entity
of a school district.

Excerpts from the opinion follow:

.
[T]owns must provide funds for the support
.
of public schools within their limits, but it does not
follow that the legislature can do no more for the
same general purpose. . . . [M]unicipal corporations
organized for different purposes may include the same
territory, as a city and a county, or a school district.
Two authorities cannot exercise power in the
same area, over the same subject, at the same time.
But the identity of territory, putting one municipal
corporation, full or quasi, where another is, is
immaterial, if the units are for distinct and different
purposes
A school district is a public agency or trustee
established to carry out the policy of the State to
educate its youth. The Legislature may change such
agencies, and control, and direct what shall be done
with school property. V/hen the district is at an
end, the town shall, in succession, take the property
impressed with the duty of carrying on the trust. The
property held by school districts for public use is
subject to such disposition in the promotion of the
objects for which it is held, as the supreme legislative power may see fit to make. , . , [Sjchool property
is public property, the property of the incorporated _
district and not of the taxpayers residing within it,'
.

Lest there be any doubt in the minds of the citizens

concerning the ultimate authority of the legislatxire in

creating school districts independent of municipal districts,
the Court concluded its opinion with the following;

"^Ibid.
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[T]he courts may not, absent express consti•
.
tutional limitations, entirely deny the power of the
Legislature to create, wholly or partly, in town or city
limits, different public corporate bodies, and to make
clear that their debts are to be regarded as those of
independent corporations. The Maine Legislature, with
regard to incorporating corporations purely public, is
of virtually unlimited power.
.

A school district is a quasi -municipal corporation

created for the exclusive purpose of carrying into effect
locally a state purpose; the city is a municipal corporation

created to direct and control local affairs.

Since education

by its very nature is a state and not essentially a local
concern, it is not to be regarded as a municipal function.

It

follows, therefore, that a town or city has no authority,

growing out of its nature as a corporation, to control in any

way the policies of the local school system.

This rule of

strict construction applies to home-rule charters of cities,
and
that is to say charters which make cities self-governing

matters of
free from legislative interference with respect to

local and internal interest.

9

made by taxIn a Bangor case in 1938, an attempt was
its general appropayers to force the city council to submit
or rejection.
priation reaolve to the electorate for acceptance
budget for the public
Among other things, certain items in the

schools were being questioned.
8

In denying the action, the

Ibid.

Garber and Neirton Edwards, The
Illinois:
in our Governmental Structure (Danville, H*
p.
state "Printers and Publishers 1962),
’^Leo 0.

,

The i

court said, in part:
•
•
[T]he legislature defines, in minimum require•
ment, what amount of money must be raised and expended
by a city for common schools; the public school system
is of statewide concern and the State at large is equally
concerned with the city regarding education.

Finally, a case in Augusta settled in 1959, once again

reaffirmed the position of the courts in the matter of who has
jurisdiction over public education in the state.

The city

council had appropriated funds for the transportation of

private school pupils within the city.

This action was

challenged by thirteen taxpayers* on the grounds that it was

unconstitutional to spend public moneys in support of private
and secular schools.

While the implications of this and other

points in the case are more appropriately considered elsewhere
in this study, the following excerpt is pertinent to the

present discussion.

It is as follows:

In enacting the laws pertaining to education,
the legislature intended that no municipality should
regulate by ordinance or order any subjects which would
.

,

.

affect or influence general education unless permitted
to do so by an express delegation of power and, in the
absence of express authority from the legislature in the
city charter or in a statute, the Augusta city council
has no authority under its police power to enact an
ordinance providing for the transportation of pupils to
(Italics mine)
or from private schools, . ,
Thus, there is little doubt that the authority and

power of Maine school districts are those provided by statute

Bangor

,

^^ Burkett v. Youngs, et al,, of the City Council of
135 Me, 459 (193^T

^^Squires v. Inhabitants of City of Augusta , 155 Me.
(19?9r
151, 153 k. 2d

^

or implied by same.

The powers of a school district are sub-

ject completely to the control of the legislature, which may

increase, abrogate, or modify the authority of a school district.

The basio authority for sohool districta reads in

part as follows:
An administrative unit as referred to in this Title
shall include all municipal or quasi -municipal corporations responsible for operating public schools.
Every administrative unit shall raise and expend,
annually, for the support of public schools therein,
not less than 80jzf for each inhabitant, according
.
.
.
to the census by which Representatives to the Legislature
were last apportioned, under penalty of forfeiting not
times the amount of its
less than twice nor more than
deficiency. All moneys provided by towns or other
administrative units or apportioned by the State for the
support of public schools shall be expended for the
maintenance of public schools established and controlled
by the administrative units by which said moneys are
provided. . .
I4.

Creation, alteration and dissolution .

The procedure

for organizing school districts, altering the boundaries, or

dissolving districts is largely regulated by statutory provisions.

The formation or change of school districts is a

to
governmental function and the legislature has full power

without the
create or change school districts at its pleasure,
affected
request or assent, or even against the will of the
inhabitants.
district, its board of education, or its
School Pis*
In Knapp v. Swift River Valley Co mmunity

dissolution of
trict,^^ it was hold that the creation and
^^Maine, Revised Statutes Annotated
**

(I96I4.),

0. 103»

mmunity School Dlstrl^,
13Knapp V. Swift River Valley Co
(1957).
152 Me. 350, 129 A. 2d 790
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community school districts is solely within the legislature’s
power, and a town can withdraw from such a district only in

compliance with the statute requiring authorization of such

withdrawal by special act of the legislature.
V, Rollins

,

In Blackstqne.

the court held that the legislature may validate,

reconstitute, and establish school districts despite failure
relating to
of strict compliance with statutory provisions

procedure.

held
In the McGary case^^ cited earlier, it was

constitution for
that there is no requirement under the state
administrative
submission of the question of formation of school

districts to popular vote of the municipalities.
administration has
Perhaps in no other area of school
opposed the doctrine
the local governmental unit so vehemently
establishing school districts.
of state control as in that of
in court on this subject
The State of Maine has had its day
howIt is interesting to note,
as have other jurisdictions.
case reviewed earlier, all of
ever, that except for the Kellex
school districts have occurred
the court cases relative to
Sinclair
law of 1831. or after the
under the old school district
supervisory legislation of 1897
Act of 1957. The school union
purposes of employing a
permitting towns to unite for the
mandatory in
permissive at first, and made

superintendent,

the courts
xmscathed and unchallenged in
continued
has
1918.

iVackstone
(

1961 ).

170 A. 2d
v. Rollins . 157 Me. 85.

l5 McGary V. Barrows . l56 Me. 250. 163 A. 2d

7W

(I960)

to the present time.

The system has apparently served the needs

of Maine very well over the years.
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the

Sinclair statutes and judicial interpretations of same are of
sufficient import to the future of Maine's public school system
to be treated in depth, in a separate chapter on school dis-

trict reorganization.

Earlier court cases involving legis-

lation now repealed or amended will not here be reviewed.
The interested reader is referred to the following cases:

Deane v
272

(

.

Washburn

,

1? Me. 100

1850 ); Call V. Chadbourne

Stearns ,

i;8

(l8l<.0);

,

I4.6

Smyth v, Titcomb

,

3 I Me.

Me. 206 (18$8); Jackson v.

Me. 5^8 (i860); Allen v. Archer ,

and School Dist. No. 1 in Gorham v. Peering

,

U-9

(I 86 I);

Me.

91 Me. 5l6,

1^0

A.

Ski (1898).
School Committees

The powers and duties conferred by statute upon school

districts are exercised by their legally constituted officers.
committee and
These officers are always members of a board or
part of such a
have no legal standing except when acting as
of groups known
board. In Maine, these officers are members
directors.
as school committees or boards of school
state.
Members of such boards represent the

They act

function, and they are state
in the performance of a state
are not municipal officers
officers. School committee members
elected locally or appointed by
even though they may have been

V

kk

the mayor and/or city council.
School committees are agencies of the state,
created

by it to carry out its educational policies
in local communities.
They possess no inherent powers nor are any
powers conferred
upon them by the local community. Whatever authority
a school

committee may possess is authority which has been delegated
to
it by the state.^^
A school committee is a legal entity and must act as
such; action taken by board members acting separately (in-

cluding the chairman) is not the action of the committee and
is without legal force.

Rules and regulations adopted by

school committees in legally constituted sessions, however,

have the binding force of law within the local school district.
The authority of school committees, when acting within

statutory and constitutional bounds is very broad in matters

pertaining to the local district which they represent.

The

duties of school committees and school directors are spelled
out in Chapter 1 $, Section

i4.73*

A partial list of these duties

is as follows:
"1,

The management of schools and the custody and care,
including repairs and insurance on school buildings,
of all property in their administrative units;

”2.

Direct the general course of instruction and approve
a uniform course of instruction and approve a uniform
system of textbooks, and perform such other functions
as may be specified by law;

^^Barth v. School Dis trict of Philadelphia
557,

11^3

aT2cT909 (195^) .

,

393

”3*

"I;..

After investigation, due notice of hearing, and
hearing thereon, they shall dismiss any teacher,
although having the requisite certificate, who
proves unfit to teach or whose services they deem
unprofitable to the school;
Expel any obstinately disobedient and disorderly
scholar, after a proper investigation of his behavior, if found necessary for the peace and usefulness of the school; and restore him on satisfactory evidence of his repentance and amendment;

Determine what description of scholars shall attend
each school, classify them and transfer them from
school to school where more than one school is kept
at the same time.”^»
Additional duties and responsibilities of school com-

mittees appear throughout the statutes on education.

In-

terestingly enough, some of the most important statutory

authority of school committees appears in Chapter 7» Section
l6l under the powers and duties of superintendents.

In this

section, it is noted that the school committee must vote to

purchase all materials and supplies; approve all vouchers for
school expenditures; determine the amount of time spent by
the superintendent in supervising each of the schools; approve
all nominations for teaching positions; determine salaries and

qualifications of teachers

;

provide for a hearing, when re-

quested, for dismissed teachers, or teachers serving on a

continuing contract

iidiose

contract has been terminated; and

determine when changes in local conditions warrant the elimination of a teaching position.
functions of
A recent publication lists the duties and

^^Maine, Revised Statutes Annotated
sec.

14-73*

(1961;.),

o. 1 $,

1^6

school committees in detail for the interested reader.

It

is noteworthy that the powers of school committees have rarely

been challenged in the Maine courts.

Most of the questions which

have arisen center around Jurisdiction concerning pupils or
teachers.

Those questions are discussed in succeeding chapters

of this study.

Miscellaneous questions concerning school committees
have arisen over the years relative to;

membership; legal

salary
meetings; a legal quomim; eligibility for membership;
of members; and
of school committee members; records; removal
Maine Supremo
vacancies. The only such question to reach the
school committee
Judicial Court concerned the legality of a
two questions pertinent to
meeting. In Elaemore v. Hancock,
Must each member of
the present discussion were raised: (1)
notified of a meeting? and
a school committee be personally
member
school committee valid when one
(2) Is a meeting of the

out of town?
is not present because he is

In answer to the

that there must be an official
first question, the Court held
committees; a verbal message of
notice of meetings of school
house is sufficient, whether or
a meeting, loft at a member's
response to the second question,
not the member is at home. In
not invalid
school committee meeting is
the court held that a
out of
attend as a result of being
because one member does not
town.

U

^

y.tles and Func
l8„aino school Board Quarterly,
April, iWTh
.r aehool Boards (Orono, Maine,
~
Hanco^,
l^ Elsemore v. Tnb.bltants of the Town of
137 Me. 2iv3 (19W*

The other questions cited above have been referred to
the Attorney General's office and the opinions rendered, until

reversed by court decisions or subsequent opinions from the
same office, should serve as guidelines for Maine school

officials*

The opinions are as follows;

"1.

A selectman or plantation assessor may not at the
same time hold the office of school consnittee
member. These offices are incompatible since
selectmen must approve the bills of the school
committee. 20

"2.

The official records of a school committee are
in the nature of public documents and should be
open to inspection by citizens for reasonable
purposes and during reasonable times. 2^
There is no express provision in the laws for the
removal of a member of a school committee. Lacking
such express provision, the removal must be governed
by the Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. 5» which provides
for the impeachment of civil officers for misdemeanor
in office, and further provides that every person
holding any office may be removed by the Governor
with the advice of the Council on the address of
both branches of the Legislature. 22
'

"1^..

A vacancy may be declared to exist on a school
committee when a member has resigned, died, or when
he has been absent for more than ninety days . ”23

Superintendents of Schools
It was recognized almost from the beginning of the
pu.Llic school system in Maine that an executive officer of

some kind was needed to implement the local policies of the
^^ Attorney General Report (1961-62), p.

914.*

2l A-ttorney General Report (1952), p* 156*

22 Ibid .

,

p. 155*

23]^ttorney General Report (1950), P» 152.

school committee.

The original statute of 1821 set up a

system of dual control between the school committee and an
official known as the school agent.

The incompatibility of

the two offices could have been predicted from the wording of
the statutes.

The duties of the Committee, on the one hand,

included the examination of the school masters and mistresses
who proposed to teach school within the town or plantation,

and it was further provided that they be empowered to dismiss
any school master or mistress who should be found incapable
The school agent, on the other hand, was

or ui.fit to teach.

Comto be chosen for each school district to share with the

mittee in the control of schools.

The agent *s duties as stated

to provide
were to "hire the school masters and mistresses and
It took
the necessary fuel and utensils for the schools.
of this legislation
only five years from the date of enactment

In
Judicial Court.
for litigation to reach the Maine Supreme
that the authority to hire
a case already cited, it was held
school agent and not the
a school master was vested in the

school committee.

25

persisted until 1893
This system of dual control
abolish the system. As early
despite the repeated attempts to
State
Crosby, first secretary of the
as l81^6, Mr. William G.

annual report that, in his
Board of Education, wrote in his
21^Maine,

Public Laws (1821), c. 67, sec. 7.

25noor V. Mewfield .

1;

Mo.

Ui Oreonl.)

1*1;

(1826).

opinion, the majority of the school agents were incompetent,

neglectful and uninterested in the work of the office.

He

felt that the agents were more interested in the prestige,

profit and local prominence that they might gain than in providing good schools.

He commented at considerable length on

the favoritism shown local teachers, the employment of in-

competent persons as teachers and the petty quarrels
politics

^ich

sind

small

were constantly in evidence, and ho finally

became caustic in his remarks relating to the failure or refusal of district agents to cooperate with the superintending
school committee.

The records reveal a continuing state of unrest and
controversy, resulting in a large number of Supreme Judicial

Court cases, until the repeal of the district system in 1893In 1897 , the act of 1893 which provided that the school

committee might, if the town so voted, elect a superintendent
of schools, was amended, and thereafter this office was mandatory.

This official, the replacement for the school agent,

is recognized legally and professionally as the chief school

official of the local school system.

This position continues

in Maine today as it does in virtually all of the states al-

though the title may vary from one jurisdiction to another.
The necessary professional competence of such a person

was recognized and ably described in 1896 by Mr. W. W. Stetson,

^^William G. Crosby, Second Report of the Board oX
Education (Augusta, Me.; State Board ol^ Education, lo4o)»
p. 16^
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the State Supei*intendent of Public Schools.

These same general

qualifications are sought in candidates for the post today.
Mr. Stetson’s comments were as follows:

To superintend schools intelligently, one needs
scholarship, professional training, and experience in
the work of the school room. He needs to know the
subjects studied, the methods used in giving instruction
and to be familiar with the history, science and art of
education.
He must not only be familiar with the facts taught
in textbooks, but he must also be a student of science,
art, literature, history, and economy. He must know what
the world has done, what it is doing, what it is capable
of doing. He must know men, things, means. He must be
strong of mind, rugged of body, rich in personality. His
work must be his absorbing vocation. To this ho must
give his entire time and devote his best thought. He must
study schools; he must study children. One cannot do and
be all these things unless he has an aptitude for the
work, has prepared for it and gives his whole time to
it. 27

Maine Superintendents have clearly defined powers and

duties spelled out in the statutes in addition to whatever

authority may be delegated to them by the school committee.
A partial list of these duties as written into the law follows;
"1.

He shall bo, ex officio, secretary of the school
committee or board of directors and of any school
building committee chosen by the administrative
unit and shall perform such duties not enumerated
as said committees or board shall direct;

”2.

He shall keep a permanent record of all its votes,
orders and proceedings. He shall place orders for
materials and supplies purchased by vote of the
committee or directors and shall be its agent in
keeping all financial records and accounts;

”3.
-

He shall examine the schools and inquire
proregulations and the discipline thereof and the shall
he
purposes
which
ficiency of the pupils, for

)erin tendent of
W, Stetson, Report of the Si^
Education, 1896),
Common Schools (Augusta, Me.: State Boar< I of

T3V
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visit each school at least the miniuiuin number of
times each term which the joint committee may
designate* He shall make a written report annually
bho condition of the schools for the past year,
with a statement of the condition of school
buildings, the proficiency made by the pupils and
the success attending the modes of instruction and
government thereof, and transmit a copy to the commissioner;
He shall keep a faithful and accurate account of
school finances, and he shall report at least once
a term in writing to each of the several- committees
or directors, including in such report a statement
of the condition of the schools, a financial statement and a statement of the condition of school
buildings and outbuildings in the matter of repair,
cleanliness and sanitary arrangement;
”

5*

-

.

He shall nominate all teachers subject to such
regulations governing salaries and the qualifications
of teachers as the school committee or school
directors shall make, and upon the approval of
nominations by said committee or directors, he
may employ teachers so nominated and approved for
such terms as he may deem proper, subject to the
approval of the school committee or directors. . . .
In case the superintendent of schools and the superintending school committee or school directors fail
to legally elect a teacher, the commissioner shall
have authority to appoint a substitute teacher who
shall serve until such election is made;

”6*-

He shall direct and supervise the work of all teachers

”7*

He shall select textbooks, supplies and apparatus
subject to the approval of the school committee or
school directors and shall make all purchases of the
same under such regulations as the school committee
or school directors shall adopt;

”8.

He shall see to it that all necessary apparatus and
supplies are seasonably distributed to each school
and accurately accounted for and economically used;

”9*

He shall enforce or cause to be enforced all regulations of the school committee or school directors;

"10*

He shall devote hia entire time to superintendence
in the towns oou^rising the union or School
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Administrative District.

II

28

There is lack of agreement, around the country, conschools within
cerning the legal status of a superintendent of
school committee
the educational hierarchy. The status of
been well
members as state agents or state officers has
not so clear.
established. The status of superintendents is
superintendent is a public
Some courts have held that a city
his powers and duties
officer or a state officer, and that

of the public school
relate entirely to the administration
Other
state government
system which is a function of the
is an employee of
opinions hold that a city superintendent
Summer Coun^ v. Nioelx, the
the board. In County Cour t of

Court said

tiie

following i
one who stands in
It is difficult to. see how

nrcunies a public office is.
^
position
it
least,
'^^%g?J^®At^presentrat
sovereignty of the state? At p
the
of
sovereignty
is
education,
Ttfte ^rLJefat^rrL-ectio^
education,
delegated to the board of
a
has been classified as
The Maine superintendent
law and his
position is established by
His
officer.
public
landmark case in Maine on
The
defined.
duties are legally
utes Annotated (1961^), c. 7,
28„ai„e, Revised Stat
sec. l6l.
^^Edwards, op. cit . , p. H5*
Va
v. Hiceli, 121 W.
10
^oiirt Of Summ ers County
767, 6 S.E.

(2d'i

W'p;
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this point is Benson v. Inhabitants of Town of Newfield

This

.

case concerned the illegal dismissal of a teacher and
will be

reported in detail in a later chapter.

Of interest here is a

quote from the opinion which reads as follows;
•
.
.
The superintendent of schools is a public
officer and his acts in that capacity, so long as in line
with the performance of his official duties, are presumed to have been done in accordance with law, for every
person holding office or tinist is presumed to perform his
duties without its violation. 31

With respect to the retirement system, however, a
superintendent is considered to be a state employee or teacher.
a question was directed to the Attorney General as

In

follows:

”Is there any provision in the law to prevent or

bar the position of superintendent of schools from being con-

sidered that of a state en^^loyee?”

replied as follows:
Chapter 60, R.S.

Attorney General Frost

"The only applicable statute is Section 1,

ISMi-y

as amended.

Under this section of the

law, for the purposes of retirement only,

'en^loyees' of the

State of Maine participate in the Maine State Retirement System.

Employees include teachers, and teachers are defined to include
the superintendent employed

in'

any day school within the State."-*

School superintendents are elected by school committees,
school directors, or in the case of a school union by a joint

union committee for terms of not more than five years.

Super-

intendents are not eligible for continuing contracts or tenure
3lBen3on v. Inhabitants of Town of Newfield
^
23, 1 A. 2d 227“ (193B7^
^^Attorney General Report (1954)* P* 21^.9*
-

,

13^ Me.

Sk

status as are teachers.

School committees or school directors

may, by a majority vote of their full membership, after due

notice and Investigation, discharge a superintendent for cause

before the expiration of his elected term.

The superintendent

has the right of appeal of such a dismissal to the commissioner
for a public hearing.
The legality of contracts between a school committee
and the superintendent of schools was considered in a Lewiston
case in 1910.

Mr. Arthur J. Collins was superintendent in

Lewiston in 1907-08.

In April, 1909, he was reelected to the

position for the next year at a salary of $2,000.

In August,

1909, the Lewiston School Committee and Mr. Collins executed

the following contract;

This Agreement, entered into by and between the
Lewiston School Board, party of the first part, and
Arthur J. Collins, party of the second part, is an
agreement of contract to specify and set forth more
fully the election, duties, privileges, tenure of
office, and salary of the said party of the second part
as superintendent of schools as previously voted by the
said Lewiston School Board,
The parties to this contract agree that the election
of
of the party of the second part as superintendent
regular
the
at
part
first
schools by the party of the
meeting of the School Board, April 5,
natural school year August, 1909, to July, 1910, sl^all
that the duties, privileges, and responsibilities
^e party of
be the same as during the past two years, thousand
two
the first part agrees that a salary of
of
party
the
to
paid
be
dollars ($2000.) shall
payments; but
second part in ten (10) equal monthly
part is discharge _^
in case the said party of the second
manner
dLmi.aed. superceded by another, or in any inother
the P®r_^
with
d Anrlved” of his ol‘fi^e , or interfered
foLanoe of hia dutlSI, a ll
c ond
of the
then
<-.v,n thousand dollars
(Italic
and payable.
pg-Pt: 5.hril immediately b^We^
mine)

M

'
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In consideration of the payment of salary and
expenses as above set forth, the party of the second
part agrees to faithfully perform the duties and
obligations as superintendent of the Lewiston Public
Schools .33
Mr. Collins entered upon the performance of his duties

under his appointment and continued his services until
September 6, 1909, when he was summarily dismissed by the
school committee.

The special law in the Lewiston City

Charter under which the committee acted read in part as
follows

Section 2. The superintending school committee of
said city of Lewiston, may exercise all the powers conferred, and shall discharge all the duties imposed,
by law, on superintending school committees; and they
truant
may also appoint a superintendent of schools and
as
compensation
such
officers, for such term and with
of
City
said
of
the superintending school committee
Lewiston may determine. Such superintendent may be
removed at the pleasure of said committee, and any
vacancy shall be filled by their appointment.
year’s salary,
Mr. Collins, in seeking to recover his

been ready at all
contended that, under his contract, having
agreement, he was entitled
times to perform his part of the
to recover his full salary.

The Coxirt ruled otherwise.

Justice Spear’s opinion

follows:
contract the
After conferring the power to
provision:
statute contains this express
intondent may be removed
their
upon tL committee
"^^'tntment S^^Srclausf ^on^trs
superintendent at any
salary autltority to dismiss a

831+

Mo. 220, 77 A
33collins V. r.itv of Lewiston , 107
(1910).
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It does not require the prestate of his services.
ferment of any charge or proffer of any reasons, but
permits action "at the pleasure of said committee.'
The plaintiff’s employment was for the "natural" school
year" without any further agreement. The written contract, would, therefore, seem to have been executed for
the sole purpose of defeating the express provision of
the statute.
<
j
<
in
The contract, as construed by the plaintiff, is
direct conflict with the statute, and completely incontends
hibits its intended operation. The defendant committee
the
that
and
vires
ultra
that the contract was
pccessors of
could not thus deprive themselves or their might at any
the right to exercise an authority, which
imposed upon
moment assume the form of a duty, clearly
them by statute.
^ ^
contract conThis contention must prevail. When a
yield. Otherwl-e,
flicts with a statute, the former must
without even the
repeale^d
statutes could be modified or
approving caress of the referendum.
Contracts
clear.
The implications of this case are

school personnel
negotiated between school committees and
at the state level or
cannot contradict the statutes either
granted by the legislature.
those contained in city charters
between a superintendent
By mutual consent, a contract
Cowan
be altered. Attorney General
and a school committee may
joint
mutual agreement between a
"Upon
that
19l|.3
in
ruled
terms
superintendent of schools, the
a
and
committee
ohool
in
provide for (a) an increase
to
changed
be
can
f a contract
(b) a le^thenof the contract and/or
;alary for the remainder
drawn.
the contract as originally
of
period
the
of
.ng
the
the oourts concerning
The last case to reach
occurred
superintendent of schools
the
of
duties
powers and
^ ^Ibid e

35tfctorney General Report

(^3).

P- ^8
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in
36

In Inhabitants of Town of Farming ton v. William P.
—

an action was brought by the inhabitants of the town

of Farmington to recover town moneys alleged to have been

illegally received and disbursed by William P. Miner, the

superintendent of schools.
were:

(1)

Specifically, the four allegations

that it is the duty of the superintendent to make

personally the annual school canvass and census, and the
employment of another person for that purpose at the expense
of the town was unauthorized; (2) that the reimbursement for

expenses incurred in attending a superintendents' convention

was not a proper charge against the state school funds nor

money raised by the town for the support of the common schools,

nor money which the town is required to appropriate;

(

3)

that

it was an unlawful expenditure of public moneys to provide

for an allowance for the use of the superintendent's automobile in the performance of his official duties; and
(1^)

the superintendent had no authority to hire and pay the

rent for an office for his and the school committee's use.
On all four points the Court ruled in favor of the

defendant, Mr. Miner.

In rendering the opinion, the Court

made several observations which have important implications

for the practicing school superintendents in Maine today.
Excerpts from this opinion are here quoted:
^^Inhabitants of Town of Farmington v. Miner , 133 Me.
162, 175 A. 219 U93it-) *
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.
The School census is the basis of a large
annual apportionment of state school funds to the
several towns and cities. All superintendents of
schools in the state ^ union or otherwise, and regardless of the school population under their supervision,
are required to certify bhese returns annually in order
that the apportionment of state funds may be made as
provided by law. In this provision, we find a legislative recognition of the well-known fact that in
larger cities and towns, and in some of the school
unions, it is entirely impractical, if not impossible,
for the superintendent of schools to personally canvass
the school population and attend to their other necessary supervisory duties, and, whenever it is necessary,
they may employ other persons at the expense of the
town to make the preliminary canvass for the annual
school census. . , .
.
The first item in the account annexed is for
money which the defendant Miner drew as reimbursement
for expenses incurred in attending a superintendent's
convention. His bill for this disbiirsemcnt was approved
in advance by the school committee and paid from the
treasury of the town on the order of the municipal
officers. It does not appear in the case stated from
what appropriations this money was drawn. It came to
the superintendent in an order from the treasurer which
included other items approved by the school committee
It is true that it
and certified by the superintendent.
school funds
state
the
against
was not a proper charge
support
of the
nor money raised by the town for the
and still
however,
common schools. It always has been,
such
to
raise
is within the power of the municipalities
amounts in addition to the required appropriations as
[T]he progress and advance.
.
they may deem proper.
ment of our educational system demands trained superintendents, educated, experienced and in touch with
modern school methods and practices, and it is now
generally recognized that the conventions of superintendents, as well as teachers, have a real educational
value and tend to promote the efficiency of those
attending. Under the broad powers given towns to raise
money for school purposes by our laws, we cannot lay
down the rule that the payment of the expenses of a
superintendent to a convention is an illegal expenditure
.

.

.

.

.

When he was first elected superintendent, the
salary and
loint committee of the towns apportioned his
authorized
added a travel allowance which they were not
However, each year during the first term of
to grant.
school committee
the superintendent's appointment, the
the municipal
and
change
of Farmington approved this
orders on
drawing
by
officers recogniLd its propriety
.

.

.
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the treasury for its payment. Under the statutes then
in forcoj the town was not compelleci to make this payment.
It had a right to do so, however, if it saw fit.
It was not in itself an unlawful expenditure of public
moneys
.
In Section 5 of Chapter 206 of the Private and
Special Laws of 1891, the Act expressly provided that a
suitable and convenient room shall be furnished by the
town for the superintendent’s office and the meetings
of the school committee, wherein shall be kept their
records . . . even if the superintendent of schools and
the school committee did not have authority to hire and
pay the rent of this office without the consent of
municipal officers, the supplemental approving and
ratifying action of the municipal officers binds the

....
.

.

town. 3

The dual control of school committee and school agent

under the old district system was largely eliminated in the
legislation providing for superintendents of schools in 1897.
It is interesting to note that in at least one area, the

employment of teachers, a balance of power still exists.

The

superintendent has the sole authority to nominate teachers
while the school committee has the sole authority to approve
'

or reject the nominations of the superintendent.

While this

balance of power in regard to the selection of teachers has

been generally satisfactory, there have been instances where
the sup jrintendent could not or would not nominate the can-

didate favored by the school committee, nor would the com-

mittee approve the nominee of the superintendent.

This

passed
awkward situation was partially remedied by a statute
that when
in 1913, and still in effect today, which provides
and legally
the superintendent and the committee cannot agree
37 Ibid

60

elect a teacher, the Conimisaioner of Education has the
authority
to appoint a substitute teacher to serve until
such election is

duly accomplished.^®
Summary
This chapter has traced the delegation of authority

for the operation of the public schools from the state to the
local level.

While the authority to create, alter or dissolve

school districts is clearly a matter for the legislature to
decide, the maintenance and operation of these districts is

delegated almost entirely to the local level.
The legislature has provided for the election of
school officers to manage the public schools.

While chosen

by the local electorate, these officers, known as school com-

mittee members or school directors, are agents of the state
and are responsible to the state, rather than the local district, for the performance of their duties.

The powers and duties of these local district officers

have been reviewed in some detail.

Rules and regulations

passed by these officers in a legally constituted meeting
have the force and power of law at the local level, unless
contrary to state statutes.

With the phenomenal growth of the public school
system it became evident that these officers, laymen in the
3 ®Maine,

sec. 161, par.

Revised Statutes Annotated

(I96I4.),

c. 7

,
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field of education for the most part, needed professional

assistance in carrying out their mandate from the legislature.

As a consequence the legislature provided for a

chief local school administrator known as the superintendent
of schools.

While employed locally by the district officers

and serving at their discretion, the school superintendent in

Maine holds a unique position in the administrative structure
of public education.

His powers and duties are clearly de-

fined by the statutes and he is considered by the courts to
be a public official.

By law, he serves as the secretary,

ex officio, of the local school committee and of any school

building committee chosen by the administrative unit which
he serves.

His many duties and responsibilities, as well as

his privileges, sots him apart from all other en^loyees of
the local school district.
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CHAPTER IV

SCHOOL DISTRICT REORGANIZATION
Introduction
As a result of the early delegation to localities of

the power to structure educational administration, a tradition
of local control has developed over the years, based more on

sentiment and political expediency than on efficiency and

economy of operation.

Despite exceptions, the history of

school district consolidation around the country has been for
the most part one of cajoling and wooing rather than one of

state exercise of powers generally recognized to be in the
states' domain.

The interplay of heavy state commitment to

the financial support of education and the equally great degree

of local attachment to the schools has led to a constant con-

flict which has created a variety of statutes on redistricting.
One author, after reviewing court decisions on school district

reorganization in the United States, had the following to say
on the subject:
The litigation of local quarrels concerning the necessary and inevitable reorganization of school districts
makes up one of the moat voluminous and most arid chapters
in American law. • . .
No one should suppose that these cases have any great
intrinsic importance. Their significance is chiefly in
their triviality and in the powerful argument thereby
tacitly made for legislative intelligence and courage.
The need is for state legislatures to accept their
responsibility as law-making representatives of the people,

—
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to sweep aside the. incomparably tangled jungle of
thousands of outmoded districts encumbered with the
legal debris of a century, and give their states a
county-unit system or something closely akin to it.^

The nation's school districts come in all sizes and

shapes and present some interesting contrasts.

Alaska's School

District One, geographically the nation's largest, contains all
the schools of the forty-ninth state except those of twenty

towns and villages.

district.

Hawaii is actually one large statewide

But most school districts are town and township

units, controlled by an elected board of education.

there were 127

fi(-22

In 1932 »

school districts in the United States,

By

1961, reorganization efforts had whittled the number to

36,880 and by 1965 to 26,983.^

Despite the reduction in numbers of districts, half of
the nation's school districts in the late 1960's had fewer than

ten teachers, and in the early 1960's there were more than
3
9,000 elementary schools with only one teacher.

School district reorganization in New England has, in
country.
general, been even slower than in other sections of the

districts of
In a 1962 report,^ the breakdown for reorganized
"Court Decisions on Reorganization,"
(January, 1914 9 ).
Nation's Schools
England
^David L. Peterson, "School Districts: New
University of Maine
c^tvTe." Maine Law Review (Portland, Maine:
A National Study Group has su^
9.
llVooi o FLaw, 1 %U)Tp
districts necos
gosted 10,000 as the maximum number of school
on National
Commission
fary in the country. See President's
Goals, Goals for Americans (I 960 ),
Pi ge s^..
3 "Education in Surging Numbers," The Reader's
(Pleasantville
F amily Reference Series, These United States
The Reader's Digest Association, 19 o 8 ), p. IOI4..
N, Y, :
^John Hodgen, "Regionalization in Massachusetts: A
^M. M, Chambers,

-

,

TU
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.

the six states was as follows:

Now Hampshire- -one 9-12 dis-

trict, six 1-12 districts, total (7); Rhode Island

— two

7-12

districts, total (2); Connecticut— seven 7-12 districts, one
9-12 district, total (8); Maine

— twenty-two

K-12 districts,

total (22); Vermont— four 7-12 distriots; two 9-12 districts,
total (6); and Massachusetts--ei^teen 9-12 districts, twentytwo 7-12 districts, two K-6 districts, one K-12 district, total
(

14.

3 ).

More recent figures will be included in a later section

as a basis for comparison, but the statistics suggest that the

solution to the problem has been something less than spectacular.
Major Problems in Redistricting
There are numerous problems in consolidating school

districts in the United States.

Typical of these are the

traditions of local control, finance, geography, urban problems,
ethnic problems and lack of state leadership.

These problems

have been widely reported in the literature and will not be

discussed here.

Redistricting problems peculiar to Maine,

however, will be included as a backdrop to the succeeding
that
sections on redistricting legislation and the litigation

has arisen as a result of it.

Geography .

Maine ranks 39th in size among the states

School
Progress Report," Focus (Boston, Mass.: Massachusetts
Building Assistance Commission, 1962), pp. 4l“4b«,
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and yet has a total population of less than a million people or

969,265 as of the I960 census.

The population density is only

twenty-nine persons per square mile.^
Other interesting features about Maine's geography include the following:

the highly indented coast, if unraveled

into a straight line, would stretch from New York to Arizona
and off this coast are many islands inhabited year-round; one
county, Aroostook, is larger than Connecticut and Rhode Island

combined; and within Maine's borders lie 17,000,000 acres of

forests, more than 2,000 lakes and 5,000 rivers.

These facts point up one of the major problems in

forming larger school districts, namely transportation.

In

fact, one small hamlet, Estcourt, located in the extreme north-

west tip of the state, has no road leading to any other section
of the state I

The pupils walk across a bridge to the Province

of Quebec where they attend school on a tuition basis.

Finance .

While finance is a nationwide problem in

education, Maine has extremes in economic differences between

districts which would be difficult to match anywhere.

One

commonly used yardstick in school finance is the amount of
assessed valuation per student in average daily attendance.
valuation per
One report states that Maine has a range in local

pupil from $1,727 to $620,000.^

These inequities cause

Manual,
^Maine Register, State Yea r-Book and Legislative
9o.
Vol. XCVIII (Portland: Fred L. Tower Co., 1967), P«

m^

A Stat e
^Charles S. Benson, The Cheerm Prospec t;
Mifflin
Hougnion
on the Future of American Education tBoaton;
Company, lVhJ>), p, lii>»
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resentment among taxpayers and tend to keep the richer districts

from joining with their less fortunate neighbors.

This problem

has occurred in Maine where school districts, within whose
limits are located large paper mills, have been reluctant to
form larger districts with neighboring towns without such industry.

Also, school districts along the coastal areas, where

real estate valuation is higher than inland, have been reluctant
to join with their "inland" neighbors.

Local Control

The history of local control of educa-

.

tion in Maine has been traced in previous chapters.

It will

be remembered that the original district system which provided
for several school districts with their own school committees

within one town or township existed for approximately threevested
quarters of a century before local control was finally
school committee.
in the town or city itself with one general
were authorized to
Shortly after this important change, towns

purpose of employing
join together into school unions for the
althou^ local control of
a Joint superintendent of schools,
committee of each
education was still vested in the school

member town.
of the more common
This type of control is still one
several towns Joining together
ones and the newer concept of
district to be controlled by a
to form a school administrative
not
the several towns is still
board of directors representing

popular in some areas*
Tradition.

reorganization
One other impediment to
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which cannot be underestimated is tradition.

Local citizens

have a considerable amount of pride in their own school system,
and in their high school in particular.

It seems to matter

little, in the minds of many residents, how small or inadequate
the schools may be.

Many of the voters graduated from these

schools and have a strong seinitimental attachment to them.

Many

such schools have had at least one outstanding athletic team
that has won statewide publicity and recognition for the school

and the town.

To many people, the loss of the local high school

through consolidation means loss of identity, as well as control.

One high school with a total enrollment of eleven

pupils, located on an island, recently won the statewide

basketball championship.

The school's team brought much

glory and publicity to the island as well as the school.

Con-

decide to close
sider the reluctance with which the voters will
mainland to a conthe school and send their pupils to the
eventually arrives.
solidated school, when such a time to vote
and tradition is
The problem of overcoming local sentiment
pushing consolidation.
obviously of no small concern to those

Legislation
tv school Districts .

The adequacy of the town

quesfor school purposes has been
aa the administrative unit
serious challenges have come
tioned repeatedly, but the most
since the end of World War II.

Maine, aa all other states,

postwar baby boom, the increased
has felt the pressures of the

68

demands from the public for quality education as well as the

need for more diversified programs to meet the needs of all
pupils.

Along with the need for increased services, expanded

programs and additional school plant facilities have been the

ever-increasing costs of education as reflected in higher
salaries for teachers, increased costs of books and supplies

and higher costs of school construction.
In keeping with the trend in other states to form

larger administrative units to share costs and to keep duplication to a minimum, Maine passed its first legislation in

Known as the Community School District Law,

7

19li.7

it permits two or

more towns to Join together in a Community School District to

operate Joint schools.

The primary intent in this legislation

seems to have been to encourage towns to Join together as one

administrative unit for secondary education although it is
possible to form Community Schools at the elementary level.
the
These districts are operated by two boards, one known as

comboard of trustees, and the other as the community school

mittee.

The duties of the former read as follows:

election
of the affairs of said district, except
and
schools
or
school
said
in
of teachers who shall serve
the
study,
of
courses
the
the fixing of their salaries,
to the
terms of school and other matters pertaining
be
shall
education of pupils, which matters
managed by said
by a community school committee, shall be
board of trustees.

*7

(195i^)»
Maine, Revised Statutes. Annotated

sec. 121.

®Ibid.
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The community school committee has all the powers and

duties with respect to the community school as are conferred
9
by the general statutes to superintending school committees.

It is interesting to note that the construction, care and

maintenance of buildings

are

the responsibility of one board

under this legislation while the actual operation of the
schools is under another.
This legislation is pemissive and carries with it no

financial inducements for towns to form Community School Disin the
tricts other than the local opportunity to share costs

construction and operation of schools.

Except for the earlier

to share in
union legislation which permits two or more towns

supervisory personnel,
the cost of a superintendent and other
districts were
this represents the first time that local
of their schools.
encouraged to share costs in the maintenance
never really caught
The Community School District idea
districts in operaAt its peak there were eight
in operation. While blazing
tion. As of 1968, Just two remain
administrative units, the legisthe trail for larger school
needs of the majority of the
lation seems not to have met the
by newer legislation, first

on, however.

people and has been reinforced

the Sinclair Act.
enacted in 1957, commonly called
reorganization statute
Before discussing this latest

.

Maine
the one case to reach the
review
to
appropriate
it is
Community
relative to the formation of
supreme Judicial Court

^Ibid., sec. 3^1*
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School Districts.

Opinions from the decision have implications

for the more recently organized school administrative districts
and have been, in fact, frequently referred to in later decisions.
In Knapp v. Swift River Valley Community School Pi strict ,

facts of the case are interesting.
of Roxbury voted:

the

On March 5» 1956, the Town

to join with the Town of Byron to form the

Swift River Valley Community School District; to authorize the

District to acquire and hold property of a value not in excess
of $1^.0,000; and to authorize the District to borrow money and

issue its bonds and notes in an amount not in excess at any
time of $36,000.

On March 19, 1956, like votes were passed at

the town meeting of Byron.

The trustees of the District were subsequently appointed

by the municipal officers of each town.

On March 21, 1956, the

State as retrustees filed their return with the Secretary of
certificate on
quited by statute and the Secretary issued a
organized as a politic
March 23 that the District "had been duly
'

and corporate entity."

On March 26 the District borrowed

$5,000 from a bank.
the Town of Byron from
We come now to the action of
6 at a special tcwn
which th® litigation arose. On April
against the very propositions
meeting, the Town of Byron voted
against
That is, Byron voted: - (1)
it had voted for on March 19.
school district; (2) against
joining with Roxbury to form the

School pistri^,
lOxnapp V. Hwift River V aliev Coicmunity
119!?/ )•
152 Me. 350, 129 A. 2d 790
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authorizing the District to acquire and hold property; and
(3)

against authorizing the District to borrow money.

In brief,

the Town of Byron did a complete turnabout on April 6 from its

action of March 19.
The plaintiffs, ten taxable inhabitants of the Town of

Byron brou^t suit to enjoin the defendants, the trustees of
the newly formed Community School District, from borrowing or

expending funds since, by their contention, the action of Byron
in voting against the District on April 6 destroyed the District.

The ”ten taxable inhabitants” statute under which the

action was brought reads in part as follows:

When counties, cities, towns, school districts,
village or other public corporations, for a purpose not
authorized by law, vote to pledge their credit or to
raise money by taxation or to exempt property therefrom
or to pay money from their treasury, or if any of their
officers or agents attempt to pay out such money for
such purpose, the court shall have equity jurisdiction
on petition or application of not less than 10 taxable
inhabitants thereof, briefly setting forth the cause of
complaint
The defendants contended that the "ten taxable in-

habitants” statute did not apply and that the Town of Byron’s
withdrawal from the District was not legal.
Court agreed.

With this the

Justice Williamson said in part;

[W]e are not inclined to seek subtle differences
in the meanings of words. The plain fact is that if the
plaintiffs are correct, Byron has destroyed The Swift
River Valley Community School District. Roxbury had no
part in the Byron vote whether we call it a vote to
dissolve the District or to suspend its activities. If
.

.

.

^^Ibid.
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the right of the District to do business depends from
day to day upon the votes of town meetings first
granting, then taking away, and perhaps again granting
rights, it is apparent that a District, duly organized,
would not be worthy of the name of a quasi -municipal
corporation with rights and powers, duties and obligations of its own.
Of particular significance to school officials is the

following excerpt:

... The control over a district to be exercised by
member
town is limited by the terms of the statute.
a
Each town selects trustees and members of a school committee, who then serve the district, not the town
Their authority is determined by the Statutes reTating
to community school districts and not by the will of
.

the town.
The district is a creature of legislative action.
Its creation and likewise its dissolution are solely
within the power of the Legislature . The Legislature
has made full, complete, and readily understandable
provisions for withdrawal of a town from a community
school district. Withdrawal requires not only action
by the town, but action by the Legislature as well.
(Italics mine)

Withdrawal from a Community School District is still

permissible under existing law but the town in question must
vote to withdraw by a two-thirds vote and then receive

authorization by special act of the legislature.

No withdrawal

is allowed while there is indebtedness outstanding.

It is

from
appropriate to point out at this time that withdrawal
newer type district
a school administrative district, the
under the
authorized by the Sinclair Act, was permitted
in 1961 to prooriginal Act of 1957 but this act was amended
school administrative
hibit withdrawal.’-^ Dissolution of a
^^ Ibid .
^3 ibid .

’^Peterson, op. cit ., p* 168.
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district is still possible and will be discussed in the section
to follow.

School administrative districts

.

After approximately

ten years of experience with the Comniunity School District

legislation and its relative lack of success in creating
larger administrative units, new legislation was passed in the

form of Legislative Document 1637, "An Act Relating to Educational Aid and to Clarify the Procedure of Reorganization of
15
Commonly called the
School Administrative Units," in 1957.

Sinclair Act, after its sponsor, this is perhaps the most
significant piece of legislation relating to education to be

passed in Maine since the demise of the school district system
in 1893.
Unlike previous legislation pertaining to school districts, the Sinclair Act provides certain financial rewards

from
for the formulation of school administrative districts
the state.

be
This one factor, more than any other, seems to

reorganization in Maine,
the key to success in school district
as elsewhere.

Under this legislation, school administrative

reimbursement bonus
districts are entitled to a 10 percent
costs. They are
from the state for their annual operating
for school construction
also entitled to state reimbursement
upon the combined
costs of from 18 to 66 percent depending

valuation of the district.
passing this legislation
The intent of the legislature in
c. 9, sec. 211
^^Maine, Revised Statutes (1957),
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is clearly stated in Section 211:
It is declared to be the policy of the State to
encourage the development of school administrative
units of sufficient size to provide a more equalized
educational opportunity for pupils, to establish
satisfactory school programs and to achieve a greater
uniformity of school tax rates among the School Administrative units and a more effective use of the
public funds expended for the support of public
schools. do

While the formation of school administrative districts
is completely voluntary and requires an affirmative vote of

all of the participating towns, it was evidently the intent
of the legislature to include all towns and school administra-

tive units under a minimum size within a reasonable time.

Section 212 reads in part as follows:
.
The State Board of Education shall, after a
master plan for school administrative district organization is presented to the 103rd Legislature, as ordered
in Senate Paper 453 of the 102nd Legislature and accepted
by the 103rd Legislature as presented with modifications,
approve the formation of School Administrative Districts
only in accordance with the plan adopted. It further is
the intent of the Legislature that all municipalities
with fewer than $00 resident high school pupils and not
in School Administrative Districts shall, within a reasonable time after adoption of the master plan for school
administrative district organization, join into School
Administrative Districts in accordance with the master
.

.

plan. ^7

A master plan was presented to the 103i*d Legislature but was

not accepted and that part of Section 212 quoted above has

been repealed.^®
^^ Ibid

Evidently a master plan for the entire state,

.

^7 Ibid .

,

sec. 212.

"Report of Legislation Enacted
by the 103rd Legislature Relating to Education” (Augusta,
State Department of Education, 19^7 )» P» 22.
jjaine :
iQj^ermit S. Nickerson,
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mandatory for the smaller districts, is a major step which the
legislature is not yet ready to take.
As might be expected, the legal implications and con-

stitutionality of this new major legislation in the field of

education were soon to be challenged.

The remainder of this

section will be devoted to a review of the cases to reach the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court on the Sinclair Act.
The first questions to be raised were propounded by
the State Senate in an order dated January 13» 1958 and answered

in an Opinion of the Justices on January

II4.,

1958,

in what

would appear to the layman to be a remarkably speedy response
in comparison with the usual speed with which the wheels of
justice turn.
It might be noted at this point that official opinions

from the Justices of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, like
those from the Attorney General's office, carry considerable

weight and influence but do not constitute the law.
court of law necessarily bound by these opinions.

Nor is any
No loss an

is
authority than Justice Cornish pointed out in 1912 that "It

of
true that the opinions of Justices given at the request

do not
either Branch of the Legislature or of the Executive,
cases, yet
have the binding force of decisions in adjudicated
reasons upon which they
they carry weight in proportion to the

are based.
^^ Opinion of the Justices , 153 Me.

1|.69,

li;5 A.

2d 250

(1958).

^^Sawyer v. Gilmore

,

109 Me. 169, 83 A. 673 (1912).

,
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The complete text of the Opinion is included in Appendix

For purposes of the present discussion it is sufficient to

A.

quote the major points on the constitutionality of the legis-

lation as follows:
The Legislature did not violate the Constitution
in delegating authority to the State Board of Education and
the School District Commission to carry out the provisions
of the Act.
A School Administrative District organized under the
Act is a "body politic and corporate." It is a quasimunicipal corporation of the familiar pattern of school,
The indebtedwater, recreational, and sewerage districts.
ness of a School Administrative District thus is not the
indebtedness of such municipalities.
The limitation on municipal indebtedness applies to
cities and towns and not to other entities, or, as here,
a School Administrative District.
Municipalities providing for their public school
system by the medium of School Administrative Districts
will nevertheless thereby be making suitable provision
fop the support and maintenance of public schools, and by
ppoportional contributions to the expense incurred
by such Districts will be in compliance with both the
letter and spirit of the Constitution. The Legislature,
the
by making provision therefore, will have satisfied it.
upon
imposed
mandatory constitutional requirements
fulfill such
As for home rule, municipal plebiscites
requirements. The creation of a body politic and coror license
porate is not the granting of a franchise prohibition.
The
within the meaning of the constitutional
license
or
proposed Act contains no grant of any franchisemeans of
by
mechanics
provide
but does no more than to
action to form
which municipalities may initiate voluntary
School Administrative Districts.
^
^ the
of
The Act proposed observes the requirements state
ConsStutio/for equal taxation by adopting the
valuation.
as
oases include questions of procedure
.

--

.

.

^

The following

well as constitutionality.

interesting to speculate

as to

In reviewing these oases it is
whether these procedural questions

^^ noinion of the Justices . 153 «e- 469. 145 A. 2d 250

(1958).
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were raised in the interests of judicial nicety or as stumbling
blocks to preserve local control as long as possible.
The first case to reach the Supreme Judicial Court was
22
McGary v, Barrows in I960.
This was indeed a landmark case

and has been referred to repeatedly in subsequent litigation.

An action for a declaratory Judgement was brought by ten tax-

payers and residents of Farmington designed to test the con-

stitutionality of the statutes under which School Administrative

District No. 9, comprising the Towns of Farmington, Chesterville
and Industry, was organized.

Specifically, the taxpayers argued that:

(1)

the Act

violated Article VIII of the State Constitution in that towns
thereby escape an obligation to support and maintain public
schools, and are also deprived of the responsibility for the

operation and control of schools within their jurisdiction;
(2)

there was an unlawful delegation to the School District

Commission in violation of the constitutional provisions relating to the separation of powers under the State Constitution; (3) the section which empowered the Commission,

without notice, hearing, or right of appeal, to issue a
certificate of organization, deprived them of property without
due process; and

(Ij.)

that the Act impaired the obligation of

contracts in violation of Article
Constitution, and Article

I,

I,

Section 10 of the U.S.

Section 2 of the Maine Constitution.

Administrative
The Court held for the defendant School
^^ McGary v. Barrows , 1^6 Me. 2^0 (I960).
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District No. 9.

Excerpts from the decision which answer the

allegations above in the order in which they are stated follow:

Municipalities providing for their public school system
by the medium of School Administrative Districts will
nevertheless thereby be making suitable provision for the
support and maintenance of public schools, and by their
proportional contributions to the expense incurred by such
Districts will be in compliance with both the letter and
spirit of the Constitution.
The School District Commission is an administrative agency designed by the Legislature to administer the
Sinclair Act and thus to make effective the declaration of
The Commission exists "for the purpose of
policy.
promoting, developing and adjusting a state plan for the
creation of efficient School Administrative Districts
throughout the State and for the purpose of approving
applications for the organization of School Administrative
.

.

.

.

.

.

Districts ."
The desirability and practical need of some such
agency, whether it is a board, commission or officer to
administer the Act is apparent. The Legislature cannot
be expected to investigate each situation throughout the
State relating to the new school policy and to make the
findings required to meet the standard set by the LegisThat the Legislature has the power to underlature.
take this task and the right to exercise this power at any
the
time or in any case, does not deny the authority of
adminin
responsibilities
Legislature to place important
istration upon any agency such as the School District ComIt
The Commission does not make law.
mission.
administers the established law.
.

.

.

.

.

.

of the state for
A school district, being an auxiliary
provide for its
purposes of education, the legislature may
violating the
creation, control, and regulation, without
property ri^ s
due process guaranty, with respect to the
•
*
owners therein. •
of the district or of property
established
trustee
or
school district is a public agency
®
to
to carry out the policy of the State
and control
•

.

agencies,
The Legislature may change such
direct what shall be done with
the property f
school property is public property,
taxpayers residing
incorporated district and not of the

within it.
‘

the formation of the
in' voting upon’the'question of’

responsibility
the district to assume full

or amor
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the following listed indebtedness now outstanding
in

the
^nicipalities and school districts comprising the School
Administrative

District under consideration."
The intention of the Legislature is clear, namely,
that
sinking funds and other moneys dedicated for payment
of
particular indebtedness assumed by the School Administrative District be used for such purposes and none
other.
We cannot, however, anticipate issues, constitutional or otherwise, which might arise in the
application of this provision of the statute to a
particular set of facts. No given situation is presented
on the record for our consideration 23
.

These rather strongly worded statements from the Court,
once again reinforce the concept of education as a state function
and responsibility.

They also confirm the authority of the

legislature to create, alter, or dissolve local school districts
for the purposes of carrying out the provisions of Article VIII
of the Constitution.

Another important legal implication

arising from this case is the firm conviction that in joining
school administrative districts, towns while losing local control in part, are fulfilling their obligation to provide for

public schools.

Finally, the Court leaves little doubt that

school districts are but auxiliary arms of the state and that
the legislature may provide whatever machinery or agencies
as are necessary for the creation, control, and regulation of

such districts.
A second case reached the Maine Supreme Judicial Court

from Aroostook County in 1961.^^

This litigation was concerned

almost entirely with the mechanics of proper organizational
23 Ibid .
i

Blackstone v. Rollins

157 Me. 8$ (1961).

80

procedure

Ten residents and taxpayers of the Town
of Perhara, one
of six towns comprising School Administrative
District No. 2,
brought an action to declare the acts of
the directors of this

District to be null and void, and to seek a
declaratory judgement
that the District did not exist since it was
illegally
organized.

The Town of Perham had voted to withdraw from the
District.

The

taxpayers made the following allegations in their suit:

that

(1)

the Town of Perham was not a member of the District because
the

District was not in existence at the time when the Town of

Perham voted to withdraw from the District; (2) that the
directors did not properly organize; (3) that the vote by the

Town of Washburn to assume its proportionate share of the

indebtedness of the District was not in conformity with the
law and invalid;

([;.)

that the District, not having been properly

organized, made the acts of the directors null and void; and
(5) that the operating budget was invalid since it was

allegedly approved at an illegal meeting because no voting list
was used to secure the majority vote necessary.

Due to certain irregularities in the manner of pleading

by the plaintiffs, not all of the above points were considered.
The taxpayers’ appeal was denied, however, by the Court,

Once

again, the Court ruled that actions of school authorities, taken
,

in good faith, need not necessarily adhere to the technical

accuracy of a Judicial tribunal in matters of organization and
procedure.

Justice Dubord declared in part that:
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lifiving b© 0 n decidsd in th© McGary cqsg
as
^ ^
well
as in several other decisions of thl's court that
the
Legislature may create school districts without even
referring the matter to the people of the communities
involved, it inevitably follows that the Legislature may
validate, reconstitute and establish a school district,
the original organization of which may be clouded with
^ilure of strict compliance with statutory provision^
relating to procedure
In the case of a school administrative district, organized under the Sinclair Act,
such legislative act of validation precludes successful
attack against all acts relating to organization occurring
prior to the date of the certificate of organization issued
by the Main© School District Commission. 25 (Italics mine)
.

In considering the legality of the operating budget. Justice

Dubord said the following which is important for school directors
operating today’s Districts to note:
If a budget for the operation of the school administrative district is not approved prior to April 1st in
any given year, the budget as submitted by the school
directors for operational expenses, reserve fund and
capital outlay purposes shall be automatically considered
the budget approved for operational expenses in the
ensuing year.^°
It should be emphasized that while a majority vote is needed

for the approval of the budget for a school administrative district, it is a majority vote of the district voters, not the

member towns.

Thus, while the budget is considered separately

by each member town at its own town meeting, a negative vote

by any one town will not defeat the budget unless the aggregate
vote in all towns fails to be a majority vote.
In the early days of the Sinclair Act, several other

attempts were made by member towns either to withdraw from
^^ Ibid .
^^Ibid.
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newly X^ormed school administrative districts, to
dissolve them,
or to prove their creation to be illegal, through

court actions.

A review of these cases would add no new guidelines to those

already presented.
V.

Me.

[|.01

Elwell

,

The interested reader is referred to:
156 Me. 505 (I960); Peavy v. Nickerson

(1962); and School Administrative District No.

Maine School District Commission

.

3

158

.

v.

158 Me, 420 (1962).

The ability of individual towns to withdraw from a

school administrative district constitutes one of the key problems of encouraging voluntary reorganization.

The basic problem

is deciding between the extremes of legislation so final that

no one will Join, or so loose that a dissatisfied town can dis-

rupt the new district at will.

As pointed out earlier, with-

drawal from a Community School District is still possible,
but withdrawal from a school administrative district is not.

Dissolution of a school administrative district in
Maine must be done with the approval of the State Board of

Education which is in a position to protect the rights of
creditors.

Under the law, dissolution is illegal if there is

outstanding indebtedness in the District.

The petition to

dissolve must carry a two-thirds majority vote of the petitioning

member towns and then a majority vote of all of the voters in
the District member towns.

Only one attempt to dissolve a

District has thus far been tried in Maine, in School Administrative District No. 3 »

failed.

27

School Administrative District No. 3 v Maine School
District Commission, 13 ^ Me. 420 (1962).
^*^
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A number of rather specific questions
of concern only

to

local officials at the time have been answered
by the
Attorney General but are not of sufficiently general
interest
to be included here.
The reader is referred to "Attorney
tfie

General Findings Related to Education. "28

one question of

general interest was raised in 196 [|., however, inquiring as to
whether the State Board of Education has the authority to
refuse to permit the formation of a school administrative
district.

The Attorney General answered as follows:

"According

to general law, the State Board of Education may disapprove

the applications submitted by local school committees

.

2^

Current Progress

While it is not the primary purpose of this study to

consider legislation or judicial decisions which affect the

administration of the public schools in any state other than
Maine, it is of value in some instances to review what is

happening in other jurisdictions with similar problems.

Such

is the case with school district reorganization.

As stated in the introduction to this chapter, progress

in school district reorganization around the country has been
slow and painful.

Some states have been more arbitrary and

courageous in exercising their authority and responsibility
than others.

The literature on this subject is voluminous

2®state School Boards Association, Attorney Generals
Findings Related to Education (Orono, Maine: State School
Boards Association, 1966
pp. 32 - 35
)

,

*

2^ Attorney General Report (I 96 I4.), p.

214.9*

and readily available to the interested reader
and will not
here be reported. It might be of interest, however,

to cite

two examples of what can bo done on a statewide basis
in re-

districting with strong legislative support.

The Nevada

Legislature, in 1956, summarily abolished all of the 222 school

districts in the state and reorganized them into 17,^^

Mississippi’s 1953 reorganization law withhold state aid from
districts not organized to the state’s satisfaction which re-

sulted in a reduction in the number of districts from over
3,000 to less than 150 by 1961.^^
Of more interest to Maine school officials is the

current status in New England.

In attempting to compare

statistics from state to state, the reader should be warned
that^ two

major problems exist, that of semantics and the

lack of uniformity in reporting facts on an annual basis, since
some states define a year as a calendar year while others use
the federal fiscal year (July 1 through June 30) as their basis

for reporting figures.
The first of these problems can best be explained by

listing a few of the titles by which school districts are

described in New England.

School districts, depending upon

the state in question, include the following:

school unions;

school supervisory unions; community school districts; school

administrative districts; school districts; union districts;
^^Peterson, op. cit.
^^Ibid., p.

11^.8.

,

p.

ll|.7

,
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regional school districts; regional vocational school districts;

reorganized school districts; and cooperative school districts.
The lack of uniformity in defining the various grade

levels included in these districts presents yet another problem.

Without boring the reader with all of the possible com-

binations, suffice it to say that any combination of two or
more consecutive grade levels from kindergarten through grade

twelve may constitute a school and/or a school district de-

pending upon the state.

There is, as a matter of fact, one

interstate school district in New England which includes pupils

from grades 7-12 from New Hampshire and Vermont.

Adding to this

the inherent confusion in describing schools as primary, inter-

mediate, elementary, middle, grammar, junior high, high school,
and secondary, one must conclude that in comparing statistics

from state to state, or even from district to district within
one state, it- is difficult, even for the professionals, to
arrive' at meaningful conclusions.

Despite the obvious difficulties in state-to-state
provide the
comparisons, the following figures are included to
the past six
reader with some type of index of progress during

in the
The figures for 1962 were included earlier
these same figures
chapter. For the convenience of the reader

years.

1968 are reported in the
as well as the current figures for

table below.
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REORGANIZED SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN NEW ENGLAND
State

1962^

1968^

Connecticut

8

11

3

Massachusetts

43

51

8

Maine

22

61

39

New Hampshire

7

21

14

Rhode Island

2

3

1

Vermont

6

16

10

^Hodgen, op, cit .

,

Increas

pp,

^Based on interviews with officials of the State
Departments of Education of the New England States, April 8,
1968
.

Since it is not apparent from the figures above, it

should be noted that only two states, Maine and New Hampshire,
are redistricting from K-12.

Twenty of New Hampshire’s

twenty-one districts are K-12 or 1-12 and all sixty-one of

Maine’s districts are K-12.
Admittedly, these figures are somewhat misleading in
that they do not reflect the total number of school districts

in each of the states.

There has been, as a matter of fact,

an increase in the number of school districts in Massachusetts

during the past few years.

This is due to the fact that new

ones
regional districts have been superimposed over existing

without dissolving the latter.
^^Ibid., p. 150 .

In interviewing the officials

87
rroni the six

New England states, however, an attempt was made

to obtain the number of reorganized districts whore two or more

existing districts were merged to form a larger administrative
unit.

But, as pointed out earlier, it is next to impossible to

obtain meaningful statistioa from state to state so that direct
comparisons can be made.

It is unmistakably clear in Maine,

however, that the number of school administrative units is

decreasing and that larger, more efficient districts are being

organized from K-12 at a reasonably fast rate in comparison

with the other New England states.
Summary
It has been pointed out in previous chapters of this

study that education is basically a state function.

This

authority, for the most part, has been delegated to local

school districts.

Local control of education is a cherished

tradition in the United States but the balance between effi-

ciency of operation and preservation of local control has become increasingly difficult to maintain.

Education has be-

come such a huge and expensive enterprise that the small

administrative unit is beset with almost insurmountable
obstacles, not the least of which is that of financing the

educational program that society demands today.
The consolidation of school districts has been a slow
and painful process everywhere.

There is perhaps no other

so closely
governmental function wherein the average voter is
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affected.

Sentiment for local control is strong.

To many,

the public schools offer the last opportunity
for the exercise

of such control.

Indeed, many school bond issues are defeated,

not because the voters are against new schools, but
because
this is one of the few remaining areas where the voter
can

impede the trend of ever-higher taxes, by a direct negative
vote.

While consolidation has been slow, it has been steady,
as reflected by the figures quoted earlier.

Maine has gone

through four major phases of school district reorganization:
the original school district system in which towns maintained

several school districts, each with their own school committee; the supervisory union district in which two or more
towns combine for the purposes of employing a professional

school superintendent; the community school district in which
two or more towns combine for the purpose of constructing and

operating a school; and finally, the school administrative
district in which two or more towns combine to operate and

maintain a complete program from K-12 under a board of school
directors representing the member towns.
Despite the numerous problems in reorganization pointed
out earlier, Maine has a commendable record in this field.

In

the ten years that the Sinclair legislation has been in effect,
some sixty-one districts have been formed and are in operation.

The number of school administrative districts now outnumbers
the supervisory unions which have been so popular in Maine since
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the turn of the century.

This process of reorganization has not been easy as

evidenced by the number of court cases on the subject.

More

litigation has been precipitated by the Sinclair Act than by
any other single piece of legislation in Maine's educational

history.
The legal principles seem clear, however.

It is the

expressed intent of the legislature to include eventually all
school administrative units, except the very largest, in a
school administrative district.

While the first master plan

for redistricting the entire state was defeated, there is no

reason to doubt that the legislature will eventually adopt
such a plan.
Meanwhile, a number of factors are working to encourage
the formation of school administrative districts.
of legislation passed by the 103rd Legislature,

As a result

Maine's

elementary schools must, for the first time, be approved and
accredited.

Also, for the first time, Maine's private schools

must meet certain standards including standard certification
of teachers.

«

The state subsidy foundation program is being

reviewed in an attempt to equalize state aid among the towns,
depending upon local valuation.

These factors, and others,

in Maine, which
all suggest that school district reorganization
be accelerated in
has already made a major breakthrough, will

the future.

^^Nickerson, op

.

cit

,

p. 27
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CHAPTER V

LIABILITY OP SCHOOL DISTRICTS, SCHOOL OFFICERS
TEACHERS, AND OTHER EMPLOYEES
Introduc t ion

Litigation in connection with injuries to school

pupils is almost nonexistent in Maine.

Only one case has

reached the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in this field.

This

makes the general subject of no less concern to the Maine
school official, however.

This chapter will concern itself

with the general laws of negligence and the implications of
court decisions from other jurisdictions which can serve as

guidelines for Maine school officials.
All school personnel are in potential danger spots

that may leave them open to court actions alleging negligence

insofar as pupil injuries are concerned.

This is, of course,

truer for teachers than for others because of the particular

subjects they teach or activities with which they are connected.

Accidents to pupils may take place anywhere on the
school premises, the school playground, the corridors and

stairways of school buildings, or the regular classroom;
injuries may occur during athletic activities, in gymnasiums,
science laboratories or shop classes, or during field trips.
School administrators and school bus drivers are often concerned
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with injuries pupils sustain in school
transportation, whether
furnished by district-owned buses, or by
privately
contracted

buses.

All school employees face the
possibility of being
sued by injured pupils, or their
parents, for alleged negligence.
It is in order, therefore, to consider
briefly the law
of negligence as it applies to public
schools.^

Liability for negligence in connection with personal
injury is known as tort liability.
one person against another.

A tort is a legal wrong by

Torts typically include injuries

to the person or property of another, but may also
involve

damage to less tangible interests such as reputation, privacy
or freedom from other forma of "nuisance."

Torts are generally

divided between intentional and negligent wrongs.

Among the

intentional torts--those in which the wrongdoer deliberately
and knowingly injures his victim--are assault, battery, and
some cases Involving defamation of character such as libel

and slander.

Negligent torts include injury or damage arising

out of carelessness or recklessness without any deliberate

attempt or design to do harm to an individual.
Negligence

Negligence defined

.

Personal liability of school per-

sonnel for damages to pupils injured because of their own

^Material for this section has been adapted from, "Who
is Liable for Pupil Injuries," National Education Association,
A Report Prepared by The NEA Research Division (Washington:

National Commission on Safety Education, National Education
Association, 1963)»
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negligent conduct is Judged by the same general
legal principles that impose liability on private individuals
whose
negligence harms others. Because of the relationship
that

members of the school staff have to pupils, referred to
as

—P‘-j-P^Q_P^^ddtis

2
,

there is a legal duty to exercise care to

prevent injuries to them.
The evolution of the law of negligence has resulted in

the development of a group of elements necessary to the success-

ful maintenance of a suit based on negligence.

These elements

are, generally, as follows;
"(1) Duty to conform to a standard of behavior which
will not subject others to an unreasonable risk
of injury.
"(2) Breach of that duty--failure to exercise due care.
•"(3) A sufficiently close casual connection between the
conduct or behavior and the resulting injury.

”(4) Damage or injury resulting to the rights or interests

or another. "3

What kind of conduct constitutes negligence in the eyes
of the law to make a school employee legally responsible for

damages?

Negligence is any conduct which falls below the

standard established by law for the protection of others against

unreasonable risk of harm.

The standard of conduct is measured

against what a reasonable man of ordinary prudence would have

^In place of the parent; charged with some of the
Robert L.
parents' rights, duties, and responsibilities.
Drury and Kenneth Ray, Principles of School Law (New York;
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1965) P« 33*^?*
^Howard C. Leibee, Tort Liability For Injuries to
o.
Pupils (Ann Arbor, Michiganl Campus Publishers, 1965), P.
»
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done in the same or similar
circumstances. As one court
defined it, a teacher may be
charged only with reasonable
care
such as a parent of ordinary
prudence would exercise under
comparable circumstances.
Whether the particular facts
of a
case involve negligence on the
part of the teacher is a
question
the jury decides.
In general, negligent conduct
is one of two types,

action which a reasonable man would
have realized involved an
unreasonable risk of injury to others,

or failure to do an act

which is necessary to protect or assist
another and which one
is under a duty to do.
Hegligence in each case is determined
by the particular circumstances involved.
In order
to estab-

lish negligence, it must be shown that the
conduct complained
of is the "legal" or, as it is otherwise
known, the "proximate
cause" of the injury.
Pure accidents .
are due to negligence.

Not all injuries suffered by pupils
Some injuries are caused by misadventure

or pure accident; that is to say, no individual is
legally at
fault.

The accident occurs without negligence.

It could not

have been avoided under the circumstances by the exercise of

reasonable precautions.
The line of demarcation between a pure accident and an

injury caused by negligence is sometimes difficult to draw.

For example, a pupil cut herself when she fell off

a chair she

^Ohman v. Board of Education of City of Now York. 300
N.Y. 306 , ^^0 N.E. r2dl 4'/!;
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was standing on to water

a plant.

Although the teacher permitted

the child to use a milk bottle to water the plant and allowed

her to climb upon a chair to do so, the teacher was not held
liable.

The court said the teacher could not have been expected

to foresee that the child would fall off the chair or that the

milk bottle would break and cut her.^
Test of foreseeability

.

As already stated, the standard

of care the law expects one to exercise to protect others from

unreasonable risk of harm is that which

a

man

The test of determining

wo\ Id

employ in the circumstances.

reasonable and prudent

whether one's conduct was proper or negligent is that of
"foreseeability."

In situations where a reasonable and prudent

person could have foreseen the harmful consequences of his
action or inaction, an individual who disregards the foreseeable consequences is liable for negligent conduct.

If the

accident or event is one that a person of ordinary prudence in
the reasonable exercise of care would anticipate, failure to

take the necessary precautionary steps is negligence.

Thus,

a teacher could not reasonably foresee the latent danger that
a

paper bag would contain a broken soda bottle and that the

pupil whom she asked to pick up the bag would cut herself.^
But a school district was held liable for injuries suffered by
a

nine-year-old girl when an old upright piano set on casters
^Gaincott v. Davis

,

28l Mich. 5l5» 275 N.W. 229 (1937).

of City of New York, 187
^West V. Board of Education
~
N.Y.S. ( 2d y 88 (1959)^
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which she and other children were moving tipped over.

Per-

mission had been granted to use the schoolroom where the
accident occurred.

The piano, a top-heavy instrument, had

been placed with its keyboard side against

a wall,

enough space for a small child to squeeze through.

with Just
The court

said it was foreseeable that some child or group of children

would want to use the piano and would try to move it.

Con-

sequently, reasonable minds could conclude that it was negli-

gent for anyone to leave the piano in such a position where it

might overturn if moved.*^

Contributory negligence

.

Although pupil injuries may

be found to be due to the teacher's negligent conduct, there

may be available to the teacher one or more defenses to relieve him of liability.

tributory negligence.
of all sane persons.

Among these is the defense of conReasonable self-protection is expected

The law defines contributory negligence

person that falls helow
83 conduct on the part of the injured
for his own protection
the standard to which he should conform
cause, cooperating with
and which is a legally contributing

bringing about the harm
the negligence of the defendant in
Minors are not held to the
the injured person complains of.
-protection as are adults. The
same degree of care for self
upon his intelligence and
standard required of a child depends
degree of care which the
maturity as an individual and the
expected to exercise.
average child of his age would be

TKidwell V.
UOb UVbv).
38 Wash. Wl. 535 P.“(2d)

Whitman County,
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Assumption of risk

.

A teacher may sometimes raise the

defense of assumption of risk in order to exonerate himself of

liability for negligence in a pupil injury action.

Assumption

of risk is a legal doctrine which presupposes that despite a

relation or situation known to be dangerous

^

a

person appre-

ciating the danger involved voluntarily chooses to enter upon
and remain within the area of risk.

Pupils engaging in certain

school activities, like athletics, assume the normal risks
involved.

A high school freshman in a compulsory physical

education class fell and broke his arm when he made a leapfrog Jump over a gymnasium horse.

The teacher had instructed

this pupil and the others in class on how to use the horse,

had demonstrated the Jump, had warned them of possible dangers,
and had told them not to try to Jump if they did not think they

could do it.

Since the pupil knew of the danger involved and

assumed the risk, the teacher, was not held liable for the
injury.^

Responsibility for Injuries to Pupils
School districts

The great majority of states still

.

cling to the archaic doctrine that "the King can do no

wrong"--the King being the state or a corporate subdivision
thereof, including school districts.

Under this doctrine,

injuries
school districts are immune from tort liability for
^

Sayers v. Ranger

,

16 N.J. 22, 83 A.

(2d) 775 (i95i)»
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suffered to pupils.

This Immunity applies to their
own negllgent acts, as well as to the
negligent acts of their officers
and employees, or for injuries
arising from dangerous or
improper care and maintenance of school
buildings and grounds,
defective applianoee, or unsafe operation
of the school transportation system.

However, the courts and/or the legislatures
in a number
of states have attempted to resolve or
partially resolve the

problem by:

(1) abolishing the immunity of school districts;

(2) enacting legislation which permits districts to
purchase

liability insurance; (3) enacting legislation which
permits
districts to purchase liability insurance protecting employees
of the districts during scope of employment;

(i^.)

enacting "save

harmless* statutes; and (^) legislating methods of recovery
other than common tort law.

The following states have abolished

governmental immunity of school districts:

Alaska, Arizona,

California, Hawaii, Illinois > Minnesota, Washington and

Wisconsin.

9

The reasoning behind this change in policy from a

judicial point of view is well expressed by Justice Traynor
as follows:

Policy changes in judicial views of charitable
immunity afford an appropriate analogy for illustrating
the reasons that the doctrine of governmental immunity
should no longer be applied to school districts. Charity
immunity was justified in order to protect the assets of
a charitable institution normally to be used for public
9

Leibee, op. cit ., p. 27*

98

the doctrine has recently
received Judicial
scrStinv'
gcver™?nt;i-i,;„^L'ty. ^rort^rt^li'aMlUy'^!):
,
a a

shift has been realized not only
because of T»Anp+-ir»n +-«
awareness of another considera??of
sideration--insurance. Wherever there is
insurance, tort liability no longer merely widely held
from one individual to another but it tends shifts a loss
to distribute
the loss according to the principles of
insurance, and
the person nominally liable is often only
a conduit through
whom this process of distribution starts to flow.
Instance makes it possible to protect a charitable institution's or municipality’s assets at a minimum cost,
and at the same time permit recovery where an injury
^ has
been suffered. 10

^

.

,

.

School districts in Maine currently enjoy governmental

immunity under the common law principle.

While there are no

court cases so stating, the Attorney General’s office has sup-

ported this theory on at least two occasions.

Those opinions

were given as follows
Municipalities are not liable for injuries occurring to
persons when those persons are availing themselves of the
governmental functions of a municipality. Carrying on a
school is such a function.
,

I do not suppose there can be much doubt of the proposition that a municipality is not responsible in damages
for carrying out its public duties. The driver of the
bus, or the private person for whom he was working would,
however, be responsible for carelessness resulting in
injury to a passenger. The general principle is established by an almost uniform course of decisions, that
a public officer, when acting in good faith is never to
be held liable for an error of judgment in a matter
All he undertakes to do
ccTimitted to his determination.
is to discharge his duty to the best of his ability and

^

^Myers v. Drozda

^^

,

180 Neb. 183»

li^-1

N.W. 2d 852 (1986).

Attorney General Report (1941), P» 43*
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integrity. That he may err in hie judgments, or
that he
may decide differently from what some other person
may
thi^ would be just, is no part of his official undertaking.

While there seems to be little doubt of the governmental

immunity enjoyed by municipalities or school districts in Maine
at this time from tort liability, it should be noted that under

the statutes, a transporter (including district-owned school

buses) must procure bodily injury and property damage liability

insurance in order to secure registration plates.

Since the

courts have generally held that it is illegal for a school

district to purchase insurance against an impossible contingency, this particular statute seems to contradict the

general legal principle of governmental immunity in Maine.
On the other hand, a 19^3 opinion from the Attorney

General's office stated the following:
The State is not authorized to expend subsidy to
administrative units upon the cost of liability insurance acquired by the units for the protection of
teachers. Ih

Professional employees .

School administrators, like

teachers, are liable under general principles of tort law for

their own personal acts of negligence or wrongdoing.

Where

their duties call for promulgation of rules and regulations

for adequate supervision, failure to do so may be cause for a
^^ Attorney General Report (1930), p.

^^Maine, Revised Statutes Annotated

.O.

I4

(196i|.),

Sec. 832 .
^

^Attorney General Report (I963), p. 129.

Title 29,
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charge of negligence.

Thus, an acting principal was held to be

negligent when a pupil was injured on being struck by a bicycle

ridden by another pupil.

The negligence was based on lack of

proper supervision of young children on school grounds and
failure to adopt rules and regulations for their safety.

Liability is not usually imposed on an administrator
for wrongful or negligent acts of a subordinate.

No employer-

employee relation exists between the administrator and the

subordinate employee, even though the administrator may hire
teachers and other school employees and supervise their
activities.

The school board is the employer.

However, the

administrator would be liable for the negligence of his subordinate if he employed the subordinate knowing him to be incompetent, or if the administrator directed the subordinate

employee to do some act which was in itself dangerous to pupil
safety and resulted in pupil injury.

Schoolteachers

.

The relationship between pupils and

teacher is much closer than between pupils and administrator.
pupils
It has been said that the responsibility for preventing

from injuring each other rests upon the teacher in charge
comrather than upon either the administrator or the school

committee
mittee; and that the responsibility of the school
teachers are
and the administrators ends when competent

upon the
selected, the responsibility thereafter resting

l5selleck v. Board of Education
(

1949 ).

,

94 N.Y.S. (2d) 3^8
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teachers concerned.
,

16

Even when a teacher has been given

authority to conduct some activity which results in
pupil injury the administrator who gave permission is not
legally
,

responsible if the classroom teacher was competent, and the

administrator ascertained that the teacher would be present

during the activity.

17

Injuries are sometimes inflicted on one pupil by

another or on the playground or in the classroom while the
teacher is present.

Or this may occur during unsupervised

moments while the teacher is attending to duties elsewhere.

Under what circumstances will the teacher's lack of supervision constitute negligence?
in general terms.

The answer can be stated only

When the pupil conduct causing the harm is

of the kind that the teacher, in the exercise of reasonable

care, can neither control nor anticipate, it is unlikely that
a charge of negligence will prevail.

Thus, in a recent New York case the court dismissed
a suit against a teacher charged

with negligence because

pupil sustained a serious eye injury as a result of
snowball on the school playground.

a

a

thrown

There was a school ruling

against throwing snowballs on school property and the teacher
had warned her class several times about the rule.

The injured

pupil was on her way to school when the accident occurred.

^^National Education Association, The Teacher's Day in
Court: Review of 1965, A Report Prepared by the NEA Research
National Education Association, 1966),
Divis: on (Washington:
P,

1^0

,

^'DeOooyer v, Harkne as
(19Uli).

,

Or'
70 S,D, 26, 13 N.W. (2d) 815
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The lawyer for the defendant
teacher argued that the
time between lunch and the
beginning of afternoon classes is
not a recreation period in the
same sense that a school recess
is.
It would be unreasonable, he
claimed, to expect teachers
to supervise students at a time
when they are not officially
in school. To do so would demand
that teachers stand outside
in the cold watching students at every
moment that they were
on school property. Such a requirement
would be in excess of
the normal standard care parents themselves
might exercise in

supervising their own children.
The lawyer for the plaintiff pupil argued, on the contrary,, that authorities must accept this responsibility.

As

long as there is snow on the ground, there are bound to be
some children who will throw snowballs.

The fact that the

school authorities had passed a rule forbidding snowball-

throwing on school grounds indicated that they recognized the

danger of this activity and that it was their responsibility
to prevent it.

Such a rule could have no effect unless it

were constantly enforced.

Moreover, he argued, as long as

the school knew that students regularly returned to play in

the school yard after they had finished lunch until the time

afternoon classes began, that period was as much a recreation
period, requiring supervision, as any other recess during the

school day.

Therefore, he concluded, the school authorities

must accept responsibility for the accident.
The court in dismissing the case said it would con-

stitute "an undue burden on the school" to expect "teachers
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to en.rorce the rule against throwing snowballs by
standing

outside in the cold to watch to see that children do not violate
the rule as they come into school."

Active intervention of

teachers could be expected only when notice of a "special
danger'* existed.

here

There was no evidence of such special danger

•

For how long can a teacher leave a classroom unsuper-

vised without being considered negligent?

Absence for a few

minutes is not likely to be interpreted as negligent lack
of supervision, especially if the teacher's absence was con-

nected with the performance of duty.

It has been held that

the temporary absence of a teacher from the classroom did not

render the teacher, the school principal, or the school board
liable to a pupil who was struck in the eye by a pencil thrown

by a classmate.
Student teachers

.

The law of negligence as it pertains

to student or practice teachers is very vague.

Until just

recently in Maine, the student teacher had no legal status in
the classroom and it was presumed that her immediate super-

visor, the supervising teacher in whose charge she had been

placed, would be held responsible for her acts.

Due to a new policy ruling by the State Board of

Education, student teachers from the teacher-training

36I4.

^®Lawes v. Boa rd of Education of New York
(1965).

,

266 NYS 2nd

^^Ohman v. Board of Education of City of New York,
300 N.Y. 3 06, 90 N.E. (2d) 474 ( 19 ^)^
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institutions in Maine are now
classified as substitute
teachers
under the sixty-day permit
rule and can presumably
be held
responsible for injuries occurring
to pupils as a result
of
their own negligence. This
new policy has not yet
been tested
in the courts, nor has
the Attorney General been
asked to
rule on the legality of the
policy.

~

r employees .

The pupil can always seek
redress

from the individual personally
responsible for negligently
causing him injury, be he a teacher,
an administrator, a bus
driver, or any other school employee.
The same general principles of law apply to cafeteria
workers, custodial

workers,
and any and all other employees
of the school district.
As might be expected, the great
majority
of court

cases involving negligence on the part
of other school employees
has centered around school bus drivers.
There are no Maine
court cases of record on this point.

Your attention is

directed, however, to the Attorney General's
opinion quoted
earlier in this chapter which stated that a
bus driver can
be held responsible for negligence resulting
in injury to a

passenger.

Litigation
The only case to reach the Maine Supreme Judicial Court

concerning negligence was Brooks
20

Brooks V. Jacobs

,

v.

Jacobs in 19l;3.^^

139 Me. 371, 31 A. 2d

In this

(19i^-3).

los
case the plaintiff, a twenty-year
-old Madison High School
aenior, was seriously injured
when a temporary staging,
from

which he was clearing snow, collapsed
and threw him to the
ground.
He had sought and had been
granted permission from
the defendant, an industrial arts
teacher, to

shovel off the

Staging.
The instructor was in charge of
constructing a new

shop building for use by the school.

Several shop classes

were helping with the work on a voluntary
basis and with
their parents' permission.
The school committee had authorized
the construction of the building and
authorized the employment
of the^boys in the shop classes, there being no
compensation

for the work, but such work to count for credit in the
manual
training course.
This was an action to recover for injuries to the

plaintiff alleged to be due to negligence on the part of the
defendant.

The plaintiff argued that the defendant, in taking

•

on and having full charge of the erection of the building,

assumed the duty to use due care and proper precaution to
prevent injuries to his pupils used in such work.

He argued

further that the instructor was negligent in failing to provide
a

suitable and safe staging, in failing to have the staging

properly constructed, and in failing to cause it to be properly
maintained.

Finally, it was argued that the instructor should

have been able to foresee the possibility of the staging col-

lapsing with the extra weight of the snow.
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The defendant's main defense was that
the construction
of the building was under the control
and direction
of the

school committee and the superintendent, who
had obtained a
number of teachers besides himself, who, with their
own classes

had assisted in the construction of the building.

He claimed

to have no authority over those in the other classes
and also

claimed no personal act of negligence.
In finding for the plaintiff (the high school senior).

Judge Hudson made a number of observations which still serve
as guidelines in Maine in the area of negligence.

Excerpts

from the opinion follow;
The relationship of teachers to their pupils has been
stated to be in the nature of in loco parentis
We find
no Maine case directly so holding, but language in
Patterson v. Nutter 78 Mo. 509, 7 A. 273, so denotes, as
therein it is said;
"He is placed in charge some times
of large numbers of children. ... He must govern
and control.
In the Patterson case, supra,
is cited State v. Pendergrass 2 D. & B. (N.C.), 365, in
which this statement is made; "The teacher is the substitute of the parent. ..."
.

,

.

.

.

.

.

,

But apart from the teacher-pupil relationship,
there is a common-law obligation that every person must
so act or use that which he controls as not to injure
another.
The plaintiff's claim is that the superintending
school committee put the defendant with his consent in
full charge of the erection of this building with the
ri^t to make use of his pupils in that work unless they
objected, over whom he had control and direction, and so
as a matter of law he was duty bound "to use due care and
proper precaution" so that no negligent act of his, either
of commission or omission, should proximately result in
injury to them.
Whether the defendant in fact took on the erection of
this building and had full charge thereof was a question of
If he did, we think that he assumed the
fact for the jury.
d’’ty as stated in the plaintiff's contention, with the
result of liability if he failed in the discharge of that
duty either by misfeasance or nonfeasance, provided such
.

.

.
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failure were the proximate cause of the injuries received
by the plaintiff,
... I am requested to say that the fact that the
defendant was a manual -training schoolteacher cannot
shield him from the consequences of his own negligence.
That is what is requested.
I say he has a responsibility;
a limited responsibility.
He is responsible for his own
acts; not the act of others.

Current Status Around the Country

Until recent years, only three Jurisdictions, California,

New York City, and Washington had abolished governmental immunity
of school districts from tort liability.

In March of 1959,

the Supreme Court of Illinois rendered one of the most important

decisions of the present century in this field in holding that
the doctrine of governmental immunity was abrogated in the

state.

In Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit School District ,

the court said in part:
[T]he whole doctrine of government immunity from
It is almost intort rests upon a rotten foundation.
credible that in this modern age of comparative sociological enlightment and in a republic the medieval
absolutism of "the King can do no wrong" should exist.
The revolutiona^ war was fought to abolish the divine
right of Kings.
,

.

.

A highly significant fact in this case is that governmental

immunity was abolished by judicial decisibn--not legislation-a point

which many state supreme courts had previously stated

was a matter for the legislature only.

Since March of 1959,

the states of Arizona, Hawaii, Minnesota, and Wisconsin have

^^

Ibld

.

^^Molitor V. Kanel and Community Unit School District
18 111. 11, 163^.E. 2d 89 119591*.

,
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abolished the doctrine.
Current practice in the several
states can be classified
roughly into six categories as follows:
( 1 )
states in which
governmental immunity of school districts
has been
abolished,

of which there are eight;

gtatee in which school districts

(2)

may purchase liability insurance to
protect the districts
against claims arising from negligent acts
for which the districts are responsible at least to the
extent of the policy,
of which there are sixteen;

(

3

)

states in which school districts

may purchase liability insurance protecting
their employees
against claims arising out of employees' negligence,
of which
there are fourteen; ( 4 ) states in which school districts

"save

harmless" their employees from claims arising out of the
employees' negligence by paying claims awarded against the

employee, of which there are seven;

(

5 ) states which have

legislated a method of recovery other than common tort law
action, of which there are three; and

(

6 ) states in which

state education associations have purchased liability

insurance protecting members for negligent acts committed

during the scope of their employment, of which there are at
least seventeen.

Maine is currently classified in group six
23
or the last category described above.

Summary
It appears to be generally accepted that the rule of

23

Leibee, op. cit ., pp. 27-31*
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immunity of school districts, school
committees, boards of
directors, or other agencies in charge
of public
schools

ordinarily does not extend to their agents
or employees, or
other persons under contract with such
public bodies,

in the

absence of a statute providing otherwise.

Therefore, the rule

has been applied or recognized that teachers
in a public school,
school bus drivers, and other school employees
are personally
liable for their own negligence.
If a school employee fails to exercise the duty
of

care expected of reasonably prudent persons in the same
or

similar situations, that person is said to be negligent; and
if such negligence is the direct and proximate cause of

injuries sustained by pupils to whom such an employee owes a

duty of care, that employee is personally responsible for
damages.
In determining personal liability, there are generally

three main questions involved, namely:

(1)

Did the school

employee owe a duty of care towards the injured?

(2) Was

there a failure on the part of the employee to observe such
duty?

(3) Was such failure the direct and proximate cause

of any resulting injury?

In the determination of whether or not a school

employee is normally prudent, the courts will examine the

following factors:

(1) Did the employee exercise reasonable

and adequate supervision for the safety and welfare of the

pupils?

(2)

Did the employee foresee, or should the employee
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have foreseen the possibility of
the ohild-s being injured?
(3) Did the employee point out to the
pupil the possible hazards
that he might encounter in a
particular activity or class,
as
well as inform him of the necessary
safety
rules?

Approximately ten years ago the State
Department of
Education issued a policy statement on

the general subject of

liability.

There appears to have been no changes,
either
through legislative action or Judicial action
since

that time

which would materially change its content and
meaning.
copy of this statement is included in
Appendix B.

«
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CHAPTER VI

SCHOOL FINANCIAL OPERATIONS
Introduction
A recurrent theme throughout this study has been that

of the supremacy of the state in educational matters.

obviously applies in the field of school finance.

This

The state

may delegate the authority to finance schools to the local
level while at the same time assisting local districts by

distributing funds collected on a statewide basis.
In Maine, the legislature, through Article VIII of
the Constitution is required to see to it that the local

districts finance their public schools.

The pertinent part

of the Article reads as follows:

The legislature are authorized and it shall be
their duty to require the several towns to make
suitable provision, at their own expense, for the
support and maintenance of public schools.^
.

.

.

It was recognized very early in Maine's history that

local support alone was not enough to finance education
adequately, especially in the poorer districts.

As a result,

state funds from various sources were authorized to be dis-

tributed to all districts.
Local school committees or school directors have the
^Maine, Constitution, Art. VIII.
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authority to determine the amount of money to be raised for
school purposes, subject to the voters’ approval,

Ecid

so long

as they act within the scope of their statutory authority, have

the right to determine how the money will be spent.
In cities operating under a charter from the state,

the city council has the authority to fix the total amount of
the school budget.

This does not necessarily mean that the

council may direct an itemized expenditure of the gross amount

authorized; the school committee may usually spend the funds

approved in any manner and for any purpose permitted by law.
Taxation
The authority of the legislature to impose a general
tELX

upon the property of the state for school purposes is

nowhere better expressed than in an Opinion of the Justices
A declaratory

of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in 1872.^

judgement from the Court was sought by the legislature on the

constitutionality of establishing a school mill fund through
public schools.
a general tax on property for the support of
for perExcerpts from this Opinion have been widely quoted
which have
suasive argument in virtually all related cases

Major portions of the Opinion follow:

followed.

art. 4.,
3»
By the constitution of this state,
and
make
to
power
the legislature has "full
1
sec
for the
establish all reasonable laws and regulations
n
defense of the people of this state,
United States.
this constitution, nor to that of the
I

.

^

Opinions of Justices

,

68 Me. 582 (1872).
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the libertie3 of the People.
Srite ve^^ l^n^I^r u"
would seem that the "general diffusion
7e eduf^tioA"
to be regarded as especially
a "benefit" to the people
legislature has "full power"
ffw?
subject
matter of schools and of education to over the
make all
reasonable laws in reference thereto for
the "benefit^
of this state." The power
easonable exercise, having due regard to existing, its
the several
provisions of the constitution, is subject
only
^ to
legislative discretion.
taxation "for the defense and benefit of
only by the good sense and sound
of the legislature.
If unwisely exercised, the
remedy is with the people.
It is not for the ludicial
department to determine where legitimate taxation
ends,
and spoliation by excessive taxation begins.
Education being of benefit to the people, and
being incidential and essential to its successful taxation
promotion,
the mill tax, being for educational purposes,
must be
regarded as constitutional.
By article 8, "to promote this important object
education--"the legislature are authorized, and it shall
be their duty to require the several towns to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the support
and maintenance of public schools." But this article
is mandatory, not prohibitory.
It imposes duties upon the legislature.
It is
affirmative, not negative in its character. The legislature cannot avoid the discharge of this duty. It
cannot constitutionally absolve the towns from making
at their own expense suitable provision for this primary
and indispensable foundation of all good government.
The legislature are by proper enactments to require the
towns to make suitable provision for the support of
public schools, and the towns are, at their own expense,
to comply with those enactments. Neither can escape from
the performance of their several and respective obligations.
But what is making "suitable provision" by the towns,
"at their own expense, for the support and maintenance of
public schools?" By whom is the amount for that purpose
to be fixed? Not by the towns; for, if left to them, there
would be no uniform and definite rule. The "suitable
provision" in such case would be a variable quantity,
an indefinite and contingent provision, dependent upon
the varying wealth of the respective towns and upon the
fluctuating views of their voters.
It is manifest that
Accordingly,
a general law upon the subject is required.
from the first institution of the government to the present
day, the general control of schools, and the determination
of what shall be a suitable provision by the towns for
*

^

.

.

.

nii
theii- support, has
•

•

been fixed by legislative

•

A "suitable uroviaion”

rm 10+-

xt- J.a lox- tne oenerit or
the whole peo'
All the property in the state is assessed therefore
according to its valuation. All contribute thereto
in
proportion to their means. It is a tax for a public
purpose, not one, by which one individual is taxed for
the special and peculiar benefit of another.

In relation to the question proposed, we answer that
the legislature has authority under the constitution to
assess a general tax upon the property of the state for
the purpose of distribution under "An act to establish
th,3 school mill fund for the support of common schools,"
approved February 27, 1872.3

The Legislatur.e of 1909 created an additional source
of revenue by imposing a further state tax of one and one-half

mills on the dollar upon all of the property in the cities,
towns, plantations and unorganized townships of the State.

This was known as the Common School Fund.
At this time the public schools were receiving financial

aid from two separate sources, state aid and direct municipal
taxation.

The state aid itself was derived from four sources:

(1) income from the "Permanent School Fund," a fund created by

the sale of wild lands appropriated by the state in former years

for the support of schools; (2) income from the state tax on
savings banks and trust companies; (3) from the School Mill
3lbid.

,

pp. 582-586.
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derived from assessing all the property in the

Tax, so called,

state situated in cities, towns, plantations and unorganized

townships; and

(Ij.)

the newly-enacted Common School Fund with

moneys derived from the same source as the School Mill Tax,
At the local level, municipalities are compelled by

the legislature to assist in the maintenance of public schools

by taxation.
time.

The amount thus required has varied from time to

There have been many court cases involving local taxation

for school purposes in the early history of Maine in connection

with the original school district system but these are now of
interest only to the historian.^

The statute of 1909 creating

and
the Common School Fund was almost immediately challenged

resulted in the only court case of record in recent Maine
history on the subject of taxation.

For that reason this

be reviewed here
case. Sawyer v. Gilmore settled in 1910 will

in some detail.
read in part as
The statute passed by the legislature

follows
on a dollar
A tax of one and a half mills
of the
shall annually be assessed upon all thereof and shall
valuation
the
to
the state according
of common schools.
be known as the tax for the support
collected in
This tax shall be assessed and
Sec. 2.
Sec.

_

1.

^

m

^ee

Gr^i^ v.
t» nts of School Pi st. No. 1
Inhabitants
^ .....
TT^»rton v.
(3
MAQQ^~~~ TS »lFr;r v. School Dist.
V

Bailey, 12 Me.

—TiAc;n^«

'

^

Si

T

Ander v. Schoo l Dist. in Sm ithlieiQ,

No. 10 > ^3 Me. 261 (1874)
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the same manner as other state taxes and shall paid into
the State Treasury and designated as the common school
fund.
Sec. 3.
One third of this fund shall be distributed
by the treasurer of the state on the first day of January,
annually, to the several cities, towns and plantations
according to the number of scholars therein, as the same
shall appear from the official returns made to the state
superintendent of public schools for the preceding year,
and the remaining two thirds of said fund shall be distributed by the treasurer of the state on the first day
of January, annually, to the several cities, towns and
plantations, according to the valuation thereof as the
same shall be fixed by the state assessors for the preceding

year.
Sec. 6.
Sums received by any city, town or plantation
from the distribution provided by section three shall be
deemed to be raised by such city, town or plantation within
the meaning of revise^ statutes, chapter fifteen, section
thirteen, as amended.

A Mr, Sawyer, the plaintiff in this case, and a resident
of Mattamiscontis

,

an unorganized township in the County of

Penobscot, brought a bill in equity to enjoin the defendant

State Treasurer from collecting the new tax.

He challenged

the constitutionality of the Common School Fund legislation

on a number of points.

His main arguments were that:

(1)

the

act imposed an unequal burden upon the unorganized townships
of the state because the fund was created by the taxation of

all the property in townships, towns, cities and plantations,

yet no provision was made for the distribution of such funds
to townships.

In other words, while four subdivisions of the

three were
state were made to contribute to the fund, only
method
permitted to share in the financial benefits; (2) the
it was made, not
of distribution was unconstitutional because

^ Sawyer v, Gilmore

,

109 Me. 169 » 83 A. 673 (1912).
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according to the number of
scholars, as was the case
with the
school mill fund, but one-third
according to the number of
scholars and two-thirds according
to valuation, thus
benefitting
the cities, and richer towns
more than the poorer;

(3) the
act was unconstitutional on
the grounds that section
6 per
mitted sums received from the state
under this act to be
deemed moneys raised by municipalities
for school purposes
thus relieving some towns from the
necessity of raising the
80/ per capita under the 1872 statute;
(1;) while the act required towns to raise a uniform amount
per capita, the requirement varied all the way along the line,
from nothing up to
eighty cents depending upon the state
reimbursement and thus
an un-uniforra rate was established; and
(5) that the act

violated section 8 of Article IX of the State
Constitution,

which reads:

"All taxes upon real or personal estate assessed

by authority of this State shall be apportioned and
assessed

equally according to the Just value thereof"; and the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution, which declares
that "No State shall deny to any person within its Jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws."

The Court, in holding for the defendant, categorically

disallowed each of the allegations.

Once again, the Judiciary

reinforced the doctrine of state supremacy in matters of public
education.

Pertinent quotes from the decision follow:

The first objection was that this act imposed an
unequal burden of taxation upon the unorganized townships
of the state.
[T]his objection is without legal
.
foundation. The legislature has the right under the
.

.

118

constitution to iinpose an equal rate of taxation upon
all the property in the state, including the property
in unorganized townships, for the purpose of distributing
the proceeds thereof among the cities, towns and plantations for common school purposes, and the mere fact that
the tax is assessed upon the property in four municipal
subdivisions and distributed among three, is not in itself
fatal.
The fundamental question is this, is the
purpose for which the tax is assessed a public purpose,
not whether any portion of it may find its way back again
to the pocket of the taxpayer or to the direct advantage
of himself or family.
Were the latter the test, the
childless man would be exempt from the support of schools
and the sane and well from the support of hospitals.
In
order that taxation may be equal and uniform in the
constitutional sense, it is not necessary that the benefits
arising therefrom should be enjoyed by all the people in
equal degree nor that each one of the people should
participate in each particular benefit. Laws must be
general in their character and the benefits must affect
different people differently.
This is the legal and constitutional answer to the
plaintiff's claim of inequality but in this connection it
should not be overlooked that the legislature has in fact
made wise and generous provision for the education of
children in the unorganized townships, more generous in
fact than in the case of children in incorporated places.
.

•

•

.

.

•

It was thus established that it is constitutional to

tax one subdivision of government to aid another subdivision
of government as long as the purpose is for the common good
of the state.

In answering the question of inequality of

distrioution the Court said:
The plaintiff further attacked the method of distribution as being unconstitutional because it is made,
not according to the number of scholars, as is the school
mill fund, but one-third according to the number of
but
scholars and two-thirds according to valuation
Inconstitutionality.
of
that result is not the test
equality of assessment is necessarily fatal, inequality
of distribution is not, provided the purpose be the
The method of distributing the
public welfare.
proceeds of such a tax rests in the wise discretion and
sound judgment of the Legislature* Such distribution
might be according to population, or according to the
number of scholars of school age, or according to school
.

.

.

.

.

.

119

attendance, or accordinc to
another. The Constitution
°n
regard to this matter and preserlh^’
say that one method should it is not
be adontoH f
another. We are not to
P^«P®>'®noe to
sub
3 titute*^oo
of a coordinate branch of
Judgment for that
8°''®'’"“®"* working within
its constitutionar?Si?s.
The legal principle was
here established that
while
the assessment and collection
of funds must be
equitable, the
method of distribution may be
determined in any manner
which
best provides for the common
welfare.
Thus, the legislature
may, if it so desires,
distribute a larger percentage
of funds
to the poorer districts.
This is not now the case in
Maine
but a new method of state aid
now under consideration would
do Just that.
This proposal will be described
later,
answer to the third allegation
the Court said:

m

,

jnie constitutionality of this
act is assailed on
another ground in that Section
6 permits sums received
from the_ state under this distribution
"to be deemed
to be raised by the municipalities
within
the meaning
ol
Ch. 15, Sec. 13, as amended,"
thereby refrom raising by municipal taxation
for

eacrUabUanl.
1^

respect this common school fund act of
1909,
^
school mill act of 1872.
The act of
afford such relief because the towns are
3 ill required to raise their
eighty cents per capita
tax, and the amount received by the towns
from the mill
lund IS additional thereto. But the act of
1909 permits
the amounts apportioned thereunder by the State
to the
several towns to be applied towards the per capita tax,
so that under this act some towns are wholly and
others,
partially relieved from such taxation. This it is
claimed, contravenes Art. VIII of the State Constitution.
What is the fair construction of this clause? What
force has it as a part of the organic law of the State?
A legislative act is to be held constitutional unless a
positive restriction or limitation or prohibition can be
found in the Constitution which renders it invalid. No
such limitation or prohibition in regard to the maintenance
of the common schools can be found.
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This part of the opinion is now
of historical interest
only.
School costs have risen to the
extent that state aid
accounts for far less than the actual
local expenditures per
pupil.
In answering the fourth allegation
of an un-uniform
tax the Court said:
It IS an historical fact that in the
early days the
towns had frequently neglected to make such
pLvision and
therefore the framers of the Constitution left
no room to
doubt that the Legislature should have the power to
require them to do their duty to the end that the
children
and youth of the State should be properly
educated.
But
the provision is nothing more than mandatory,
second place the extent of the requirement
is Tleft wholly to the discretion of the Legislature,
because their duty is to require the several towns to make
suitable provision. Who is to determine what is suitable?^ Clearly the Legislature itself.
"Suitable" is an
elastic and varying term, dependent upon the necessities
of changing times.
What the Legislature might deem to
be suitable and therefore necessary under some conditions,
they might deem unnecessary under others. The amount which
the towns ought to raise would depend largely upon the
amounts available to them from other sources, and as these
other sources increase the local sources can properly
diminish.
Towns are mere agencies of the State. They are purely
creatures of the Legislature and their powers and duties
are within its control.
Hence it lies in the power of
the Legislature not merely to pass laws applicable to all
towns but it may direct its attention to the need of a
particular town and compel such town to raise money by
taxation. ... In the light therefore, of these decisions
and in view of the language of the Constitution and of the
first legislative act passed in accordance therewith, we
have no hesitation in saying that although the Act of
1909 may relieve a few towns from any local taxation
whatever for public schools, that is a matter which may
be considered by the Legislature in the performance of
their duty but does not of itself, in the absence of any
restrictive constitutional provision, render the act
unconstitutional and void. . . •

The legal principle is here again established that the

legislature may require towns to raise any amount deemed necessary for the support of schools and can, in fact, require a
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single town to make more of an effort by
way of taxation than
another.
In anawering the final allegation of
violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said:

allegation which charged a violation of the
c
Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution can bo
answered in a single word.
"The provision in the
Fourteenth Amendment that no state shall deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws was not intended to prevent a state from
adjusting
its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways,”
Our conclusion therefore is that Chap. 17? of the Pub.
Laws of 1909 ,, violates neither the State nor the Federal
Constitution.^
Thus, in this landmark case the Court reaffirmed the

concepts established in the 1&72 Opinion of the Justices

,

namely, that the legislature has the authority to require towns
to impose taxes to make "suitable” provision for public schools;

that the legislature may establish a statewide tax to supplement
the local taxes for school purposes; that such taxes, if applied

uniformly throughout the state, are not illegal because some
towns are relieved of part or all of their local taxes; and
that the legislature may direct its attention to a single

town and compel it to raise money by taxation to meet the
"suitable provision" clause.
In concluding this section on taxation, a word on the

current status might be in order.

In Maine, as in most states,

the local share of educational funds is raised through the

property tax.

There is general agreement that this method is

inadequate or at least promotes unequal educational opportunities
^Ibid.
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for the youth of Maine.

The "wealthy" towns of Maine have

13 percent of the state's valuation and only
5 percent of its

children.

Figures on individual towns present some striking

contrasts.

Baileyville in 1966 had $73 000 in fair market
»

value for every school child; Wiscasset had
$75,000.

In con-

trast Beals Island had $5,800 and Gorham had $12,000.®

To

compound the inequity, the state pays a minimum of 20 percent
of the cost of the foundation program in every community
in

the state, regardless of how much taxable property lies within

its borders.
A new plan is now under study which would eliminate

these inequities.

Under this plan, the state would set a mill

rate to be raised for education and then make up the difference

between the yield of this tax and the foundation program.

As

an example, if the levy was ten mills and wealthy town X
could satisfy the foundation program with only six mills, the

surplus four mills would go into the state fund to aid poor

town Y.
Gifts and Bequests

Chapter II 3

,

Sec. 1285 of the Revised Statutes of

195^4-

reads in part as follows:
.

.

.

*^"$

4

.

(May, 1968

),

Administrative units shall receive in trust and

Million for Education?" The Maine Teacher
p. 14..

o

Ibid., p. 15 .
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faithfully expend gifts and bequests
made to aid in the
maintenance of free high schools, and
in such cases to the same extent and shall receive aid
on the same
such schools had been established conand
maintained by taxation.^
Chapter 103, Section 851 reads in part as
follows:

^ery administrative unit shall raise and expend,
^
annually, for the support of public schools
therein,
exclusive of the income of any corporate school
fund, or
of any grant from the revenue or fund from the
State, or
of any voluntary donation, devise or bequest,
or any
forfeiture accruing to the use of the schools, not less
than 80^ for each inhabitant
.

.

.

Two cases have reached Maine’s highest court on the

question of gifts and bequests.
V.

Moulton in l88l.^^

The first occurred in Piper

Mr. Elisha Piper,

a

resident of

Parsonsfield, in York County, willed the major portion of his
estate to the Town of Parsonsfield for educational purposes.

The will provided that a school fund be set up for the support
of a high school in Parsonsfield, provided that the town would

build such

a school.

The will was contested by the plaintiffs, who in-

cidentally, included Mr. Piper’s wife, on the basis that the

Town of Parsonsfield had no authority to support or aid in
supporting

a

high school.

As pointed out in the will, no

part of the bequest was to be used for the construction of

The town, not having

school.

a

a

high school, would be forced

therefore to build one in order to benefit from the bequest.
9

Maine, Revised Statutes (1954)

»

T13> sec, 85l»

^°Ibid.
^^ Piper V. Moulton

,

72 Me. l55 (l88l).
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In settling the question of whether
the Town of
Parsonsfield had the right to accept the
school fund and build
and support a free high school, the
Court said the following:
A trust for the support of schools or of
a particular
school, or for any purpose of general
uublic utUity
utiliti^is a valid trust. So towns can
public
hold
property in trust for purposes within the
general scope
of their corporate existence. ... It
is provided in
the will, that the school house for the
Piper free hich
school shall be built and maintained by the
inhabitants
of Parsonsfield.
It is objected that they cannot legally
raise money for the purpose of erecting such school
house,
or to pay the town treasurer and committee for
their care
of the bequest made to the town.
By R.S., c. 11, sec. 5>
amended by statute 1878»
c. 20, every city, town and plantation shall raise
and
expend annually, for the support of schools therein, a
sum of money exclusive of the income of any corporate
school fund, or of any grant, or from the revenue or
funds from the state, or of any voluntary donation,
devise or bequest. .
The minimum tax only is established.
It may be
increased for educational purposes to any extent that may
be deemed advisable.
No limitation is placed upon the
sum to be raised but the good judgment of the inhabitants
.

.

raising it.
That a city or town may receive money by devise or
bequest, is fully recognized by this section. The gift
becomes the property of the town, to be used for the
purposes for which it was given.
The town has accepted the gift.
It is bound to
furnish the requisite buildings There must be a reasonable time for that purpose. When executors or trustees
are to pay a legacy to a corporation on conditions precedent, and no time is stated in the will, five years
from its probate is allowed for their performance.
.

.

.

.

A second and much more recent case involving a bequest

reached the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in 19^2,

The results

of this action have particular implications for some of the

^^Ibid.
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smaller schools in Maine
currently considering
consolidati,.on
under the Sinclair Act,
Trust Compa ny;

briefly as follows.

v.

LaFleur .^^ the facts are

A Mr. William Appleyard.
late of Guilford
died on March 19,
195Q leaving a will duly probated
in the

County of Piscataquis.

The residue of his estate
amounting to
approximately $20,000 was left in
trust with the plaintiff,
Guilford Trust Company, under
the following conditions:
that
the trust be used for the
sole benefit of Guilford
High School;
and that the funds not be
used in any way to save the
Town of

Guilford anything by way of taxes
that would normally be raised
for the support of the high school
were the trust not created.
In June,

prior to Mr. Appleyard 's death and
with
his knowledge, the Towns of Guilford,
Sangerville, Abbott
191f9,

and

Parkman formed a Community School District
known as the
Piscataquis Community School District. The
Town of Guilford
executed a lease of its high school building
to the newly

formed District and the possession of the building
was delivered
to the Trustees of the District and accepted by
them.

The

curriculum and other matters pertaining to the education of
scholars were under the control of the Community School District

Committee with representatives of each of the member towns
while the responsibility for the physical maintenance and

operation of the building were under a Board of Trustees.
13

Guilford Tr ust Company v. Alexander A. LaPleur.

148 Me. 16^(1952).
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It will be recalled from Chapter IV that under the

Community School District legislation (still in effect) there
are two distinct groups with differing responsibilities in

such districts y

the trustees being responsible for all of

the affairs of the district, except election of teachers, the

courses of study, the terms of school and other matters per-

taining to education, which matters shall be controlled by a

community school committee.
The defendant in this case, a Mrs. Iva A. Maginnis,
sole heir-at-law, maintained that the will was null and void

and that the residue of Mr, Appleyard's estate rightfully

belonged to her.
following points:

Her lawyer based his arguments on the
(1)

that because Guilford High School

ceased to exist before the death of Mr, Appleyard, the trust
for benefit of Guilford High School lapsed; (2) that the

intended bequest was a specific and restricted charitable

bequest and not a general public charitable request for general
^^
educational purposes and could not have been applied cy pres

for the benefit of any public educational charity other than

the Guilford High School; and (3) that at the date of
Mr, Appleyard's death that Guilford High School was not an

^^Cy pres means "The equitable doctrine that if a^
charitable trust cannot be enforced according to its exact
in some
tenor, the trustee may petition to have it enforced
general
approximately similar way that will carry out the
purpose of the charity," Max Radin, Radin Law Dictionary
(Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, Inc,, 19o5)» P*
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existing entity and the
grade school at that ti„e
was under
the control and an
integral part of the
Piscataquis Co».unity
Sohool District for benefit
of scholars in four
different towns.
in finding for the plaintiff
and dismissing the appeal
the Court said in part:

school district and not alone
but with threfotherr"^''^
therefore a gi« ?or
the high school scholars
^
must be lost^ The
attenkng thl GuiUord
high
High^sLoT"
Sohool would be benefitted by
this gift mn=t
the heir, lose it because they
now attLf th^
® sohool
of Piscataquis Community Sohool
District
High
nfflefli’ secondary sohoolSohool we may weil’assume was the
of Guilfori
^
The
now the official secondary sohool communUT
of GuilfLd
Tt ?
taxpayers of Guilford support
Ld^it*ii^th?^°°^h”^i“*w*i?®
the right to att:Sd?

&iro?

The intent of Mr. Appleyard to enlarge
’and* broaden*
facilities for the youth of Guilford in
a high
school seems clear. He carefully provided
that the income
should not be used to relieve the town of
its normal burden
i^^raen
of expense for educational purposes.
We have no weight to the fact that the new
high school
IS physically located in the buildings
formerly occupied
Guilford High School. There is nothing in the will
of Mr. Appleyard to indicate that his gift
was limited to
an institution at a particular location.
The point is that
the present high school, wherever located, is in
fact and
law the official secondary school of Guilford, and it
is
this school, whatever its name, which the testator
had in
mind in naming the Guilford High School.
We need not on the narrow ground here urged by the
heir deprive the testator of his right to give, or the
youth of Guilford of their right to enjoy, the increased
educational advantages made available through his
generosity.
To say that the gift must fail because of
the change of name and th e extension of the area supporting
the school would, in our view, give undue weight to a
relatively unimportant matter.
(Italics mine)
1*5

^Guilford Trust Company v. Alexander

Me.

162 (1^527:

A.

LaFleur.
^

lij.8
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Indebtedness
The authority of a
municipality or a achool
district
to incur indebtedness for
the repair, alteration
or construc'txon of school buildings
is well established.
i„ „any state 8
the amount of indebtedness
which may be incurred by
school

districts is limited by constitutional
provision or statutory
enactment.
Such is the case in Maine.
Prom time to time,
especially when two or more towns
unite for
school purposes,

questions have arisen as to whether
the indebtedness of the
achool union or district is that
of

the separate towns combined

or independent of the towns.

Although there are no court cases of record
on this
particular point in Maine, a recent and
authoritative opinion
was rendered by the Justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court in
1958.

They said in effect that,

(

1

)

a school administrative

district is separate and distinct from the municipalities

participating in its creation and that the indebtedness,
therefore, of a school administrative district is not the

indebtedness of the municipalities included; and

(

2)

that the

limits of indebtedness of a school administrative district are
not the same as those of cities and towns; the limitation on

municipal indebtedness applies to cities and towns and not to
^^See Kellogg v. School Diet. No. 10 13 Okl. 285, 7k P*
1903 ); Hettinger v. School Board of City of Pittsburgh 266
Pa. St. 67 > 109 A. 782 (1920) ; Board of Public Instruction for
Bay County v. Barefoot l^l PI a7 522, 193 So. 823 (1939); and
Kelly V. Brunswick , 13ii Me.
187 A. 703 (1936).
.

110

(

,

,

Opinion of the Justices

,

153 Me. 469 , 145 A. 2d 250

(1958).
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other entities, or, as here.
a school administrative
district.
School Budgets
The desirability of some
form of budgetary procedure
for public schools has long
been recognized. There
has never
been dissent from the premise
that school expenditures
can be
made more effectively when
available funds are apportioned
among the various items necessary
for the efficient conduct
of the school system.
As mxght be expected, the question
of final responsibility in the approval of the annual
school budget has resulted
in much litigation around the country.
School committees in
Maine, unlike some jurisdictions, are
fiscally dependent upon
the wishes of the taxpayers. Pinal
approval of the school

budget rests not with the Committee but with
the voters of
the towns, or of the several towns in a
district, or with the
city council under the charter system.

Strangely enough, there are no recorded cases in Maine

challenging this authority.
a

On the other hand, this has been

subject of considerable controversy in other states.

There

have been three court cases in Maine which have incidentally
touched on the question of the authority of establishing the
1

o

Mort et al
McGraw-Hill Company, I960
p
-^°Paul R.

.

) ,

Public School Finance (New York;
3^3^

,
.

19

See Board of Educati on of Town of Stamford v. Board
of Finance of ^wn of Stamford 12? Conn. 3ii.5. 16 A. (2d) 601
(1<^40); and Lynch v. City of Fall River, 336 Mass. ^58. Ih7
N.E. (2d) l52irT958).
,
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school budget.

While it ie recognized that
the final authority
rests with the voters, it is
appropriate to
include summaries

of these cases at this point,

B urket t V. Yo ungs ,

m

the first of these cases,

taxpayer and voter of the City
of

Bangor attempted to force the city
council to refer, by referendum, for the local electorates'
acceptance or rejection, the

general appropriation resolve which included
the school budget.
In denying the right of referendum the Court
said in part:

defines, in minimum requirement.
What amount of money must be raised and expended
by a city
or common schools.
Some of the appropriations are,
under state law, obligatory on the city: for
illustration,
coimon schools
the public school system is of statewide concern.
The state at large is equally concerned
with the city regarding education, the support of the
poor, the construction and maintenance of highways, the
assessment and collection of taxes, and other matters.
.

.

.

.

.

.

Here again, is established the legal principle that the

public schools are a state function and of statewide concern.
Therefore, no individual city or town can refuse to raise the

minimum amount for education established by the legislature.
The second case questioned the authority of a city

council to fix the total minimum expenditures of the school
committee.

While the decision in this superior court action

is not necessarily binding upon the Supreme Judicial Court,

should a similar case reach its docket, there is no good reason
to suppose that a similar line of reasoning would not be used.

The implications of this very recent decision (1965) are of

Bangor

,

^^ Burkett v. Youngs et al., of the City Council of
135 Me. i|.59 ( 193^^ T

^^Ibid.
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sufficient import to Maine school authorities that the entire
text of the case is included in Appendix C.
oi^ly

For this reason,

the basic findings of the case will be here reported.
The basic controversy centered around the legislative

intent as to the meaning of the language, "management, care

and conduct" of the public schools as vested in the school

committee by statute.

Does this give the school committee

the right to establish the annual operating budget or must
the school committee exercise its authority within the limits
of the total school appropriation as set by the city council

under its charter?
In City of Auburn v. John B. Annett

22
,

Justice Sullivan

concluded that the Auburn City Council had the final authority
to fix the total maximum expenditures of the Auburn School

Committee.
In school administrative districts the legislature

has given to the directors the duty and power of preparing the
school budget but that budget must be approved by the majority
of voters of the district at separate meetings of member towns.

There is a further proviso that the budget becomes automatically

approved as of April 1 in any given year absent any majority
veto of the aggregate voters.

As pointed out in Chapter IV,

this means that no one member town, by a negative vote, can

veto the district budget unless the aggregate vote fails to

^^Citv of Auburn v. Jo hn B. Annett (Superior Court,

April 29, 1965).

132

sustain a two-thirds majority of all of the
voters in all
of the member towns.
This point was considered in the third and final
case

on school budgets in this section.
V.

In a case already reviewed,

Rollins , the plaintiff, among other things, alleged

that a meeting called by the directors on February
16, 1959,
to review the operational budget was illegal since no voting

list was used.

This was not a meeting to approve the budget

but rather an "open hearing" on the budget prior to considera-

tion by the voters of each member town as required under the

Sinclair Act.

In sustaining the legality of the meeting as

well as the budget, Justice Dubord commented as follows:
If a budget for the operation of the school administrative district is not approved prior to April 1st
in any given year, the bixdget as submitted by the
school directors for operational expenses, reserve fund
and capital outlay purposes shall be automatically considered the budget approved for operational expenses in
(T]his being true, even though
the ensuing year.
.
there might have been a failure to comply strictly with
the provisions of sec. Ill, the budget submitted by the
school directors, in any event, automatically became the
budget for the -ensuing year, by force of the provisions
of sec. lll-L."^^
.

.

Summary
The concept of state supremacy in matters pertaining
to public education has been reinforced repeatedly in this
study.

This chapter has pointed out this plenary power in

still another area, that of school finance.
^ ^Blacks tone v. Rollins
(

1961 ).

157 Me. 85 » 170 A. 2d

1^.05
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The courts have consistently upheld the authority of
the legislature to impose tax programs on a statewide basis

for the support of public school education, if uniformly
applied, even though local municipalities or school districts

may not necessarily receive the same proportionate amount in
return.

The courts have further upheld the premise that local

municipalities must provide, by taxation, at least

a

minimum

amount in the support and maintenance of public schools.

If

local municipalities choose to raise more than the prescribed
.

minimum, they are free to do so under Maine's Constitution.

Furthermore, the legislature has the constitutional right to
provide financial aid to a single municipality in addition to
the minimum support program, if, in its judgment, the common

good of the state is being served.
It has been held that towns or school districts have

the right to accept gifts and bequests for the benefit of

local schools.

Such benefits are not considered to be

nullified by virtue of the fact that the specific school
as
mentioned in the will merges with another school as long

was intended conthe students for whom the original bequest
gift.
tinue to profit from the benefits of the
-municipal corSchool administrative units, as quasi
incur indebtedness up
porations, have the legal authority to
valuation of all the parto 12-1/2 percent of the total
maintenance and capital outlay
tioipating towns for operation,

purposes.

the town or towns
This indebtedness is not that of
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involved in the school district.
but that or the school
admin
istrative unit.
In general, school budgets
must be approved annually
by

the voters in independent
school systems, by the city
council
in cities under the charter
system, by each member town
under
the school supervisory union
system, or by a majority vote
of
the aggregate voters in the member
towns of a school administrative district. In the latter
case, the budget proposed
by the directors becomes the official
budget if not acted upon
by April 1 of the year involved.

While Maine school districts do not enjoy
fiscal
autonomy, the privilege of the voters at a
town meeting of a
member town of a school administrative district,
to increase,

decrease or otherwise modify a school budget as been
removed.
A negative vote on the total operating budget of a
school

administrative district by any one member town will not nullify
the budget except where the negative vote is a majority vote
oi*

all the votes cast in all of the member towns.

Failure of voters to approve a school budget which
meets minimum state requirements results in a penalty from
the state through the medium of reduced state aid under the

state foundation program.

Except in a few instances in the

very early history of Maine, no town has chosen to ignore the
statutes concerning minimum local support for public schools.
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CHAPTER VII
SCHOOL PROPERTY
Introduction

School administrative units or their directors
have
no contract or vested rights in school property.
School

property, including buildings, grounds and' equipment,
is the
property of the state, and not of the local district,
despite
the fact that the property may have been paid for
solely from

funds raised by levies or bond issues at the local district
level.

School districts hold the property in trust for the

state

Since the legal ownership is in the state, the legislature may control or dispose of such property, with or without the consent of the district or its inhabitants.

This

concept of the legal nature of school buildings and other

property is sometimes difficult for the patrons of local
school districts to comprehend.

They may be inclined to look

upon the property as "their" property, since it was financed

with "their" money.

Thus, despite the fact that school

buildings are constructed for school purposes, various groups
often seek the use of school buildings for other than school

purposes
The ownership of school property is ordinarily in the
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state or the public, although
a school committee may
hold the
naked legal title as trustee for
the public.
Such property
is not to be considered as
the private property of the
school
district by which it is held or wherein
it is located.
Generally, school committees or directors
are given control of
school property and it may not be used
for illegal purposes.

Authority to Hold Property
The landmark case in Maine concerning the
authority to

hold property is the Kelley case which was
discussed in
vious chapter. The Court held that:

a pre-

A school district is a public agency or trustee
established to carry out the state's policy to educate
Its youth, and the Legislature may change such
agencies,
and control and direct what should be done with the

school property.

It will be recalled that in this case the legislature
authorized

the Brunswick School District to borrow money for the purpose
of erecting a high school' and that, after the loan had been

repaid by the district, the property would revert to the
school committee of the local school system.
said that,

The Court also

"School property is public property, the property

of the incorporated district and not of the taxpayers residing

within it. "2
In an earlier case, the Court held that the authorities

^Kelley v. Brunswick School District, 13
107 A. 703 (1936).
^Ibid.

ii.

Me.

I4.II4.,
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of a school district may acquire additional lands adjoining
the schoolhouse lot, when necessary for the purpose of an ex-

tension which has been duly voted.

3

In the Piper case reviewed

in Chapter VI, it was held that a town may accept a trust for
The Court said in part:

school purposes.

A trust for the support of schools or of a particular
school as a high school, or for any purpose of general
public utility is a valid trust. So towns can hold
property within the general scope of their corporate
existence

Sale or Disposition of Property
As early as 1843

>

It was held that school districts

which become unfit

may make sale of their old schoolhouses
for the use of the district.^

Again in 1865 it was noted by

the Court that school districts have the authority to sell

and dispose of any schoolhouse or other property, if necessary, and that the school district is the judge of the neces-

There are no recent Maine cases on this point but in

sity.^

school committee has no
1947 the Attorney General ruled that a
outside educa
authority to lease school property for interests

tional activities.

7

^Cousens v. School Dist. No. 4

^iper

V.

Moulton

,

»

^7 Me. 280 (l877)»

72 Me. 155 (l88l).

^ Whitmore v. Hogen , 22 Me.

(9 Shep.

)

5^4 U8i4-3)-

Aetna Ins.^Co.
Scho o l Dist. No. 6 in Dresden v.
505
^

54 Me

.

*^

Attorney General Report (1947)» P* 23*
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Construction of School Buildings
A school committee unquestionably
has the legal right
to construct buildings to be
used for purposes of instruction.

In Maine, as in moat other states, a
state building authority
known as the "Maine School Building
Authority" has been estab-

lished to assist local districts for school
construction purposes.
Its stated purpose is as follows:
A general diffusion of the advantages of
education
being essential to the preservation of the rights
and
people; to aid in the provision of public
state, the "Maine School Building
Authority,
as heretofore created, is authorized
empowered to construct, acquire, alter or improve and
public
school buildings and to issue revenue bonds of the
authority, payable from rentals to finance such
buildings
and when paid for by said rentals to convey them
to the
lessee towns or other administrative units.®
^

Thus, new schools, or alterations to existing schools, are

financed through revenue bonds by the Authority who "owns"
the property and rents the property to the local district

until paid for.

At this time the title is turned over to the

district to be held in trust for the state.
A municipality has no authority to construct a school/

house without the express recommendation and approval of the
school committee.

In Lund v. City of Auburn ,^ the Court held

that the City Council of Auburn, under its charter, had no

authority to erect a schoolhouse until the plans therefore were
o

°Maine, Revised Statutes Annotated (1954)
c.

>

Tit. 20,

503 » sec. 3502.
^ Lund V.

City of Auburn , 110 Me.

2i4.l1

85 A. 893 (1913)

•
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approved by the school committee of the City.
Furthermore, school construction plans must
be approved
by state authorities.
In Maine this includes the State
Department of Education and the Bureau of Health.
It was held by the
Court in 1916 that the superintending school
committee
and the

superintendent of schools cannot bind a town for
building a
new schoolhouse, contrary to the statutory
requirements of
approval by state authorities of proposed plans of
school

buildings
Control and Use

Generally

,

the use of school buildings or property for

purposes other than the conduct of the school is largely

regulated by statute.

The modern view is that school authori-

ties may permit the use of school buildings for other than

school purposes provided there is no interference with the

primary use of the buildings for school purposes.

The minority

view is that the use of school property should be restricted
entirely to school purposes on the ground that money raised by

taxation for one purpose cannot be used even indirectly for
any other purpose.
Although, as we have seen above, school buildings are

l^Morse v. Inhabitants of Town of Montville, 115 Me.
kSk, 99 a.“53B~(19i6T:

^^Robert L. Drury and Kenneth Ray, Principles of School
Law (New York: Apple ton-Century-Crofts, 1965) p. 76.
»

j

Iko

the property of the state, their management
and control are
left to the discretion of local boards.
The boards are in a

better position than anyone else to determine what,
if any,
use should be made of the school buildings outside of

school

hours

and the conditions and restrictions which should be

placed upon that use.
Local school committees are clothed with wide dis-

cretion in determining what non-school use shall be made of
the school buildings within their districts.

Maine has had

no cases reach its highest court on this matter to serve as a

guideline for school officials.

-.The

general rule in other

jurisdictions has been well stated by the Supreme Court of
Wyoming, however, and is here included.

That court has held

that so long as the proper maintenance and conduct of the

school is not interfered with, or in any wise hampered, and
so long as school district property is not defaced or destroyed,
the law vests a generous amount of discretion in the school

board.

12

It is perhaps accurate to say that there is a strong

judicial disposition to approve wide community use of school

buildings.
Maine has no statutes regulating the control of school

buildings by outside groups and, as stated above, has had no

litigation on the subject.

Attorney General opinions have

been sought on several occasions, however, concerning the
^^Robert R. Hamilton and Paul R. Mort, The Law and
Public Education (Brooklyn; The Foundation Press, Inc.,
1959}, p. 23%

j

llt-1

legality of permitting religious groups
to use school facilities
for religious training outside of school
hours.
Attorney General
Cowan said in 1943 that:
school committee in any municipality
or
cannott lawfully permit the use of a public^
school building by any group for any particular
type of
training.
Such, I believe, was the intention
of the framers of the State Constitution; and
such,
believe, has been the intention of our legislature inI
all
the enactments that it has made since the foundation
of
our government.
In 1947 the Attorney General’s office ruled that subsection one

of section 473 » giving the management and care of the schools
to the school committee, does not include the right to lease

school property to outside parties.

Again in 1950, Attorney

Parris ruled that, in his opinion, it was illegal for

a

high

school to allow the use of its auditorium for Seventh Day

Adventist meetings.^^
School buildings, being public property, and among
the largest and sturdiest buildings in most municipalities,

are often designated as public shelters in the event of an

emergency.

An interesting question arose in I963 as to who

would have jurisdiction over public school buildings in the
Attorney General Benoit

event of a national or state disaster.
stated his opinion as follows:

^^ Attorney General Report (1943)» P* 70.
^

^Attorney General Report (1947), p. 23.

^^Attorney General Report

(

1950 )

)

,

P • 200

Ik2

JS; S%r.;r“

“S

^
exist for the purpose of preventing
such cLnfrfo ?
Governor of our State executes
the”^
emergen’
in the Maine Civil Defense
nd Public Safety Act, responsibility
for manaffement
school buildings rests with superintending
school
ccnmittees and school directors. Acts
in
preparation
for emergencies by civil defense
officials do^ot include
the exercise of control over school
facilities. lo
,

Thus it would appear that while Civil
Defense officials might
be granted control of public school
buildings during an emergency by a directive from the Governor,
these officials, in

preparing for emergencies, may not assume control
of school
facilities for the purpose of equipping storerooms,

altering

basements, etc., unless such authority is granted
by the
school committee.
'

School Sites

Location

.

Ordinarily, the location of school sites

is left to the discretion of the board of education.

Since

this decision is generally left to the judgement of the board
of education, the courts will not intervene with action taken

by the board unless such action is clearly unreasonable and
arbitrary.
”.

.

.

Thus it was held in Jordan v. Haskell

that,

The location of a school house lot is not invalid,

merely because the bounds of the location, by mistake in some
^

^Attorney General Report (1963), p.

11^.

way, overlaps upon a public road. "I?

m

Marble v. McKennev

.

the Court held that, "Money raised for
the erection of a
schoolhouse upon a lot other than the one legally
designated
by the municipal officers of a town is deemed
to be raised for
an illegal purpose."^® In an earlier decision
involving the

same parties, Jordan v. Sch. Dist, No, 8 in Cape
Elizabeth

Court stated:

the

"When the location has been legally designated,

municipal oTriccPs, upon
a jury,

,

th.e

land of a certain personi

on petition of the owner, cannot change the location

to the land of another or to that of the district

Finally, an Attorney General’s ruling in 1951 held
that school district trustees have no authority to select a

location and build a schoolhouse without the approval of the
superintending school committee of the town and the State

Board of Health.
Eminent domain

.

The courts have consistently upheld

the legal right to acquire property by eminent domain.

taking is for the public use.

Such

The extent of the land that

may be taken is not limited to the amount needed for

a school

building or buildings and may include such other amount as is
necessary for reasonable use by the school, including land for
a playground and athletic fields.

Jordan v. Haskell

,

63 Me. 189

{l87i|-)*

^^ Marble v. Me Kenney 60 Me. 332 (1872).
,

^^ Jordan v. Haskell
^

,

63 Me. 189 (l87i+)

1

^Attorney General Report (1951) »P« 39.

P*

In Goodwin v.

in 1872

,

the Court ruled:

When a location for the
“
schoolhouse and necessary
buUdin^rh^r
designated, and the owner
asks an unreasonable price therfo?®reruLs®to
for it in
^
municipal officers, tLy may
lav
out
®
®®‘^°°lhouse
lot, not exceeding fort^sqLre
rod!
ods, and appraise the
damages-^!
The right of land-taking for
school purposes was confirmed
by the court again in 1877 in
C^s ens v. Inhabitants of
Dis trict Ko. If in Lyman . An
excerpt from this decision
follows
,

Where the warrant for the meeting
of a schonl
district regularly called and holden,
anS^the
!o?!!
passed at that meeting, taken as a
whole, unmistakably
district has designated a certain lot
of
land
land adjoining the one occupied by
their existing school
connection with it as a schoolhouse
lot^for°th®
ot for the erection of a new
schoolhouse, and the owner
refuses to sell the same, the selectmen
may
iLfuliv^^o
lawfully lay it out for a schoolhouse lot
and
appraise
the damages therefor 22
.

.

:

••

.

Legislative intent in eminent domain proceedings
has
been clearly spelled out in two very recent
companion
cases

involving School Administrative District No. 17 in
Norway.
In the first of these cases, a complaint was brought
to seek
a declaratory judgement interpreting certain
sections of the

Sinclair Act relative to eminent domain procedure.

Specifi-

cally, the plaintiff, owner of the land chosen as the site for
the new administrative district school, alleged that the land

could not properly be taken by eminent domain since the two
towns involved, Norway and Paris, had not voted approval of
^^ Goodwin v. Nye

,

60 Me.

[|.02

(1872).

^^Cousens v. School Dist. No. k
p. 283

.

,

67 Me. 280 (1877),
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such taking; and that the school
directors, not the "municipal
officers" of the town, had laid out the
parcel of land in question
and thus violated the law.
The pertinent part of the statute
reads as follows;

... When a location for the erection or removal
of a schoolhouse and requisite buildings
has been
designated by vote of the town at any town meeting legally
called
for that purpose or by the school direct ors of
a school
admini strat i v e district and the owner thereof
refuses to
sell, or in the opinion of the municip al officers,
asks
an unreasonable price for it .
they may lay out a
schoolhouse lot and playgrounds, not exceeding
for any one project, and appraise the damages as25 acres
is provided for laying out town ways, and on payment or
tender
of such damages .
.
the administrative unit designating
It may take such lot to be held and used for
the purposes
aforesaid, ^3 (Italics mine)
,

.

.

.

In School Administrative District No. 17 v. Robert S. Orre .^^

the Court interpreted this section to mean that the functions

nndinarily performed by either selectmen or school committees
of towns are now to be performed by the school directors of a

school administrative district.

The words "municipal officers"

as used in the statute include school directors.

Court hold that it is

Thus, the

the duty and responsibility of the

school directors to lay out the proposed lot and appraise

damages for the taking thereof if the plaintiff- refused to
sell
In the companion case settled just six months later,

the facts were these.

The plaintiff, Oxford County Agricultural

^^Maine, Revised Statutes Annotated (1957),

c.

364,

sec. 5.
^

^School Administrative District No. 17
Orre, et al., 160 Me. 45 (i9b5^»

v.

Robert S .
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Society, and owner of the proposed

lot',

contended that the

defendant. School Administrative District No.
1?, could not
legally take their land by eminent domain since
the property
was being used by the Society for a "public use" to
promote

agriculture, etc., and furthermore, that the location of
the
lot had not been approved by the voters of the District.
In finding for the defendant the Court said the following;
*
Justice below correctly found that while
*
the activities of the Society benefit the public in some
degree, tliey fall short of constituting "public uses" in
the technical sense which would exempt its property from
*

.

.

eminent domain processes.
The promotion of agricultural products at a fair
which lasts but a few days in each year, although
highly desirable, can hardly be said to lift any appreciable burden from the shoulders of the taxpayers.
We conclude, as did the Justice below, that the property
of the Society is not immune from condemnation by
the District. 25
.

.

.

In dismissing the second allegation. Justice Webber said,
".

.

.By

its express terms Sec. 3^62 provides that the location

of schools begins with a vote at a town meeting in the case of
a

town and with a vote of the directors in the case of a

district.
Contracts

Approval of plans

.

Plans and specifications for

^^ Oxford County Agricultural Society v. School Admin istrative District No. 177 Ifal Me. 33V (l9^o)
Ibid.

11^7

construction of a schoolhouse must either
be furnished by the
State Department of Education or approved
by the Commissioner
of Education and the State Bureau of
Health.
In Morse v.

^h^ bitants
_

_

of Montville a question arose as to
whether

a

school

committee could contract for the construction of
a schoolhouse
before the plans and specifications had been approved.
The

Court answered in the negative, saying;
Plans or specifications must either be furnished by
the State or submitted to the State Superintendent of
P^^iic Schools and the State Board of Health for approval;
if this is not the case, all parties who did business
with them in furnishing material or labor for the erecting
of the schoolhouse dealt with them at their peril. 27

Once plana are approved, contractors are obligated to

follow them.

In a very early decision in 181;0 it was held

that a contractor could not recover of the district the value
of materials for a school since the contract was not followed.

Neither may a city, under its charter rights, erect

a school-

house unless the plans have been approved by the school committee.

In Lund v. City of Auburn cited earlier, the Court

said in effect that the city council is in no sense a school

committee and can perform none of that body's functions,
except by legislative grant.

29

Architectural services

The authority to construct a

.

Morse v. Inhabitants of Town of Montville

,

115 Me.

kSk. 99 A.T3H”(1916), p.
^^

Shep.

)

316

Hill V. School Dist. No. 2 in Millburn

^^Lund V. City of Auburn
(1913),

,

17 Me.

(iai4.0).
,

110 Me.

2i;l,

85 A. 893

(5
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school building carries with it by implication the authority
to retain and compensate an architect.

The architect ordinarily

is retained through the execution of contract of employment

between the school board and the architect, which sets forth
his responsibilities as well as his compensation.

In an Old

Town case in 1931 a school committee had engaged an architect
to design a school and submit estimates of its cost.

The city

subsequently voted not to build the school and the architect
sought to recover his fee.
of Old Town that,

The Court held in Bunker v. City

"there is no principle or authority of law,

statutory or otherwise, on which an architectural firm could
recover from a municipality for plans and estimates never used
but returned."

30

Summary

Maine school committees or school directors are

responsible for the management of the schools and the custody
and care, including repairs and insurance on school buildings

and all school property in their administrative units.

property itself, however, is owned by the state.

The

Local dis-

tricts hold the title to the property, once paid for, in trust

for the state.

The legislature may control or dispose of such

its
property, with or without the consent of the district or

inhabitants.
'

construct
School Committees or directors have the right to

t

A. U41
3*^Bunker v. City of 01<^ Towni I 30 Me. 510 » 153

(1931).

school buildings with or without the aid
of the Maine School
Building Authority and to take land for a school
site by

eminent domain if necessary.

The state authorities must

approve the building plans, however.
The control and use of school buildings is left almost

entirely to the local board.

In the event of an emergency

declared by the Governor the control and use of school buildings

would be turned over to the appropriate civil defense agencies.
While it is common practice in Maine to permit community

use of school buildings for a wide range of activities, a series
of opinions from the Attorney General's office have consistently

held that school buildings may not be used for sectarian purposes by religious groups.
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CHAPTER VIII
PUPILS

Introduction

Questions of a legal nature affecting pupils
have been
very similar throughout the nation. Typical of
these
are

problems of admission, exclusion, attendance, classification,
residence, tuition, transportation, curriculum, pupil
control,
moral instruction, and liability for injury.

Many of these questions have not as yet been contested
in the Maine courts.

Consequently for answers to these

questions, school administrators of the state must rely on

opinions from the Attorney General's office and court decisions

rendered in other states for guidance in interpreting the
Maine statutes.
Attendance
Maine, like each of the other states, has a compulsory

attendance law.

The essential elements of the statute read

as follows:

Every child between the 7th and l?th anniversaries
of his birth shall attend some public day school during
the time such school is in session, and an absence therefrom of 1/2 day or more shall be deemed a violation of
this requirement. . • . Such attendance shall not be
required if the child obtains equivalent instruction,
for a like period of time, in a private school in which
the course of study and method of instruction have been
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approved by the commissioner,!
The validity of this enactment
has never been tested
in the Maine courts. One may
safely assume, however, that
the
law would be upheld as a valid
exercise of the police power
of
the state.
In an historic decision in our
neighboring state
of New Hampshire, it was held that.
"Education is so essential
to the general welfare . . . that
the state may require children to attend a public, private, or
parochial school. "2
In other jurisdictions, the courts are
in disagreement
as to whether home instruction by the
parents or by a tutor is

the equivalent of regular school education and
meets the com-

pulsory attendance requirements.^

This point has not been

raised in Maine but the Attorney General ruled in

1961}.

that a

correspondence course unapproved by the district directors
and the Commissioner is not the equivalent of school attendance
and does not satisfy the requirements of compulsory attendance.^

Exclusion
There are many provisions in the Maine statutes for the

exclusion of pupils.

These include contagion, filth and

disease, physical or mental unfitness, habitual truancy and
^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated

(196ii)

t

c,

105,

sec. 911.

^State V. Jackson , 71 N.H. 552, 53 A. 1021 (1902).

^Robert R, Hamilton and Paul R. Mort, The Law and Public
Education (2d ed. rev.; Brooklyn; The Foundation Press, Inc.,

W^),'p.

507.

^Attorney General Report (1964)> P> 100.
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disorderly conduct.
Maine's attendance law carries the following provision:
The school coniinittee or school directors may
exclude from the public schools any child whose physical
or mental condition makes it inexpedient for him to
attend.^
•

•

•

The extent to which a child of school age must be

handicapped in order to be excluded has never been defined by
the statutes or by judicial opinion.

Presumably this decision

is left with local school authorities.

The authority to

exclude handicapped pupils from the public schools does not
absolve the local school officials from the responsibility of

providing education at public expense, however.

A recent

Attorney General opinion states in part:
Every administrative unit is responsible for appropriating sufficient funds to provide at least the same
per capita expenditure for the education of handicapped
or exceptional children as is provided for the education
of normal children.®

Exclusion from school on the basis of disorderly conparagraph 5

duct is spelled out in Chapter 15, section

under duties of school committees as follows:
Expel any obstinately disobedient and disorderly
scholar, after a proper investigation of his behavior,
the
if found necessary for the peace and usefulness of
his
of
school; and restore him on satisfactory evidence
repentance and amendment
.

^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated

(

1961;), c. 105 ,

sec. 911 •
^

Attorney General Report (1964)

>

P»

li^-5*

Maine. Revised" Statutes, Annotated (1964)
sec. 473» par. 5*

i

l5>
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A distinction should be made
between temporary exclusion
commonly known as suspension and
permanent

exclusion generally

known as expulsion.

It is well established
that teachers,

principals, and superintendents have
the legal right to remove
temporarily a pupil from a classroom or
from school if his
conduct is disrupting the routine of
the school.
The suspension
may be for an hour, a day, or for several
days.
In general,

suspension seldom exceeds two weeks or ten
school days since
longer suspension would give the pupil the

a

status of a non-

student.

While there have been no Maine cases challenging

the authority of school officials to suspend
pupils, a

Wisconsin case settled the issue in that state and the
judicial
thinking in the case has been widely upheld elsewhere.
In

State V, Burton , Justice Lyon said in part;
The teacher is responsible for the discipline of his
school, and for the progress, conduct and deportment of
his pupils.
It is his imperative duty to maintain good
order, and to require of his pupils a faithful performance
of their duties*
If he fails to do so, he is unfit for
his position.
To enable him to discharge these duties
effectually, he must necessarily have the power to enforce
prompt obedience to his lawful commands. For this reason,
the law gives him the power, in proper cases, to inflict
corporal punishment upon refractory pupils. But there are
cases of mis-conduct for which such punishment is an inadequate remedy.
If the offender is incorrigible, suspension or expulsion is the only adequate remedy
.
the conduct of the recusant pupil may be such that his
presence in the school for a day or an hour may be
disastrous to the discipline of the school, and even
to the morals of other pupils.
In such a case, it seems
absolutely essential to the welfare of the school that
the teacher should have the power to suspend the offender
at once from the privileges of the school.
.

8

.

State V. Burton, 45 Wis. l$Ot 30 Am. Rep. ?06 (1878).

As earlier noted, the legal right
to exclude permanently
or expel a pupil rests with the school
committee or school
directors. This responsibility may not
be delegated to others.
The legislative intent of the meaning of a
’’proper investigation” was explained in
v. Small . ^
^^,^3 ^33^

^

concerned itself with the legality of expelling

a pupil

from a

school in a school district whore his parents were
nonresidents,
a second allegation of the school authorities
was that of dis-

orderly conduct.

The defendant pupil claimed that a proper

investigation of his behavior was not made.

In commenting on

this point Justice Deasy said:
.
.
The committee have large powers. They may
exclude pupils for sanitary reasons, or because mentally
defective .
.
they exercise quasi -judicial powers.
If
they act in good faith they are not liable in damages
even if clearly wrong. After proper investigation they
may expel a pupil. No appeal is provided for. If they
act in good faith after proper investigation their decision is final. But before expelling a pupil they must
make such investigation. This duty cannot be wholly
delegated to others.
In the instant case the respondents received from
certain teachers a written complaint about the conduct
of the pupil. Upon this the respondents evidently relied
in excluding the pupil and refusing reinstatement. A
complaint by teachers is a sufficient reason for an
investigation, but it is not an investigation, or at all
events not such V proper investigation as the statute
(Italics mine)
contemplates .
.

.

A

191|.6

opinion by Attorney General Farris defines both

investigation and repentance.

His opinion reads in part as

follows

^Shaw v. Small ,
10 Ibid.

I2I4.

Me. 3^, 125 A. l\96

(I92I4.).
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^ committee received
statements
from those who were present upon the written
action of this boy
^
which caused his expulsion, in my opinion,
be a proper investigation of his behavior, that would
under

the
signed a statement
that he was sorry for the trouble he had
caused and the
school board restored him and he graduated
from hivh
school indicated that the case is now closed,
as
boy 8 letter of repentance and amendment, in my the
opinion,
is equivalent to a plea of confession and
avoidance in
a civil case.-*--^

Two additional Attorney General opinions support the
principle
that the school committee or directors make the final
judgement

in expulsion cases.

In 19

4.I,

I

Attorney General Cowan said,

"The committee may enforce obedience to all regulations within

the scope of their authority.

If they may select a book they

may require the use of the book selected.

...

It is for the

committee to determine what misconduct requires expulsion.
Earlier, in 1929, Attorney General Fogg said:
If, after a proper investigation, the committee is
satisfied that it is necessary for the peace and usefulness of the school that the student be expelled, they
have the power to expel him, and if they act in good
faith they are not liable in damages, even though the
court should subsequently find that they were clearly
wrong. 13
.

It has been held in other jurisdictions that a child

may be suspended or expelled for disrespect toward school
authorities; for immorality; for drinking; for smoking; the
use of cosmetics contrary to school regulations; irregular
or tardy attendance at school; refusal to obey when told to
^^ Attorney General Report
(1946), P* 89.

^^

Attorney General Report (1941)

»

P« 5l«

^^ Attorney General Report (1929), p. 40.
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read from a school book; refusal to submit to the examination
of the school physician on the grounds of conscientious

objections; refusal to give the name of a pupil who has been

guilty of a breach of rules when he knows the name of the
pupil; making a speech in a school meeting criticizing the

‘

board of education; being drxink on Christmas Day; publishing
in a newspaper a satirical poem reflecting on school policy;

failure to maintain a required scholastic standing, althou^
there is substantial authority to the contrary; failure to

pay for school property willfully or maliciously destroyed;
and for general failure to obey the school rules or orders
reasonably issued by any teacher or administrator.^^
In view of the aforesaid, there is no question as to
the right of a school committee to expel a pupil under specific

conditions.

In our changing social scene, especially in the

area of civil rights, it behooves school officials to act with

renewed caution in this area.

School committees should be

careful to follow the prescribed procedures which include a

proper investigation.

In the future, this may well include a

hearing by the pupil or his parents in which they may be repre15
sented by counsel.
Concerning the proper procedure to follow in the event
pupil
that law enforcement officers attempt to interrogate a

^^lamilton, op. cit ., p.

^^In re Gault i

5H4-*

99 Ariz. l8l, 3®? U.S. 1 (1967).
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while at school, a 1961 Attorney General's
opinion offers the
following guideline:
If a law enforcement officer requests
an opportunity
^
to question a student who is a minor and
accused of a
crime, the safest course would be to inform
the
immediately and ask the officer to defer until parent
the

parent’s arrival.

The right of pupils to attend school is not subject
to the whims and caprices of the school authorities,
however.

It has been stated frequently that only reasonable rules may

be enforced.

If pupils are suspended or expelled for the

violation of an unreasonable rule

,

or where school authorities

act maliciously, in bad faith, or arbitrarily, an injury is

committed in which the pupil may seek remedy for wrongful
expulsion.

An action in mandamus to reinstate the pupil may

be brought or a suit in damages.

In the latter case, if a

parent has incurred tuition expenses for his child's attendance
at another school directly resulting from wrongful expulsion

or suspension, an action to recover may be brought in his own
name.

The courts will rarely substitute their judgement for

that of a school committee in such cases.

As one authority

on the subject has said:

Indeed it would be difficult to procure able
teacher and board personnel if they were constantly faced
with the possibility of having to answer in damages for^
mistakes which they might make in good faith. The public
has no right to expect of its school personnel more than
good faith efforts to carry on the educational work of
the district. 17
.

.

.

^^ Attorney General Report (1961), p. 101.
^ 7ibld ., p. 520.
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Residence of Pupils

Establishing the legal residence of pupils for
school
purposes is a problem in Maine as elsewhere.

Courts around

the country are in general agreement that the
domicile of the

child for school purposes is the domicile of the
parents.^^
In Maine y legal residence is defined as the administrative

unit where the father maintains a home for his family.
The ownership of a house and the maintaining of
are not synonymous.

a

home

Thus in 1963 the Attorney General stated

that the ownership of a summer home in a town where the family

resides each summer and on which the parents pay taxes is not

sufficient for town tuition privileges.

It has been held in

Maine that the school residence of pupils whose parents reside

on a U.S. government reservation or military reservation is
the same as the town or school district in which the installa-

tion is located.
Only one case involving legal residence has reached
This was Shaw v. Small

the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.

referred to earlier in this chapter*

22

The litigation centered

iQ

^Lee 0. Garber and Newton Edwards, The Law Governing
Danville : The
^pils ("School Law Casebook Series No.
Publishers,
Interstate Printers and
1962), p. 3.
19

Attorney General Report (1956), p* 69.

^ ^Attorney General Report
(1963), p. 59.
21

'‘

‘Attorney General Report

^^Shaw V, Small

(

1957

) ,

P • 26

124 Me. 38 , 125 A. 496 (1924).
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around the meaning of the word
"guardian" as used in chapter
16.
section 30 of the Revised Statutes.
This section provides
that every child shall have the
right to attend the public
schools in the town in which his parents
or guardian has a
legal residence.
Joseph A. Arsenault, the boy
Involved

in
the case, was thirteen years of age
and a ward of the state.
By due court proceedings he had been
placed in custody of the

State Board of Children's Guardians and this
Board placed the
boy in the care of a Mrs. VIhalen, a resident
of Yarmouth,
with whom in that town the boy lived despite
the fact that

the boy's parents were not separated and lived
in another town.

The facts of the case indicate that the boy was a

disciplinary problem and, failing to expel legally the boy on
disorderly conduct charges, the school officials attempted to
expel him on the basis that his parents did not reside in the

school district whore he was attending school.

The Court ordered

the reinstatement of the boy to the public schools of Yarmouth.

Excerpts from the opinion follow:
The word guardian when used in statutes
ordinarily si^iifLes the guardian appointed by the Probate
Court, but the word does not necessarily mean Probate
Guardian.
It may be used in its broader sense as "a
person who legally has the care of the person or property
or both of another, incompetent to act for himself." The
care and the custody of the boy was given to Mrs. Whalen
by the State.
She has the right to his custody as against
the boy's parents and against all comers except the State
itself. She stands toward the boy in loco parentis. In
the sense in which the word is used in H.S.. Chap. 16,
Sec. 30, she is the guardian of the child. ^3
.

.

.

^3ibid.
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The legislature has since revised the original
statute
and clarified the meaning of residence,
it reads as follows;

... ^ery person between the ages
have the right to attend as a full-time of 5 and 21 shall
the consent of the school committee or stuin?, or with
board of directors
as a part-time student, the public
schools in the
which his parent or guardian has
Residence as used in this section shall mean
;
the administrative
unit where the father maintains a home
family.
If the parents are separated, residency
considered to be the administrative unit where
custody of the child maintains his or
her home^^^^^^^*^^
Attendance at a school in a district where a pupil’s parents
or guardian do not reside is not- permissible unless tuition
charges are made.

In 1950 » the Attorney General's office

ruled that
If a child residing with a grandmother who stands
in loco parentis attends high school in another town
by reason of there being no high school in the town of the
child’s residence, the town of the child's residence is
liable for tuition notwithstanding that the grandmother
has not been appointed the guardian of the child. 25

The Attorney General's office offered another opinion

in 1961 as follows:
It is clear that when a town maintains an elementary
school, the only basis for allowing a pupil to attend a
school in another town and payment of tuition by the
sending town is upon a finding of the school committee
that the pupil lives remote from the public school in
his own town, except that with approval of the school
committee a parent may send his child to another town,
but the parent must pay the tuition and not the sending
town.^°

^^Maine, Revised Statutes
^

(195i^')»

c*

IO 3 , sec, 859.

^Attorney General Report (1950)» P« I 6 I.

^^ Attorney General Report (1961), p. 49.
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Tuition

Generally, children may attend school in districts in

which they are nonresident if the home district does not maintain free public schools, and the town pays
to the receiving district.

a

tuition charge

Maine, being a large and sparsely

populated state has many unorganized townships, islands, and
remote areas where free public schools cannot be maintained.
It is also interesting that there are twenty-eight private

academies in the state which depend entirely on tuition students

for operation.

This means that Maine has an \musually large

number of tuition pupils attending schools in districts in

which they do not reside.
Another interesting fact about tuition pupils in Maine
is that at least one town contracts for the secondary schooling

of its pupils with a parochial school.

V/hile it has not

been

challenged in the courts, it is interesting to speculate as
to whether or not this would be held to be a church- state coni

flict in which public tax moneys are being spent to support
1

a sectarian school.

I

Three cases, all involving the payment of tuition,

have reached Maine’s highest court.

volved private schools.
i

i

Not surprisingly,

all

in-

In the earlier statutes on tuition,

school as a tuition pupil
a pupil could not be accepted at a

from the school committee
without a certificate of qualification
pupil was qualified to
of the sending town stating that the
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attend.

In Goodwin v. Charleston .

boy who lived in

Charleston, which did not maintain a high school,
applied and
was accepted at Higgins Classical Institute as
a tuition pupil.
He did not request nor did the private school
seek a certificate
of qualification from the local school committee.
After

’

attending the school for a year, the Institute requested
the
tuition payment from the town of Charleston. The town
refused
to pay whereupon the boy's father paid the amount
due.
This

action was brought by the father to recover from the town
the
amount of the tuition.

The action was denied.

Justice

Whitehouse said in part;
•

•

•

The only question now presented for determination

is whether this action brought in the name of the pupil
himself by his next friend, can be maintained to recover
from the town the amount of the tuition voluntarily paid
to the Institute by his father, and our conclusion is
that the situation disclosed by the evidence constitutes
no-

legal basis for the plaintiff's action.

Apparently the case was settled on the single point that the

boy had failed to get a certificate of qualification from the

.

local school committee.
In a very similar case settled just a year later the

Court was asked to determine who has the right to recover

tuition from a sending town, the parent or guardian of the
pupil, or the school which the pupil attends.

Ricker Classical

Institute in Houlton brought action to recover tuition for
^"^Goodwin V. Inhabitants of Charleston , 100 Me.

606

(

1905 ).

51^9

»

62 A.
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three pupils attending from the town of Mapleton.

For reasons

not readily apparent in the facts of the case, the
town of

Mapleton had refused to pay the tuition charges due.

The

defendant town maintained that the parents were responsible
for the payment of tuition and they in turn could collect from
the town.

The Court upheld Ricker Classical Institute, the

plaintiff in the case.

Justice Whitehouse said in part:

... It is the opinion of the court that this contention cannot be sustained. It would seem to be the
more reasonable and natural construction of the statute
to hold that the legislature intended to establish the
relation of debtor and creditor between the town and the
school, and to require the town to pay the tuition
directly to the school that rendered the service.
Under the revised statutes now in effect, school admin-

istrative units not maintaining approved secondary schools are

authorized to contract with neighboring districts for the
secondary schooling of the qualified youth of its district.

Under Section 1291

>

however, any youth whose parent or

guardian maintains a home for his family in any administrative
unit which fails to maintain an approved secondary school or
fails to contract for such schooling on a tuition basis may
attend any approved secondary school in the state to which he

may gain entrance.

The town is responsible for the tuition

of the pupil.
^^ Ricker Classical Institute v. Inhabitants of
(l906 )
A*
Mapleton , 101 Me. 553 >

c.

113 >

^^Maine, Revised Statutes. Annotated
soo* 1289.

(196i4.),

Title 20,

1614

.

Tho only other tuition
case on record considered
the
right of pupils to attend a
secondary school
than those
whach had been contracted for
by the sending town,
Maine
cen tral Institut e v.
Inja
of Palmyra .31 ^he
facts of
the case were as follows.
The town of Palmyra
which had no
high school contracted for the
schooling of its secondary
students with the adjoining town
of Newport and with the
trustees
of Hartland Academy in the
adjoining town of Hartland.
Pour
students from Palmyra, nevertheless,
elected to attend Maine
Central Institute in the adjoining
town of Pittsfield.
In an
action by Maine Central Institute to
recover tuition from the
town of Palmyra the plaintiff based
its right to recover on

ot^

^ts

Section 93 which reads in part as follows:

m

"Any youth who

resides with a parent or guardian in any
town which does not
support and maintain a standard secondary
school may attend
any approved secondary school to which he
may gain entrance.
The defendant town of Palmyra contended that
under the statute,
a child residing with his parents in a town
without a high

school had no right to attend an outside school at
the expense
of the town for tuition unless the town failed to
contract as

provided.
The Court ruled in favor of the inhabitants of the

town of Palmyra.
31

Since the town had furnished adequate

Maine Centr al Institute v. Inhabitants of Palmvra.

139 Mo. 30inT91|3')V
32 Ibid.

.
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secondary school educational
opportunities to its youth
under
contracts, it was not liable
for tuition bills for
the youth
of Palmyra who wished to
attend other secondary
schools.

Justice Hudson in speaking
for the Court said in
part-

tuition? “if
spell absolute repugnancy

'

t?
intentions
would clearly

Under Section 1291 of the current
statute in effect,
a pupil may attend any
secondary school to which he may
gain
entrance if the local high school
offers less than two approved
occupational courses of study; fails
to offer a two-year
course, in mathematics, science
or a foreign
language; or fails

to offer an approved technical or
vocational course which the
pupil wishes to pursue*

A series of opinions from the Attorney
General’s office
have consistently upheld this section. They
are as
follows:

”(a) School Administrative District
# 14.7 was held
responsible for the tuition of a Sidney Student
who attended an Institute for the purpose of
studying Latin III despite the fact that the
District claimed it would have offered the
had the student requested
"(b) The town of Bristol was held responsible for the
tuition of Bristol pupils attending Lincoln
Academy for the purpose of studying foreign

^^ Ibid

*

3li

Attorney General Report (1966),

p.

68.
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lanpagea not available locally despite the
fact
language
teacher was employed
after the school year started, ”35

"(c) The town of Webster was held
responsible for the
tuition of a pupil attending Lewiston
High

School

n"

o??e?ed'’lolany?"3^^"“®

"(d) A Bristol pupil was granted tuition
privileges at
Lincoln Academy for the purpose of studying Latin
II
despite the fact that he was in his fifth year
of
secondary school study. ”37

Finally, three opinions from the Attorney General's

office on miscellaneous matters pertaining to tuition are
here
inc luded:
"(a) A receiving school may not charge a full semester's
tuition for pupils who enroll late or leave the
school before the end of the term, as tuition may
de charged for pupils while they are receiving
instruction in the schools. "38
"(b) Free tuition privileges in the public school system
do not extend to postgraduate courses. "39

"(c) Based on present law it would not be proper to charge
tuition to students attending a public school during
the summer.

Pupil Control
School committees and boards of directors charged with
^ ^Attorney General Report

^^
3'^

3°

Ibid .

,

p. 59.

Ibld .

,

p. 60.

Attorney General Report

(1965), P. 59.

(1961).),

p. 165.

^ °Attorney General Report (1963), p. 72.

^ ^Attorney General Raport (1959),

p. 37.
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the management and operation of the
public schools have the
legal right to adopt reasonable rules
for the discipline and

management of the schools.

The rules of a board of education

are final in such respect, and the
courts will not interfere
unless the board acts unreasonably or in
violation of law.
The courts are very reluctant to declare a
board regulation

unreasonable.

They will rarely substitute their own discretion

for that of the school authorities.
As has been stated repeatedly in this study, the
teacher

stands in loco parentis to children under his supervision and

may exercise such powers of control and discipline as are

reasonably necessary for him to perform properly his duties
as a teacher and to accomplish the purposes of the school.

Generally, so much of the authority of a parent is impliedly

delegated by law to a teacher as is necessary for the proper
control, supervision, and discipline of a child.

Those areas which have resulted in most of the litiga-

tion in connection with pupil control include exclusion, which

has been discussed earlier in this chapter; corporal punishment;

regulations concerning pupil dress and appearance; married
pupils; required subjects including religious and moral in-

struction; and regulations governing pupil behavior off

school grounds and after school hours.

These subjects will

now be considered separately.
Corporal punishment .

The courts have held repeatedly

that a teacher may inflict reasonable corporal punishment on
a pupil for insubordination, disobedience, or other

168

misbehavior^!

While school officials, including
superintendents, principals, and teachers, are vested
with broad discretionary authority in the infliction of
corporal punishment, the punishment must be reasonable and within
the bounds
of moderation^ it cannot bo cruel or excessive,
and
the

official administering the punishment must not act
maliciously,

wantonly or in a fit of anger.

In the determination of whether

the punishment is reasonable, the courts have hold that
con-

sideration must also bo given to the age, sex, and size of the
pupil.

Regarding the criminal or civil liability of

a teacher

who inflicts corporal punishment, certain general rules are
important.

In a civil action against a teacher for damages

caused by improper punishment of a pupil, the burden of proof
rests on the plaintiff to satisfy the Jury that the teacher

unlawfully beat and injured the child and that damages resulted therefrom.

Whether the punishment was unreasonable or

excessive and whether there was an injury are questions of
fact for a jury to determine in a civil lawsuit.

On the question of a criminal liability it has been

held that moderate and reasonable correction by

with

a teacher

a proper Instrument is not a criminal offense.

Mere

immoderate and excessive force does not constitute a crime

unless it is of such a nature as to produce or threaten lasting

^^Newton Edwards, The Courts and the Public Schools
The University of Chicago Press,
(2d ed. rev.; Chicago:
p. 610.

»
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or pormanont injury and la accompanied
by express or Implied
malice.^

Two very early cases reached the Maine
Supreme Judicial
Court on the subject of corporal punishment
and the precedents
established still hold today. In Stevens v.
Passett,^^ in l8i;7,
a pupil

by the name of Calvin Passett charged the
master of a
school, and the school agent, with assault as
a result of

having been forcibly removed from the schoolhouse.

The boy

had refused to remove himself from the instructor's desk,
and the master being unable to remove physically the
twenty-

one-year-old pupil by himself, sought the aid of the school
agent who assisted the master in ejecting the boy from the
school.

agent.

The Court held in favor of the teacher and the school

Pertinent excerpts from the decision follow:

When a scholar in school hours , intrudes himself
into the desk assigned to the instructor, and refuses to
leave it, on the request of the master, such scholar may
be lawfully removed by the master; and for that purpose
he may immediately use such force, and call to his
assistance such aid from any other person, as is necessary to accomplish the object, without the direction or
knowledge of the superintending school committee.
The right of the parent to keep the child in order and
obedience, is secured by the common law. He may lawfully
correct his child, being under age, in a reasonable manner,
for this is for the benefit of his education. He may
delegate also a part of his parental authority during his
life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child, who is
then in loco parentis, and has such portion of the power
that of
of the Parent, committed to his charge, viz:
to answer
be
necessary
may
as
correction,
restraint and
the purpose for which he is employed.
.

.

.

L. Drury and Kenneth C. Ray, Principles of
School Lav (New York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts , 1965; , p 31

^Robert

^ ^Stevens v. Passett

,

27 Me.

(11^.

Shep.) 266 (1847).

•
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The power of the parent to restrain
and coerce
obedience in children, cannot be doubted,
and it has
seldom or never been denied. The power
delegated to
by the parent, must be accomplished
time being, with the same right as incidental, for the
or the
object sought must fail of accomplishment.
,
The
practice, which has generally prevailed in our
town
schools, since the first settlement of the
country has
been in aocordance with the law thus expressed,
and
resort has been had to personal chastisement,
where
milder means of restraint have been unavailing.^
.

.

The legality of corporal punishment was perhaps
more

strongly worded in the second and only other case to
reach the
Maine courts on the subject in 1886. This was an action

charging the schoolmaster with assault and battery for
switching a pupil for refusing to bring in wood for the
school stove.

In deciding in favor of the schoolmaster.

Justice Emery clearly spelled out the legality of corporal

punishment along with certain other general propositions of
importance to school officials, teachers and pupils.

He said

in part;

... A schoolmaster has a right to inflict reasonable
corporal punishment. He must exercise reasonable judgment
and discretion in determining the manner of punishment,
and to what extent.
In determining what is reasonable
punishment, various considerations must be regarded. The
nature of the offense; the apparent motive and disposition
of the offender; the influence of his example and conduct
upon others and the age, sex, size and strength of the
pupil to be punished.
Among reasonable persons much difference prevails as
to the circumstances which will justify the infliction of
punishment and the extent to which it may be properly
administered. On account of this difference of opinion
and the difficulty which exists in determining what is a
reasonable punishment and the advantage which the master
.

^

^Ibid

.

.

.
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has by being on the spot and
knowinp- all
circumstances, the manner, look
^
of the offender, which ar4
language
not
and thus to form a correct
described
the necessity
and the extent of the punishment
should be made to the teach^
by^wav
P^^tecting him
in the exercise of his discretion
^®P®®lally
should he
have this indulgence, when he annio
good motives anf trt’ftorall|et'’trt;tute‘:£r
Pupil dress and appearance

,

a second area of pupil

control which has precipitated a
number of controversies between school officials and parents is

that of rules and regula-

tions pertaining to pupil dress and
appearance.

Especially

in this age of long hair and short
skirts, the subject has
received a good deal of publicity and much
concern among

school officials.

It should be pointed out, however,

that

current fads are by no means responsible for
the bulk of the
litigation which has arisen on the subject.
As early as 1923 in a landmark case which was
referred
to for years, the Supreme Court of Arkansas set
the judicial

tone for later decisions on this subject.

The decision of the

Court in this case would unquestionably be overruled in this

day and age but is here included as an example of how far the
courts will go in backing up rules and regulations of local

boards of education.

As stated earlier, the courts will

rarely substitute their judgement for that of school boards

when they have acted in good faith.
In Pugslev V, Sellmeyer

the Court upheld the right

Patterson v. Nutter, 78 Me. 909. 97 Am. Reo. 8l8.
7 A. 273

(IHBBT
^^Pugsley V. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 2k7. 250 S.W, 938

(1923).

.
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of a school board to deny admission of a girl using cosmetics

contrary to a board rule that stated that the wearing of

transparent hosiery, low-necked dresses or any style of

clothing tending toward immodesty in dress, or the use of face
paint or cosmetics, is prohibited!

While the board rule may

seem a little unreasonable in 1968, the reasoning behind the
Court's decision is not.

Excerpts from this opinion follow;

.is not whether we approve this
The question
.
rule as one we would have made as directors of the district, nor are we required to find whether it was
essential to the maintenance of discipline. On the
contrary, we must uphold the rule unless we find that
the directors have clearly abused their discretion,
and that the rule is not one reasonably calculated to
effect the purpose intended, that is, of promoting
discipline in the school; and we do not so find.
.

Courts have other and more important functions to
perform than that of hearing the complaints of disaffected
pupils of the public schools against rules and regulations'
promulgated by the school ‘boards fo r the government of the
schools. The courts have this right of review, forthe
reasonableness of such rule is a judicial question, and
the courts will not refuse to perform their functions in
determining the reasonableness of such rules, when the
question is presented. But in doing so, it will bo kept
in mind that the directors are elected by the patrons of
the schools over which they preside, and the election
occurs annually. These directors are in close and
intimate touch with the affairs of their respective
districts, and„know the conditions with which they
have to deal.^' (Italics mine)
a Maine
It is interesting to note that as recently as 1951 »

that
Attorney General referred to this same case in ruling
to be worn
school authorities may prescribe the kind of dress

their personal
by pupils or make reasonable regulations as to
Ibid.
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appearance,^®
The question of rules and
regulations concerning pupil
dress and appearance has not as
yet reached the Maine Supreme

Judicial Court.

The Attorney General opinion
cited above is
currently the only guideline that
Maine school officials have.
A very recent case on this subject
in our neighboring state of
Massachusetts, however, reflects a judicial
attitude which

'

would probably carry considerable weight
in Maine should a
similar case arise.
In Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro

.

seventeen-year-old high school senior was suspended
for wearing
an extreme "beatle-type” haircut, until such
time
as he got

an ''acceptable" haircut.

The boy and his parents brought an

action to require the school committee to lift the
suspension.
Their contention was that the hair style was necessary to
the
boy’s profession since he performed as a musician and that
the board's regulation was an invasion of personal privacy
as well as that of the domain of the home and family.

Not so, held the Court.

They ruled that the unusual

hair style of the boy could disrupt the maintenance of proper

classroom atmosphere and decorum.

It held that any unusual,

immodest or exaggerated mode of dress, or conspicuous departures

from accepted customs in the matter of haircuts wore legal
grounds for suspension.
^^ Attorney General Neport

(

1951 )

»

P • 93 •

i

!

i

1

^^Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro,
(1^65).
70k, 212 N.e7 (2d)

3li.9

Mass,
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Married pupils.

It has been held in Louisiana,

New York,

and Ohio,^^ that school boards cannot compel
married
pupils to attend school even though such pupils
are within
the

compulsory attendance age.

On the other hand, pupils wishing

to attend school may not be excluded because they
are married.

Attorney General Frost, in addressing himself to the
question
of the legality of excluding married pupils under twenty-one

years of age said:

Such action is not permitted
and would, in
fact, bo repugnant to public policy, in that the courts
have always frowned upon any action which might be
construed as restraining marriage after the party has
reached marriageable age, where no immorality or misconduct is present.
.

.

.

V/hile there are no Maine cases so holding, four recent

decisions in Texas,

Michigan,

Ohio,^^ and Utah^7

]^ave all

uphold the right of school authorities to exclude married
pupils from participation in extracurricular activities, in-

cluding athletics.

The weight of legal authority is clearly

on the side of the pupil on the question of marriage.

Married

^^ State V. Priest , 210 La. 389, 27 S (2d) 173 (19l;6).

^^In re Rogers

,

23 I4 NYS (2d) 1?2 (1962).
.

^^State of Ohio v. Gans, 168 Ohio
709 (WS)":

17i;,

^^ Attorney General Report (1961), p.

l5l NE (2d)

91;.

^^Kissick V. Garland Independent School District

,

330

SW (2d) 708 (1959).

^^Cochrane v. Board of Education of Me sick Consol .
School Dist
36 o'~ ich. 390, I 03 NW (^d) 5^9 (l^^boy.
^^ Ohio ex rel. Baker v. Stevens on 189 NE (2d) I 8 I (1962).
.

,

^'^Starkey v. Board of Education of Danis County Dist^ .
381 P ( 2 d) 718 ( 1963 ).
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pupils may not be excluded solely on the
grounds of marriage
nor may they be forced to attend school
to satisfy compulsory
attendance requirements.
In 1929, Attorney General Pogg ruled that
a school

committee has the power to expel a student who
is the admitted
father of an illegitimate child, if, after a proper
investigation, the committee is satisfied that it is
necessary for the

peace and usefulness of the school, and if they act
in good
This question has not since been raised with the

rai'bh..

Attorney General for an opinion nor has it reached the courts.
Curriculum

Required subjects

.

The state has the legal right to

require that designated studies essential to good citizenship
be taught and that nothing be taught which is contrary to the

public welfare.

Local boards, in the absence of statutory

regulations, have the discretion to provide for the teaching
of such studies as they deem advisable.

While the school committee, subject to state law,
has the

ri^t

to establish generally the curriculum, the law

contemplates that general methods of instruction are within
the control of professionally trained teachers, principals and

superintendents.

While school authorities have the ri^t to

define the school curriculum, parents may make reasonable

selections from the prescribed studies for their children.
^^

Attorney General Report

(

1929 )

»

p.

ii-0

A

parent cannot insist that his child be
taught subjects not in
the program of studies or that he use
a textbook different from
that adopted by the school authorities.
The Maine laws provide that the school
committees and
school directors, "Direct the general course
of instruction

'

and approve a uniform system of textbooks
and make provisions
for the instruction of all pupils in schools
supported by
public money. "^9 ^he legislature, under the
authority of

Article VIII of the Constitution has, from time to time,
directed
the local boards of education to provide for specific
instruction
in such areas as physiology and hygiene; effects of alcoholic
drinks, stimulants and narcotics; American history; geography

and natural resources of Maine; virtue and morality; and a host
of other topics which need not here be enumerated.

The only real controversy in Maine concerning required

subjects has been in connection with moral and religious instruction.
Maine, as most other states, had a statute which re-

quired readings from the scriptures and recitation of the Lord's
The Supreme Court of the United States, in 1963, in

prayer.

the historic Schempp and Murray cases,

rendered these prac-

tices unconstitutional under the First Amendment as it applied
to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.

c.

15

»

^^^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated (1961|.), Title 20,
sec. I4 73 .
.

^

^School Dist. of Abington Township, Pa v. Schempp ;
U.sV ti07» ti3 S.Ct. 2 ^, ^ L.Ed. 2d 5^
Murray v. Curie tt,

TT^7.

.
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These cases received wide publicity throughout the
country.

The arguments and reasoning of the Justices have
been

widely reviewed and need not be reported here.^^

The interpreta-

tion and implementation of the Court’s decision has differed
somewhat throughout the country.

Of interest at this point

is the interpretation of the Maine Attorney General and the

State Board of Education.

Following the June 17, 1963, Supreme Court decisions,
Attorney General Hancock forwarded a synopsis of the decisions
and an interpretation of its effect under Maine law to the Com-

missioner of Education, dated Juno 21, 1963

Quotes from this

.

letter follow:
There is no question that the exercises set
forth in section 11^5 of chapter 4l> and the statute
itself, are unconstitutional and must be considered
henceforth null and void. All practices in our public
schools of Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's
Prayer or any other prayer as part of a religious
The pamphlet printed and disexercise shall cease.
tributed by the Department of Education entitled
"Suggested Bible Readings for Maine Public Schools"
should be now discarded by school officials.
It is clear that the decision does not prohibit the
secular study of the Bible or of those subjects in which
the history of religion may be an integral part.
It also would not prohibit the study and recitation
in our schools of documents and books containing references
to God nor would it prohibit the singing of religious hymns
by students as long as that singing was not a part of a
regular religious exercise or program. ^3
.

.

.

^^See Educational Policies Commission, Religion in the
Public Schools (Washington: American Association of School
Administrators, I96I4.)

^^"How Do You Prohibit Prayer," Time

,

Aug. 25, 1967,

p. 58.

°^Letter from Hon, Frank Hancock, Attorney General,
Hill, ComState of Maine, Augusta, Maine, to Dr. Warren G.
missioner of Education.
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Following several letters of protest
not only of the
Supreme Court decision, but of Attorney
General Hancock's
interpretation, a second letter was addressed
to the Governor
on November 7. 1963 .
In this second opinion the Attorney
General went into considerably more detail
in answering
specific questions.

Excerpts from this second letter are as

follows:
The only way to nullify or override the
Supreme Court
decision is by an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
.
.
Teachers may not voluntarily conduct the reading of
the Bible or recitation of prayers in the public
schools.
.

•

•

•

The teacher has no inherent authority to conduct
religious exercises and she may not effectuate a policy
which is beyond the power of her employer to authorize,
nor may she attempt to accomplish by indirection that
which is directly forbidden by the law of the land.
.
Most of the letters I have received bemoan the fact
that children no longer may be subject to the practice of
Bible reading and prayer recitation. There is some expression of fear that, because of the discontinuance of
the practice, our children will be deprived of a vital
religious indoctrination formally provided by the public
schools.
This is the very nub of the decision, to keep
government separate from religion. If we as a society
have gone so far that we must depend upon our schools to
provide the only touch of devotional exercise for our
children, then we should admit to failure in parental
and community guidance and leadership. . . .
Finally, I am alarmed by those who urge defiance of
the ruling of the Court.
Disagreement with the Court, or dislike of its rulings,
Private citizens, as well as
is no excuse for defiance.
public officials, are bound by the law as pronounced by
the highest court in the land. ... We cannot properly
ed \cate our children, and we cannot demand of them respect
and discipline, if we ourselves do not show respect for
the law.
To be responsible citizens we must practice what
we preach and sot the example by obeying the law.®^
.

.

^^!jetter from Hon. Frank Hancock, Attorney General,
State of Maine, Augusta, Maine, to Hon. John Reed, Governor of
Maine.
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Another question which has resulted in considerable
confusion is the extent to which the Bible, as a
purely
literary document, may be studied in the schools.

The Supreme

Court pointed out that the decision does not prohibit
the

secular study of the Bible or of those subjects in which
the
history of religion may be an integral part,^^
The State Board of Education issued a comprehensive

policy statement on "Use of the Bible in Maine Public Schools"
on May 22,

In the concluding paragraph it states:

19614..

In summary, the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Schempp and Murray cases does not alter the schools'
responsibility for proper use of the Bible in the public
schools.
It is a proper part of secular education.
School
officials are free to continue use of the Bible as a source
book and to utilize it as an integral part of appropriate
courses

This policy statement appears in its entirety in the Appendix.
In i 960 a question was directed to the Attorney General's

office concerning the propriety of excusing certain students

from required instruction in the field of physiology and hygiene
on the grounds of conscientious objection.

The opinion was

stated as follows:
A statutory duty of the school committee is to
"... make provisions for the instruction of all
pupils in schools supported by public money or under
state control in physiology and hygiene, with special
reference to the effects of alcoholic drinks, stimulants
and narcotics upon the human system." It is my opinion
that the Legislature has acted in this area and the
agencies charged with administration of the law are
^ ^School Dist.

Murray

v.

Curlett

,

of Abington Township, Pa . v. Schempp ;
371 U.S. ti07» 63 S.Ct. 2^, ^ L.Ed"ii 2d~"52

66Maine, State Department of Education, Use of the
Bible in Maine Public Schools (Augusta: State Board of
Education, 19b4)*
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^equire/brstaSte!67**"P*
textbooks.

The authority of the legislature

to prescribe specific subjects to be taught in
the public

schools implies authority to designate the textbooks
to be
used.

This authority has been challenged only once in the

Maine courts.

The primai*y issue in the case was the legality

of requiring the Protestant version of the Bible to be
used

in the daily opening exercises.

In Donahoe v. Ri chard ,^^

a Roman Catholic pupil was expelled for refusing to read from

the Protestant version of the Bible.

The Court upheld the

decision of the school committee in this historic case.
In view of the recent United States Supreme Court
decisions Just cited, the Maine decision of upholding the
school committee *s right to prescribe which version of the

Bible shall bo used is largely academic.

Certain excerpts

from this decision, relative to textbooks and prescribed
studies are still valid, however, and are here included:

With such committee, the Legislature has reposed
.
.
the power of directing the general course of instruction
and what books shall be used in the schools; and they may
rightfully endorse obedience to all the regulations by
For
them made within the sphere of their authority.
.
.
the
comprescribed,
from
book
thus
to
read
a
a refusal
mittee may, if they see fit, expel such disobedient
scholar.
No scholar can escape or evade such requirement when
made by the committee, under the plea that his conscience
will not allow the reading of such book.”^
.

.

...

^^ Attorney General Report (I960), p. 160.

^®Donahoe
^^ Ibid .
f
A

i

Richards , 3® Me. 379 > 6l Am. Deo. 256 (1854).
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Transportation
The matter of pupil transportation is largely regulated
in each state by statutes.

The constitutionality of laws pro-

viding for the transportation of public school pupils has consistently been upheld by the courts.

The ages of pupils and

the distance they reside from schools, in order to be eligible

for transportation, varies from state to state and from school
district to school district.

The Maine statutes leave these

decisions almost entirely to the discretion of the local boards.
f

Chapter 505> section 35^1 of the Revised Statutes provides that "Conveyance of all elementary schools, a part or
the whole of the distance, to and from the nearest suitable

school, shall be procured when such pupils reside at such a

distance from the said school that, in the judgement of the
Section 358
school committee, such conveyance is necessary.
of Chapter 11 pertaining to Community School Districts, on the

other hand, states that, "Transportation shall be provided by
the community school committee in the same manner as is pro-

vided for transportation of elementary pupils in section 3561*
f

the expenditures for transportation to be considered an ex71
Finally,
pense of operation of said school or schools.”

section 220 of Chapter 9 provides that the transportation of
all pupils residing in a school administrative district shall

'sec.

^^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated
3561 .
*^^Ibid,, o. 11, sec. 356.

(I96I4.),

c.

505»
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be provided in accordance with provisions of section 358.72

Although the matter of distance from the nearest
suitable school is clearly left to the discretion of the
school committee, the question of age, or more specifically

grade level, is not.

Secondary pupils residing in a local

independent district or in a school union district are not

entitled to transportation under the statutes whereas secondary
pupils residing either in a community school district or

a

school administrative district are.

While these statutes are not contradictory, nor have
they been challenged in the courts as discriminatory, legis-

lative scrutiny is indicated.

It is apparent from the statutes

that some secondary pupils in the state must be provided with

transportation while others, depending upon the local administrative organization, do not enjoy the same privilege.

Questions frequently arise concerning the responsi-

bility of pupil control on school buses.

The general legal

principle is that schools have ”home to home” responsibility.
at
That is to say that a pupil eligible to be picked up

a

bus

to the same
stop or at his home has the right to be returned
that pupils cannot
place after school. This is not to suggest

because of disorderly
be denied the privilege of transportation
responsibility carries
conduct, however. The "home to home”
and the authority
with it the implied right of pupil control

behavior while on the bus.
to enforce reasonable rules of

Attorney General Be port (1958 )> P» 72.
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There are no court cases of record on this point
in

Maine but the Attorney General's office has offered
the opinion
that a bus driver has the authority under the statutes
to
con-

trol the conduct of the pupils and can use reasonable
force to
do so if necessary, and furthermore, has the same authority
as
a teacher while the pupils are under his control,

The opportunity to ride on a school bus is a privilege

and not a right.

Pupils who refuse to obey reasonable rules

and regulations while on a bus may be denied the right of
transportation.

The question of liability of a bus driver in

the event of an accident has been discussed elsewhere in this

study.

The question of liability due to an injury to a pupil

who has been removed from a school bus before reaching his
regular bus stop and forced to walk home has not been settled

in the courts.

School officials and/or the bus driver might

well be held responsible in such a circumstance.
The question of the legality of transporting private

school pupils at public expense has caused considerable litiga-

tion and the courts in various jurisdictions are not in agree-

ment on the subject.

The United States Supreme Court has up-

held the constitutionality of a New Jersey state law which
provides for the transportation of parochial school pupils at

public expense.

In the famous Everson case,*^^ the Court held

^^ Attorney General Report (1958)> P* 72.
"^^Everson v. Boar d of Education of Ewing Tp. et al .,
US. 1, 67 sT^tTToii

dWT
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.

that the state did not violate either the Fourteenth
Amendment
I

of the Constitution or the First Amendment in providing for
the

transportation of parochial pupils at public expense.

Such

expenditures for transportation, in the opinion of the Court,

did not constitute the conduct, establishment, or support of

‘

religion.

Whether or not a parochial pupil may bo transported at
public expense in the respective states depends largely on
the constitutional or statutory laws of each state.
V

j!

This question was settled in Maine as a result of

the Squires case.*^^

The city council of Augusta had appro-

t!

!

printed funds for the transportation of those elementary
school children residing in the city who attended parochial

'

schools.

The council claimed it had this authority under its

I

I

charter from the legislature.
I

Thirteen taxpayers of the city

challenged this appropriation as being unconstitutional.

In

deciding against the council, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court

ruled that:
1

I

j

'

'

I

;

In enacting the laws pertaining to education, the
legislature intended that no municipality should regulate
by ordinance or order any subjects which would affect or
influence general education unless permitted to do so by
an express delegation of power ... the state educational
policy cannot and must not be interfered with by any
subordinate governing body.
In the absence of express authority from the legislature in the city charter or in a statute, the Augusta
to
city council has no authority under its police power
of
enact an ordinance providing for thg transportation
pupils to or from private schools.'
"^^Squires v.

Inhabitants of City o f Augusta, 155 Me.

151 , 153 A. id Bo (l 9?^r
T^ibid.
I
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Tha Supreme Court Justices added some dictum in their

written opinion, however, which suggested to the legislature
method of solving this problem.

a

This is one of the very few

times that the Court has entered into the realm of speculation,
at least in the field of education, so far as this writer has

been able

to determine.

The Court said the following:

A properly worded enabling act, authorizing municipalities to expend funds for the transportation of children
to private schools, not operated for profit, if one were
to be enacted by the legislature, would meet constitutional requirements.
Just two years after this decision was handed down,
the legislature passed the enabling act suggested above.

The

constitutionality of this act remains unchallenged to date.
The legislation is permissive, however, and there is a

monetary penalty involved in that sums expended for the trans-

portation of parochial students are not included in the com-

putation for determining the foundation program subsidy.

The

legality of the financial penalty has been referred to the

Attorney General on two separate occasions.

In each instance

the opinions have upheld the legality of the statute.

78

Summary
under
The legislature, in carrying out its mandate

enacted
Article VIII of the Maine Constitution, has

a

number

77 ibid .
78 Attorney General Report (I960), p. 120;
General Report (lvb3)^f P> lb7»

Attprr^
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of statutes pertaining to pupils.

Some of these are mandatory

on a statewide basis; others leave the
authority to the discretion of the local school committee or
school directors.
All pupils, excepting those with severe
handicaps, between the ages of seven and seventeen must attend
public schools
or approved private schools in the school district
where they
live.
Residence has been defined as the municipality where
the father or legal guardian of the child maintains
a home

for the child.
Children of compulsory school attendance age may be
excluded on the basis of physical or mental unfitness or disorderly conduct.

In the case of conduct, the exclusion may be

temporary or permanent but the child has the right of re-

admission upon his repentance.
Pupils residing in school districts not maintaining

high schools or maintaining a high school without certain
prescribed courses of study have the right to attend high
schools in other districts on a tuition basis although they

may not be compelled to attend.

The local district is

responsible for the tuition.
The legislature has delegated the authority for the
care and management of schools to the local boards of education.

This authority includes the

ri^t

to make reasonable

rules and regulations concerning pupil behavior.

This

authority is further delegated to school administrators and
teachers*

They may use corporal punishment in enforcing these

187
^'^Iqs if

ddomed nocessapy*

The local control principle includes
curriculum as
well as behavior. Local committees may
prescribe which subjects shall be taught as well as the textbooks
to be
used.

The secular study of the Bible may be included if
the local
school district deems it advisable.

Transportation of public school pupils at the elementary
level is mandatory in all districts although the distance
that

pupils may be required to walk is left entirely to the dis-

cretion of the local committees.

Transportation of public

school secondary pupils is mandatory in community school

districts and school administrative districts although the
same option of establishing a reasonable "walking" distance
is left with the school officials.

The transportation of

secondary pupils in supervisory unions and in independent
districts is optional with the local authorities.

Trans-

portation of private school pupils is optional with the local
district.

No state reimbursement for such costs is provided

for under the law.
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CHAPTER IX
TEACHERS

Introduction
The profession of tesching hss undergone dramatic

changes, especially over the last twenty-five years.

In the

early beginnings of public school education in Maine, teachers
or "schoolmasters" as they were commonly called, enjoyed few
of the present-day privileges and little or no protection under
the law.

They were examined and awarded a certificate to teach

by local officials.
school boards.
".

.

They were at the mercy and whim of local

Indeed it was held in an early case that,

If all the members of a board should neglect or even

.

wantonly refuse to examine a person he would not be authorized
to teach and to recover his wages without the required cer-

tificate."^
Contracts in the early days were informal and subject
to termination by the school board at their pleasure.

The

teacher was without tenure rights and without the protection
of minimum salary laws.

Other benefits, including a retire-

ment system, equal pay for men and women teachers, sick leave

and leaves of absence were not provided.

'

^Jackson v. Inhabi tants of Hampden , 20 Me. pt. 1

37 (I8ia)-

(2 App.)
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This chapter will consider the
topics of certification,
employment, tenure, dismissal, compensation,
and retirement of
teachers. A section on collective
bargaining is also Included
since this is the latest issue of concern
to educators

in Maine,

as elsewhere.

Before proceeding with specific topics, a
clarification
of the legal definition of a teacher might be
in order.
In

general, any discussion of the rights and privileges
of a

teacher also includes those, of persons in charge of a
school
or schools known as head teachers, teaching principals
or

supervising principals.

Also, in Maine the statutes do not

differentiate between classroom teachers and those persons who
are assigned to full-time supervisory positions.

Basically,

a principal is considered to be a teacher-in-charge and is

entitled to the same privileges under the law as a full-time

classroom teacher.
There is only one reference to the word "principal” to
be found in the Maine statutes on education.

This is in

Chapter 7» section l5l> paragraph 5 of the Revised Statutes.
It reads as follows

When a School Administrative District employs less
than 15 teachers and owing to geographical location or
other reasons it is not practicable to combine with other
administrative units to form a supervisory unit as
authorized in this section, the directors, on approval of
the commissioner and board, may employ a qualified person
to serve as superintendent of schools and as supervising
principal. 2 (Italics nine)
^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated
o. 7, sec. 1 $ 1 , par. 5*

(19614.),

Title 20,
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It would appear that the intent of the legialature
here is to

combine the positions of superintendent and principal in
small,
isolated districts in which case the legal duties of the
position

would pertain more to those of superintendent than teacher.
The position of superintendent of schools is well defined

in the statutes in terms of qualifications, duties and responsibilities.

The only direct benefit obtaining to superintendents

similar to that of teachers is that of retirement privileges.
It was held in a

195^4-

opinion by the Attorney General that;

Under this section of the law, for the purposes of
retirement only, "employees” of the State of Maine
participate in the Maine State Retirement system;
"employees" include teachers, and teachers are defined
to include the superintendent employed in any day
school within the State.

Another Attorney General opinion in 1961 held that a principal,
who had served twenty years as a teacher, could not be put on
a probationary contract as a principal since a principal is

included within the definition of a teacher.^
Certification
In the early history of

Issuance of certificates .

Maine public education the authority to issue a teaching

certificate or "license" to teachers was vested in the local
school committee.

Later, in 1854 » the newly created Superin

tendent of Gomroon Schools for the state was charged with
^ Attorney General Report

K

(

1954 )» P»

^Attorney General Report (1961), p. 55*
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advising" the superintending
school eoranittees "in
methods of
ascertaining the qualifioations of
teachers for their duties."?
Still later in 1923 the authority
to certify teachers

was vested

in the Consaissioner of Education
under sec. 1751 of Chapter
201
which reads as follows
•
•
e
No certificate shall be crantftri
onw vn
to teach in the public schools of
the State unlLrhe°"
furnishes evidence of good moral character
and meets such
to preliminary education and
training
??
® as
may be prescribed
by the commissioner.^

The most recent change in certification
was enacted by the 103rd
Legislature in 196? by replacing the word
“commissioner" with

"Board of Education" in the section stated
above.

This is a

rather major change in keeping with recent
trends in Maine to
separate the policy-making functions from the

•

executive functions

at the state level.

A major revision of the certification requirements
was

completed in

I 963

following a five-year study by a special com-

mittee of educators and laymen established by the State Board
of Education.

The specific requirements for the various types

of certificates are compiled and distributed in pamphlet form

by the State Department of Education.®
^Maine, State Laws (I 85I4.), c. 89, sec. 11.
sec.

^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated (196h).
1751 .

c.

201,

’^Kermit S. Nickerson, Report of Legislation Enacted by
the 103rd Legislature Relating to Education (Augusta; State
Department of Education, 1967T, p. 11.

°State Department of Education, Higher Standards for
Maine Teachers (Augusta: State Department of Education, 1963).
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It la a prerequisite to lawful
employment as a teacher,
or for recovery of wages under his contract,
or to seek redress
of its breach that such person have a
lawful certificate as a

teacher.

It is on these points that the courts
have had occasion
to oonsider oertifioation.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has consistently
upheld
the principle that teachers are unauthorized to
teach without
the required certificate.
In Jackson v. Inhabitants of Hampden
the Court held that, ”... A teacher is not authorized
.

to

teach, and cannot recover pay therefore, without the
requisite

certificate."^

In Pore v. Billings . the Court said in part:

•
Although a teacher of a public school may not
be entitled to recover her wages, by reason of having
neglected to obtain the certificate required by the
statute, yet the tovm alone is entitled to raise that
objection.
•

•

Later, in Jose v. Moulton , the Court once again confirmed this

point by saying in part,

".

.

.A

person teaching a school with-

out the required certificate is by the statute barred from re-

covering pay of the town."^^
The last case to reach Maine's highest court in which

certification was considered was in
Inhabitants of the Town of Standish

^Jackson

v.

1914.8*

12
,

In Perkins v.

the plaintiff, a teacher

Inhabitants of Hampden, 20 Me. pt. 1 (2 App.)

37 (1841).
^

^Dore V. Billings , 26 Me. (13 Shep.) 58 (1846).
^^ Jose V. Moulton
37 Me. 3^7 (1853)«
,

^^Perkins v. Inhabit ants of the Town of Standish
”
82 A (2d) “321 (19487.
'

253 »

,

143 Me.
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by the name of Doris Perkins, sought to
recover wages for the
balance of the school year after her alleged
wrongful discharge.
She had been employed on January 6,

19i|.7,

to finish out the

school year for a teacher who had resigned.

She had no teaching

certificate at the time of employment, although she had
hold a
valid certificate some eight or ten years before.

She informed

the superintendent of this fact at the time of employment.

told Mrs, Perkins that it would bo all

ri^t

Ho

to accept the

position without a certificate ”if she would apply for one at
Augusta.

**

Mrs. Perkins started teaching on January I 3 and taught

through to January

2I4.

for which service she was paid.

On

January 24 she was informed by the superintendent that her

employment was at an end, the reason given that she did not
have a teacher's certificate.

from the facts of the case

,

Although it is not apparent

one may assume that her performance

in the classroom was unsatisfactory, and, rather than follow
the dismissal proceedings, the school committee chose this

alternate method for a fast and legal termination of the contract.

In finding for the town of Standish, the Court confirmed

earlier decisions that a teacher may not teach without holding
a valid teaching certificate.

It said in part:

Under these sections of the statute, the actual
holding of a state teachers' certificate by the plaintiff
was a condition precedent to the authority of the town to
employ her, and it was a condition precedent to her right
to teach; such conditions precedent cannot bo waived by
the town or anyone acting in its behalf.
It would indeed bo incongruous to hold that a person
could recover as damages, for not being allowed to teach.
.

.

.

.

.

.

^

1914

.

wages which she could not recover had ah«

RQ,YiL9atlon.

Along with the authority to grant a teaching

certificate is the authority to revoke or annul a
certificate.
This authority still rests with the Commissioner,

The pertinent

P&rt of the statute reads as follows!
.
Any certificate granted under this or any preceding
law may for sufficient cause be revoked and annulled. Nothing
in this section relative to revocation of teachers* certificates shall be retroactive. Any teacher whose cer^l^lcute has been revoked shall be granted a hearing on
request before a committee. . . . The hearings before this
committee may be public at their discretion and their
decision shall be final,
.

.

There are no court cases of record on revocation but the Attorney
General *s office has twice rendered opinions on the subject.
194.3 It

In

was stated that:

Ch. 38 of P.L. 1931 provides, ”... that any certificate
granted under this or any preceding law may for sufficient
cause be revoked and annuled
any teacher whose cer.
tificate has been revoked shall be granted a hearing on
request before a committee, one member to be selected by
the department of education, the second by the teacher
involved, and the third by the other two members. The
hearings before this committee may be public at their
discretion and their decision shall be final." This
language is sufficiently broad to give you authority to
revoke the certificate of any teacher when in your opinion
such revocation is Justified, The law in the language I
have quoted above provides for an appeal and a decision
by a committee of appeal after hearing the evidence is
.

.

final.

The second opinion considered the permanency of a
^ 3ibid .

^^Maine, Revised Statutes. Annotated (1964.)# c. 201,
:i.
sec. 1751»

V

1

r^ ^Attorney
General Report

(

194-3 )f

P* 53
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revoked teaching certificate.

In 1963 the Attorney General

said that:
A limited revocation is not possible.
To revoke an
instrument is to aimul or make void by recalling
or taking
back, cancel, repeal, reverse.” Thus, the
Commissioner
in*
the present matter cancelled the teacher's
certificate: he
annulled it; he took it back; and he repealed it.
It no
longer exists
The following action is available to the
Committee, affirm the action of the Commissioner,
or
reverse the action of the Commissioner. The latter
action
would require that the Commissioner issue another
certificate
to replace the one revoked.
.

Employment
Procedures .

The legal authority to employ teachers

generally rests with the school committee and may not be
delegated.

In some' states, school boards may select and employ

teachers only from a list recommended by the superintendent,

while in others, a school board may employ with or without a
superintendent's recommendation.
In Maine the prescribed procedure for initial employ-

ment is

nomination of a teaching candidate by the superin-

:

tendent; approval, ratification, or "election” of the candidate

by the school committee or directors; and "employment" or

placement of the teacher in a Job assignment by the superinIt is interesting to note that the authority to employ

tendent.

is vested in the superintendent.

In fact, the statute itself

is found under duties of the superintendent rather than under

the duties of school committees.

This is undoubtedly a hold-

over from the old school-agent days.
^

It will bo recalled from

^Attorney General Report (1963), p, l$k»

.
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the discussion in Chapter III that the
school agent, the forerunner of today's superintendent, was given
the

authority to

employ teachers without ratification by the local
school committee.
This system created a number of problems and
con-

tributed to the eventual repeal of the school district
system.
The legislature, in drafting the new legislation, wisely
saw
fit to provide the school committee with veto power over
the

superintendent in the matter of teacher employment.

They also

provided for an emergency procedure in the event that a stalemate is reached between the superintendent and the board in

which either the superintendent refuses to nominate a candidate
of the board's choice or the board refuses to approve the

nomination of the superintendent.
".

.

.

The statute provides that,

In case the superintendent of schools and the super-

intending school committee or school directors fail to legally
elect a teacher, the commissioner shall have the authority to

appoint a substitute teacher who shall serve until such election
is rnade,"^^

The current procedure for employment, seemingly simple

and effective, has led to a considerable amount of litigation,

however.

In some instances it would appear that school com-

mittees, disenchanted with their choice of candidates, have

challenged their own employment procedures under the law as a
roundabout method of discharging teachers or bresdcing their
^^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated
sec. 161, par. 5*

(196l|.),

o.

7»
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contracts.

Three cases, all decided since the abolition of the

district system, have reached Maine’s highest court on the subject of teacher employment.

The decisions reached and the
I

opinions stated by the Justices have legal implications for

Maine school officials today,
In Dennison v. Inhabitants of Vinalhaven

1

A

,

a teacher

was offered a position to fill out the remainder of a school
year, by telegram, by the superintendent, which he accepted.

There had been no school conxnittee meeting held to approve
After having tau^t for two

the nomination of this teacher.

of the three remaining quarters in the school year, the

teacher’s employment was terminated..

The reason for his dis-

charge is not given in the facts of the case.

The teacher

brought an action to recover his salary for the remaining

quarter because of a wrongful discharge.

The defendant school

committee claimed that the teacher was never legally employed.
In finding

foi^

the teacher the Court said in part:

While the authority to hire teachers was conferred
a contract with a teacher,
on the school committee ,
of schools,
superintendent
made at their request by the
is valid. ...
A contract with a school teacher by a person not
authorized may be ratified by those having authority
either expressly or by acts.^^
,

Other points of interest brought out in this case

^^Dennlson v. Inhabitants of Vinalhaven, 100 Ma. 136
(

1905 )
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include the following:

a,

superintendent may hire teachers at

the request of the school committee
since he is an instrument
of their official responsibility; a
telegram contract is

valid; a school committee may ratify the
employment of a

teacher, without a formal vote, by issuing
payment of bills

presented for wages due; and in the absence of definite
terms
in a contract, an offer of employment made in
the middle

of a

school year carries the inference that employment is
for the

remainder of that year.
The second case, Michaud v. Inhabitants of St. Francis
-

was settled in 1928 but is still frequently quoted as a land-

mark case in Maine on teacher employment.
of the case were as follows.

Briefly, the facts

A teacher by the name of Michaud

had been employed to teach in a school known as the Nadeau
school.

She had taught in this school for two years, when in

June, 1926 , at a regular meeting of the school committee, it

was urged by the Committee that Miss Michaud be transferred to

another school known as the Jones school at the beginning of
the fall term.

The superintendent saw no good reason for the

transfer and refused to nominate Miss Michaud for a position
in the Jones school.

On August 23

,

the date fixed for the beginning of the

fall term, two members of the school committee appeared at the

Nadeau school and instructed Miss Michaud to go to the Jones
^^Michaud v. Inhabitants of St. Francis , 127 Me. 255
( 1928 ).

.
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school cod promised her that she
would be paid for her services.
Miss Michaud understood that this
arrangement was in opposition
to the superintendent.
s plans, and soon after she began
teaching
was advised by the superintendent,
by letter, that she had not
been nominated as a teacher for the
Jones school.
Miss Michaud continued, however, to
carry on the work
of the Jones school without interruption
during the entire
school year. She was not paid for her
services and thus
brought an action to recover her year's salary.
The Court
found in favor of the defendant, the town of
St. Francis, refused
to allow recovery of salary, and in its
decision stated the

following;
To constitute a legal employment of a public
school teacher, there must be a nomination by the superintendent, an approval of the nomination by the school
committee, and an employment by the superintendent of
the teacher so nominated and approved.
The committee has no authority to employ teachers
and contracts of employment by it do not bind the town.
One teaching under contract with the committee cannot
recover from the town even though services were actually
rendered and the price charged was reasonable.
Persons working under the employment of town or city
officers must take note at their peril of the extent of
the authority of such officers.^^
.

.

.

The third and final case on employment was settled in
193Q-

A teacher by the name of Benson, without formal employ-

ment, had acted as principal of Newfield High School during
the school year 1935-36.

On April 26, 1936, at a regular

school board meeting, he was reelected for the ensuing school
Ibid.

*

V
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year of 1936-37 at a salary of
$1020.
nomlnatad as principal nor. following

He was not formally

approval of his nomina-

tion, formally employed by the
superintendent as principal of
Newfield High School. The record
shows, however, that he worked
at the school as principal until
the Christmas vacation with
the knowledge and acquiescence
of the superintendent, and that
during this time he received his salary
checks

regularly from

th.0

town treasur©!*.

On December 28, 1936, Mr. Benson received
a letter from
the superintendent stating that the school
committee had
decided to ask him to resign as principal of the
high school.
This he refused to do and was henceforth dismissed
by the

superintendent.

This resulted in an action by the plaintiff,

Mr. Benson, to recover his salary for the remainder
of the

contract.

Once again it appears that the school committee,

disenchanted with the services of a teacher, attempted to
dismiss the teacher on the basis of illegal employment rather
than by the regular dismissal procedures.
In finding for the plaintiff, the Court found the

contract to be valid, the dismissal illegal,
breached.

sind

the contract

The Court’s opinion reads in part:

...

To constitute a legal employment of a teacher in
a school union, there must be nomination by the superintendent an approval of the nomination by the committee,
and an ©n^jloyment by the superintendent of the teacher so

nominated and approved. The school committee has no
authority to employ a teacher.
After legal ©lection of the plaintiff, it was the duty
of the superintendent to employ the one elected and the
presumption obtained that he performed his duties as
required by law. ...

201

the Totlt

f

®

vesl^d ^^one
and invest!^a?l^S:
$awfSfl" dismissed only for proven
services it deemed unprofitable to unfitness or for
the school.

****.****••••••••#•.
It is not

expected that boards of this kind nriformality nor that their recorda arl
aa full and
explicit aathoae of a legialative body
or
a court; and
it undoubtedly often happens that
the selection of
teachers is made after a general discussion
between the
committee and the superintendent in which
all reach an
^reement without^ a^jToi^al nomination having been
made
^e superintendent and without a forma l
xmying been reg istered /by
the committee
(Italics mine
These three cases leave little doubt as to the
proper
procedures to be followed in the employment of teachers.
While
the procedure may be informal, even to the point of
gi-eat

^_

an oral

contract, or a telegram confirmation, or of no formal
school

committee action, the employment of a teacher is valid by

subsequent acts of the school committee which may include

authorizing vouchers for their salary checks.

The "employment'?

or actual job assignment of a teacher by the superintendent
is absolutely essential and the school committee may not usurp

this authority.

Contracts and tenure

.

Maine teachers serve under one

of two types of contracts, the probationary, or the continuing'

contract.

The statute reads in part as follows;

.
.He shall nominate all teachers, subject to such
regulations governing salaries and the qualifications of
teachers as the superintending school committee or school
directors shall make, and upon the approval of nominations
by said committee or directors, he may employ teachers so
nominated and approved for such terms as he may deem
.

22 Benson v. New fi eld, I
36 Me. 23 » 1 A (2d) 227 (1938)

•
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w

^

J.**,

oU.UOf3UUt3llU

J.J
^
years, although
the right to an extension for a longer
period of time through a new contract is specifically
reserved to the contracting parties, ...
The right to terminate a contract, after due notice
of 90 days, is reserved to the superintending school
committee or school directors when changes in local
conditions warrant the elimination of the teaching
position for which the contract was made,^3

Probationary contracts are usually issued
a time for the first three years of employment.

a

year at

A school com-

mittee is under no obligation to renew a probationary contract,

nor are they under any obligation to provide a hearing or
reasons for not renewing a probationary contract.

It should

also be noted that a continuing contract may be awarded earlier

than the fourth contract.

The statute requires only that the

probationary period not exceed three years.

While the statute quoted above contains no reference
to tenure,

it is reasonably clear that the intent of the legis-

lature in providing continuing contracts is to make available
to the successful teacher a measure of security and protection

through continued employment.

Tenure legislation varies in

the several states from that which provides merely that the

teacher’s contract shall continue from year to year unless the

teacher is notified within a specified time that it will not
^^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated
0.

(I96I4.),

Title 20 ,
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be renewed, to more elaborate systems
which provide that after

stated probationary period the employment
becomes permanent,
allowing dismissal only for stated specific
causes.
The probationary period varies from one year in some
states to
a

five

years in others.

During the probationary period, the teacher

may be dismissed at the end of the year for any or
no reason,
but once his tenure has become permanent he may
be dismissed
only for causes stated in the law. Thus, there is a
distinct
difference between failure to renew a contract and the breaking
of a contract or dismissal.

The tenure status of Maine teachers is not entirely

clear under the continuing contract.

Another section of the

statute on contracts cited earlier reads as follows:

After a probationary period of 3 years, any
teacher who receives notice in accordance with this
section that his contract is not going to be renewed,
may during the 15 days following such notification request a hearing with the school committee or governing
board.
He may request reasons. The hearing shall be
private except by mutual consent and except that either
or both parties may be represented by counsel.
Such
hearing must be granted within 30 days of the receipt
of the teacher's request.^h
.

.

.

This section of the statute has not been interpreted by the
courts, except for the "l5-day” clause.

In a case decided so

recently that it is not included in the latest Maine Report,
the Supreme Judicial Court held unanimously that the dismissal
of a teacher serving under a continuing contract was not invalid

because the school superintendent and school committee failed

204
to explain adequately the failure to renew her
contract.

While

the teacher had asked for “an explanation” following
the notice,
she failed to request a hearing within the 15 -day
period specified

in the statute.

In its ruling the Court noted that:

•
[T]he superintendent did not answer the request
for an explanation, but the failure to give desired information has no bearing upon the fact that at no time
within the statutory 15-day period from the Feb.
3 notice
did Mrs. Beckwith request a hearing, 25
•

•

The Court also pointed out that the statute does not provide
that dismissed teachers be notified of their rights to hearing

or

ri^ts

to request reasons for the dismissal before a hearing.

And it added:
There was thus no failure on the part of the school
authorities to advise Mrs. Beckwith of her rights under
the statute. She must be held to have knowledge of the
statutory requirements and she must suffer such loss as
may have risen from her failure to comply with the plain
terms laid down by the legislature.

Except for the "changing conditions" clause cited
earlier, the reasons for which a teacher's continuing contract

may be terminated have never been defined.

There is consider-

able confusion between this section of the law and the dis-

missal statute which will be discussed later.
A case to reach the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in

1941 upheld the validity of an oral contract.
V.

Hancock

27
,

In Elsemore

a teacher was contracted orally by the

^^ Portland Evening Express , June I 8 , 1968, p. 1.

Elsemore v. Inhabi tants of Town of Hancock

2k3 (191A).

,

137 Me.
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superintendent to teach at Hancock High
School during the school
year of 1939-40. His employment was
ratified by a meeting of
the school committee on May
3 , 1939.

During the summer of

1939, however, the town of Hancock, at a
special town meeting,
voted to close the high school. Following
this action, the
school committee voted to terminate the
contract of the teacher,
a Mr. Elsemore.

The teacher brought an action to recover
his

salary in the amount of $775 for breach of contract.

The

defendant town of Hancock argued that the teacher
did not hold
a valid contract since the teacher was employed
without
a

written contract; was employed at a school committee meeting

which one of the three members was not present; and
that the town of Hancock terminated its liability under the

contract by its vote to close the school.

In finding for the teacher the Court held that the

affirmative vote by the two members of the school committee
present constituted a legal employment; and that the abolish-

ment of a school did not negate the contract of a teacher

employed to teach it.

Evidently the school committee had failed

to give Mr. Elsemore the 90-day notice of elimination of his

teaching position.

On this point Justice Murchis said in part:

The continuing supremacy of the State if exerted for
the common good and welfare, can modify the contract . . .
but in the case of a teacher losing his contract because
of the closing of the school, there is no implied
limitations of the contract, therefor the town does not
terminate its liability.
Where the contract is to do acts which can be performed,
nothing but the act of God or of a public enemy or the
interdiction of the law as a direct and sole cause of the
,

pQ
failure will excuse the performance. ®

Several Attorney General opinions have been rendered

pertaining to contracts or tenure which are pertinent to the
present discussion.

In 1961 it was held that the matter of

contracts between teachers and superintending school committees

for employment is a local question and the communities involved
may determine the dates at which the contracts will begin and
terminate.

It was held in 1951 that part of a probationary

period served in one municipality will not serve as part of
the probationary period required by another municipality.

30

Also in 1951 it was held that when a probationary period is

required as a prerequisite to permanent employment, inter-

ruption of that probationary period nullifies any benefits
secured prior to the interruption.

Newly organized school administrative districts are
teachers
obligated to honor contracts between member towns and

which are in effect at the time of the merger.

Thus, teachers

district are
serving on a continuing contract in a local
school adminentitled to the same status in a reorganized
reads in part as
istrative district. The pertinent statute

follows:
^^

^^

Ibid

.

Attorney General Report (1961), p.

^^ Attorney General Report (1951)

^^Ibid.

,

p. 58*

>

lOlj..

P* ^7.

^
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School Administrative District

uL^^%hTdis1^?ct^^aSd°:K
the^d^tf fo

Of course this would not hold in the
case of a position being

eliminated as a result of the merger.

It should be noted that

this protection for teachers does not
apply in the formation
of school community districts.
The law is silent on the matter of teachers'
terminating

contracts.

Of course a contract can always be terminated
by

mutual consent of both parties.

The matter of a teacher re-

signing before the end of the contract period has never
been

brought before the Maine courts.

In the absence of a specific

clause in the contract to the contrary, common law practice

would suggest that a teacher may terminate a contract upon a

written notice of thirty days.

The standard contract form

recommended by the Maine Teachers Association and widely used
throughout the state, prohibits a resignation, except by mutual
consent, during the months of July, August, and September.

Dismissal

.

The subject of dismissal of teachers

occupies a prominent place in the literature.

That monumental

study by Edwards, referred to several times in this study,

devotes some thirty pages to the topic.

Court cases on dis-

missal are plentiful in jurisdictions all over the country.
^^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated
sec.

22l\.,

(19614.),

c. 9,
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A school committee may dismiss a teacher for such
causes

and in such manner as is prescribed by statute.

It is a well-

established rule, of which teachers should be cognizant, that
all pertinent provisions of the statutes are, by implication,

read into contracts of employment.

Thus, it was said by

Justice Harris, speaking for the Supreme Court in Oregon:
The contract of teaching is made with reference to
the provisions of the statute, so that the contractual
obligations of the teacher are not necessarily limited to
the words found in the written contract, and therefore
the contract of teaching includes not only the duties
enumerated by the written paper, which for convenience
is called the contract, but it also embraces those duties
which are imposed under a then-existing statute; and if
the teacher breaches this contract of teaching, one of
the ordinary legal remedies available to the school
board, unless some statute declares to the contrary,
would be found in the right summarily to discharge the
teacher. 33

The Maine statute on dismissal is remarkable for its

simplicity.

It is found under the duties of school committees

and reads as follows:

After investigation, due notice of hearing, and
hearing thereon, they shall dismiss any teacher although
having the requisite certificate, who proves unfit to
teach or whose services they deem unprofitable to the
school; and give to said teacher a certificate of dismissal and of the reasons therefor, a copy of which they
Such dismissal shall not deprive, the
shall retain.
teacher of compensation for previous services.
It should be emphasized here that the teacher serving under a

probationary contract, while having no remedy for fail\ire of a
33 po reman v. School District No. 25 * 81 Ore. 587
Pac. 1155»

^^Maine, Revised Statutes. Annotated
sec, 4-73» par* 4*

(

»

159

1964.), c. 15»
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school committee to renew his contract, is protected
from breach
of contract or

^smissal during the term

of the contract, at

least to the extent of a hearing and a certificate of dismissal

stating the reasons therefor.
As would be expected, controversies over the dismissal

statute have centered around two points

,

the mechanics or pro-

cedure of dismissal, and interpretation of the phrases "unfit
to teach" and "services deemed unprofitable to the school,"

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has heard two cases, one

involving procedure and the other interpretation of the
language,

Althou^ both cases were settled many years ago

they are landmark cases for Maine and are still useful as guidelines.

In the first case a schoolmaster by the name of Farwell

was contracted to teach school in Searsmont for a period of
three months.

After two months on the job, he was discharged

by the school committee after the committee received a petition

from the inhabitants alleging that for want of natural abilities
he was not qualified to teach in their school.

No notice of

discharge was given nor was a hearing held,
Mr, Parwell continued, however, to instruct the school

for another month and brought an action to recover his wages.
The plaintiff argued that his contract had been breached and
that the dismissal was illegal since the order of discharge

given by the committee did not contain any express adjudication

respecting the fitness or unfitness of the instructor, nor was

210

any hearing held.

The defendant claimed, on the other hand, that

the oommittoe was not bound to render any reasons
for the dis-

missal of a schoolmaster, the law having made the contract
subject to their discretion.

They argued that an instructor is

continually under a course of trial, and the committee may
adjudicate whenever they are satisfied, without a more formal
notice or hearing.
The attorney for the plaintiff countered with the

argument that it was as important to the community that school-

masters be protected from unfounded popular caprice and disaffection, as that none but fit teachers be employed and that
the powers granted to school committees should be interpreted
as all other limited powers, and like them, to be strictly

pursued.

The committee might, he said, upon proper application,

summon the party before them, and after due hearing and examination, might for good cause dismiss him but this they failed to
do.

The Court decided in favor of the schoolmaster.

While

the facts of the case suggest that there was sufficient evidence

upon which to dismiss the master legally, the school committee
failed to follow the proper procedure as prescribed by law.
Excerpts from the opinion follow;
The third section of the law, provides that
"Said committee shall have power to dismiss any schoolmaster or mistress, who shall be found incapable, or
unfit to teach any school, not withstanding their
having procured the requisite certificates." This, being
an authority given to those who represent one party only,
to vacate a contract,' must in our opinion be strictly
.

,

,
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pursued according to the provisions of the act, to have
that effort.
The superintending committee, not binding
or assigning the reasons, which by the act would authorize
them to discharge the master, he cannot therefore be considered as having been discharged, by any adequate or
competent authority. 35
The other case to reach Maine's highest court was

Hopkins v. Bucksport in 1920,^^

In this case the Court was

called upon to interpret the meaning and legislative intent
of the clauses "unfit to teach," and "services deemed unprofit-

able to the school."

Lucinia Hopkins, a teacher of seventeen years experience,
was duly employed to teach a school in Bucksport for the school
year beginning in September, 1918.

At a meeting of the School

Committee of Bucksport on September 16, 1918, Mrs. Hopkins was

dismissed from her job as her services in the judgement of the
Committee would "bo unprofitable to said school on account of

her admitted associations with a German Alien Enemy of the

United States of America, under suspicion and under investigation at this time by the Government."

37

Mrs. Hopkins had been

given due notice of the mooting to consider her dismissal but

had not been provided with any reasons for such action prior
to the meeting.

Her

Mrs. Hopkins did not attend the meeting.

dismissal resulted in an action brought by Mrs. Hopkins to
^ ^Inhabitants of

Searsmont v. Farwell

,

3 Me.

kSO (1825)*

^^Ho pkins v. Inhabitants of Bucksport , 119 Me.
111 A. 734 (ftiTTy.
37 Ibid.

f
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recover her salary for the 1918-19 school year because of a
wrongful discharge or breach of contract.
It appears from the testimony that in the summer of

1918 Mrs. Hopkins purchased an automobile to enable her to

teach in Bucksport, and to return to her home in Verona each
night on account of her mother's illness.

Her husband had

secured the services of a Mr. Margraf to teach her to drive the
automobile.

Mr. Margraf was a German alien.

He was also a

summer neighbor of the Hopkins whom they had known for several
years.
It does not appear from the record that any complaint

against or criticism of Mrs. Hopkins had been lodged with the
Committee, nor does it appear that Mr. Margraf was in fact a

German alien enemy under investigation by the Government or that
the Committee had any evidence to that effect.

Judgement was found in favor of Mrs. Hopkins and she
was awarded her year's salary.

Among the findings of the

Court were the following:
The authority given by statute to a superintending school committee to vacate a contract, being an
authority given to those who represent one party only,
must be strictly pursued according to the statutes to
have that effect.
The statute in question authorizes the dismissal of
Unfitness to teach, and
a teacher upon two grounds:
failure of practical success in the work of the school
rendering the teachers services unprofitable to the
school; the first may be apparent either before or after
the work of the school has begun but failure of practicaj.
Access in the work of the school can only pecome a pparei^
after the work has actually beguiT
It is evident that these causes may run into each
to
other; yet they are substantially distinct . Unfitness
.

.

.

;
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teach, including in that term moral and te nmermentnl
a

l^k

of“educational Waihin^«nrl
or after I'he actu al
work of the school has begun; but failure of
practical
success in the work of the school can only be
apparent

abr^J^, may be apparent either befo re

after the work has begun.
The action of the committee in this case cannot be
sustained. The fitness of the plaintiff to teach the
school is conceded; she should have had the opportunity
to show practical success in the school work.
the action of the committee can only be
taken ’’after due notice and investigation,” The statement
in the record before the court is insufficient as notice to
the plaintiff of the object of the meeting at which action
was taken dismissing her.
The clause, ”or whose services they deem unprofitable
to the school” is first found on the R.S. of l8ij.l in the
form ”or whose services are believed by them to be unprofitable to the school.” This cause of dismissal was
evidently introduced into the statute to cover cases frequently arising where from some cause it is apparent,
after the school has begun that the teachers usefulness has
become impaired, and that the good of the school requires
dismissal.
Such action can only bo justified as for the
good of the school and can only be taken after notice and
’’candid” investigation.
The notice to Mrs. Hopkins of the object of the meeting
was wholly insufficient; from it she could not know what
reason her dismissal was sought , whether upon the grounds
of moral unfitness
t empe rmen t al unfitness, or lack of
educational qualification; much less whether it was sought
on the ground that her services were deemed unprofitable
to the school.
She was entitled to know in advance on what
round her dismissal was sought
This, she did not have. 38
f Italics mine)
>

,

.

A much more recent case was settled in a Superior Court

action on a teacher dismissal case in 1962.

While not binding

on the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the case is significant

because the findings show that the judicial interpretation of
the dismissal statute has not changed since the first case in

1825.

3®Ibid.
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In Richard Mainente v. Inhabitants of
Mechanic f»iVc 39
,

a complaint was heard by the Court
in which a teacher sought to

recover the balance due him under a teaching
contract for the
school year of 1963-6i^ as a result of an alleged
illegal

dis-

missal.

Mr. Mainente received a letter from the
superintendent

of schools dated January 27, I 96 ..
4
I

Excerpts from this letter

which were entered into the court record follow:
The Mechanic Palls School Committee at its last
meeting on January 2^th, voted to notify you that after
careful consideration and~ihvestlgation of the facts
concerning your teaching that they feel that it would
be in the best interest of the students, the school, and
yourself if you were released from your teaching position
as of the February vacation.
This letter would serve as
an official notice that as of 30 'days from today, which
would be February 2?th, that you would be released
unless conditions changed to such an extent that a reconsideration could be possible. From all indications
it would be very unlikely that conditions could change
enough to make such a reconsideration possible.
In all we regret that it is necessary to have to
notify you of this decision but it is felt by all that
it would be in the test interest of all if a change could
be made at the time of the February vacation.
If you wish to meet with the board to go over their
decision I'm sure they would be glad to meet with you
during their next meeting or at a special meeting.
(Italics mine)
.

.

«

,

,

,

In delivering the verdict for the teacher, Superior

Court Justice Marden said, in part:
The law in Maine having to do with the dismissal
.
.
of a teacher is embodied in the statute cited and three
litigated cases, two under former statutes and one under
The cases are:
the statute in its present form.
Searsmont v. Farwell , 3 Maine kSO; Hopkins v. Bucksport ,
.

^^ In the matter of Richard Mainente v. Inhabitants of
Mechanic Falls , Androscoggin County, MaineV Superior Court,

June Term, 1962.
^Qlbid .

‘
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119 Maine 437: and Benaon v. Newfleld
136 Maine 23.
cases hold that the authority of a
superintending school committee to vacate a
contract
being an authority given to those who
represent
one
party only, must be strictly pursued
according to the
provisions of the statute."
statute requires:
(1) due notice to the teacher:
io\
J?''^®f^^Sation by the superintending school committee;
(3) finding based upon sufficient evidence that, a)
the
teacher is "unfit," or b) that the teacher's
services are
deemed unprofitable to the school; and
giving to
(1^.)
teacher a certificate of dismissal and of the reasons the
therefor.
It is determined that there was valid cause for
the
termination of this contract.
While a superintending school committee may not be
expected to follow the terms of a statute with the technical niceties which are expected from a legal tribunal,
we cannot, within the circumscription of the cases cited,
hold that the action of the committee of the defendant
in:
(1) dismissing the plaintiff; (2) giving notice of
the dismissal for reasons not specifically identified
with the statutory causes; (3) investigating; and (I4.) giving
the plaintiff a hearing, in that order, complied with the
statute.
.

As in the Searsmont case, it appears from the facts presented

that there might have been valid reasons for dismissal but
once again the committee failed to adhere strictly to the pro-

visions of the statute in terms of procedure.

Compensation

.

The authority of a school committee to

set and regulate salaries for teachers is found in Chapter 7»

section 161, paragraph 5 as follows:
He shall nominate all teachers subject to such regulations governing salaries and the qualifications of teachers
as the superintending school committee or school directors
shall make.^

^^ Ibid .

^Maine, Revised Statutes, Annotated
sec. 161, par. 5 *

(196i|.),

c.

7»
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This authority, of course, must conform to other
pertinent

statutes on compensation.

There are two such laws, one

regulating minimum salaries and the other ensuring equal
pay
for men and women holding comparable positions. The first
reads in part as follows:

Each administrative unit operating public schools
within the State shall employ only certified teachers and
after July 1, 1966 shall pay such teachers, except substitute teachers as defined by the commissioner, the
minimum salaries as follows.
Figures are not here quoted since they were revised by the 103rd

Legislature to become effective in September, 1968.^

The

latest minimum starting salary with a bachelor's degree and no

experience is $5>000.

The second statute reads as follows:

In assigning salaries to teachers of public schools in
the State, no discrimination shall be made between male and
female teachers, with the same training and experience,
employed^in the same grade or performing the same kinds of

duties
Except for a few very early cases under the old school

district system when schdol agents established the salaries,
none have reached the courts where compensation was the prin-

cipal point of contention.

It would appear that local admin-

istrative units have been able to resolve their own salary conflicts with the aid of an occasional opinion from the Attorney
Those opinions include the following:

General's office.
^ ^Ibid

. ,

c.

209, sec. 1901.

^Nickerson, op. cit ., 17.
^^Maine, Revised Statutes (1954)*

sec. 238.
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'(1)

No discrimination shall be made between
male and
female teachers of public schools who have
the same
training, experience, and duties.
Specific questions
relative to grading, academic load, etc. are
administrative problems and can be answered more
easily
by local officials, giving common, every-day
meanings
^
to the words used in the law."4o

(2) All certified teachers, whether regularly employed by

the superintending school committee on nomination
by
the superintendent or working on a substitute basis,
but possessing the required certificate, are entitled
to be paid the minimum salaries prescribed."^'

"(3) The superintending school committee has no right to
make a reduction in the salary paid to a teacher who
does not receive notice of termination of contract or
a new contract.

”(^4-)

Rblative to the minimum salary law, service teaching
in private schools such as Westbrook Junior College
counts as years of teaching experience. "49

An interesting question, which remains unanswered at
this time, is the legality of a contract executed between a

teacher and a school administrative unit containing a raise for
the ensuing year, prior to formal approval of the new school

budget by the voters of the district.

Retirement

.

All teachers in the Maine public schools

are required to be members of the Maine State Retirement System.

Five and three quarter percent is deducted from their salaries;
5 percent toward Member Contribution Fund, I/I4 percent toward
.

the Survivor Benefit Fund, and 1/2 percent toward the Retire-

ment Annuity Adjustment Fund.

This last is the provision that

^^ Attorney General Report (19^2), p. 120.
^^ Attorney General Report (19^1), p. 2?5»
^^ Attorney General Report ( 1957 ) » P • 69

^^ Attorney General Report

(195il-)>

P*
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enables retirees to receive increases whenever the
state
employees receive pay raises.

The state contributes about

$8-1/2 million annually toward the Retirement System, which
includes state employees as well as teachers.

Members are eligible for retirement on attaining age 60
or after 30 years of service (at a reduced rate) regardless of
age, and must retire on attaining age 70, except that on request
of the Governor, with the approval of the Council, the Board of

Trustees of the Retirement System may permit employment past
age 70 ,

The maximum pension may bo attained after 35 years of

service and is an annual stipend which amounts to 50 percent
of the "average final compensation."

This is defined as the

average salary for the highest five years which do not neces-

sarily have to be consecutive.

Additional rules and regulations as well as the optional
plans are described in detail in a handbook published by the
Maine State Retirement System,

51

and need not here be enumerated.

There are no court cases of record concerning retirement.

The

Attorney General's office has, from time to time, been asked
to clarify certain points in the regulations.

A summary of

these opinions follows;
"(1) Local school committees do not have the authority'

^^Maine Teachers Association, Handbook for Maine Teachers
(Augusta: The Association, 1967 )> P»
^^Maine State Retirement System, Informational Handbook
for Employees of the State of Maine (Augusta; Maine State
Retirement System, 19b2}.
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to establish a regulation making teacher retirement compulsory prior to age 70 "52
.

"(2) Teachers reaching their seventieth birthday during
the school year may be permitted to continue
teaching until the end of the year with special
permission. "53

"(3) A teacher retiring without the full thirty years
of credit may make up time for full credit by
substituting a day or two at a time. "5^
”(i^)

Teaching at the Maine School for the Deaf counts
as creditable service. "55

"(5) Substitute teaching after retirement on a parttime basis will not impair pension payments. "56

In connection with the last opinion cited it should be noted

that there is a limitation on the amount of substitute work that
a retired teacher may perform.

The annual salary earned as a

substitute plus the amount of the pension may not exceed the

five-year average used as a basis for computing the pension.
Collective Bargaining

Introduction

.

Collective bargaining, or collective

negotiations, or professional negotiations in the field of

education are all synonymous terms and used interchangeably

by various groups.

The legal right of teachers to bargain

collectively with their employers is becoming more common in
^^ Attomey General Report (1964), p. Il8.

General Report (1963)> P« 147*
^ ^Attorney General Report

(

1945 )

»

P • ^38

^ ^Attorney General Report

(

195^ )

>

P • 318

^^Attorney General Report

(

1945 )

P • 129
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the various states.

Legislation on the subject was introduced

in fifteen legislatures and enacted in at least
seven in 1965.^’^

Although there is not yet any legislation in Maine on
the subject, a bill was introduced in the special session of
the 103rd

Legislature.

This bill was not passed but another one is being

prepared for consideration by the

10l4.th

legislative session.

The

latest' handbook of the Maine Teachers Association includes
the

following comment:

... Probably the biggest movement in education in
Maine is in the area of professional negotiations. Local
associations are seeking written agreements with their
school boards so that the association will be officially
recognized as the bargaining agent for the teachers,
specific guidelines for negotiations will be established,
and provisions will be made in the event that an impasse
occurs.
A recent publication from the Association cited the

fact that as of that date, there wore fifteen negotiating

agreements between school committees and teacher organizations
in force and some forty more in process of development.^^
The advent of collective bargaining in the field of

education is too new for any clear-cut guidelines to have been
established.

As stated by Edwards,

the law governing the

authority of school boards to negotiate with teachers' unions
^*^Myron Lieberman and Michael H. Moskow, Collective
Negotiations for Teachers (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company,

1966), p. 21.

^^Maine Teachers Association, op. cit ., p. 22.

^^”Sanctions in Portland,’’ MTA Newsletter, Dec, 18,
1967, p. 1.

^^Edwards, op. cit ., p.

1|.73*

221
is still in the process of development.

In the absence of any

statutes or litigation on the subject in Maine,
educators are
forced to turn to other jurisdictions for guidelines.
This

final section will, therefore, briefly consider the current
status of collective bargaining in other states.

Teacher strikes

.

The strike is one of the most con-

troversial and the moat widely publicized source of teacher

bargaining power.

The courts are in agreement that teacher

strikes are illegal even in the absence of specific legislation.

Teacher strikes were prohibited by law in at least

fifteen states as of 1965.^^

In addition, six state courts

have ruled that teacher strikes are illegal even in the absence
of legislation.

In the opinion of a noted writer on the subject,

"It is likely but not certain that other state supreme courts

'

would also rule teacher strikes to be illegal if they were
62
called upon to resolve the issue.”

•

In labor organizations generally, the right of employees
I

to strike is deemed an incident of the right to organize.

How-

ever, the right of teachers to organize, as in the case of other

public employees, does not necessarily carry all the benefits
,

L

'

and privileges possessed by members of unions of nonpublic
employees.

Perhaps the most important difference in the rights

of members of organizations of public and nonpublic labor

organizations is the right to strike.
^^Lieberman, op. oit ., p. 289.
^^Ibid.

,

p. 290.
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It is well established that the members of labor unions

generally may strike in order to enforce their demands.

This

rule is not applicable to unions of public employees, including

teachers.

In a leading case on the point it was held that

teachers may not strike.

The Supreme Court of Connecticut

stated that it should be the aim of every employee of the

government to do his or her part to make the government function
as efficiently and economically as possible.

The drastic remedy

of the organized strike to enforce the demands of unions of

government employees was, in the opinion of the court, in
direct intervention of this principle.

The main basis for

this rule is the absence of the profit motive on the part of
the public employer and the necessity that there be no inter-

ruption in the operation of public functions because of the
serious consequences which would ensue if they were interrupted.
Thus the right of the public to have its children taught takes
its place beside the public right to fire and police protection,

other
the right that courts shall continue to function, and

similar rights.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has reached

the same conclusion.

6

I4.

teachers are
While most persons assume that strikes by
different point of view
illegal, there is some precedent for a

and the issue is by no means settled.

According to a state

^3yfoyy,alk Teachers* Association v. Board of Education,
138 Conn. 269, b3 A. 2d 4b2 (19^1)^

Manchester v. Manchest er Teachers
131 A. 2d ii9Tl9577^

^^r.lt y of

100 N.H. 507 ,

Ouil^d,
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district court in Minnesota, the view that public employees
cannot strike is:
[T]o indulge in the expression of a personal
belief and then ascribe to it a legality on some tenuous
theory of sovereignty or supremacy of government.
The right to strike is rooted in the freedom of man, and
he may not be denied that right except by clear, unequivocal language embodied ih^a constitution, statute,
ordinance, rule, or contract.
.

.

.

.

.

.

The decision in this case was upheld by the Minnesota

Supreme Court in 1951*^^

Despite the fact that there are many states which have

passed legislation prohibiting strikes, teachers are continuing
to strike in widely scattered sections of the country, including

those jurisdictions with anti-strike laws.

such laws actually encourage strikes.

In some situations

Penalties may be so

severe that public officials are afraid to impose them.

The

New York City teacher strike in I960 was settled in part on the
stipulation that there be no reprisals against striking teachers.
A recent release from the Associated Press

68

reported on strikes

in Washington, D.C., Florida, Pittsburgh, Pa., and Waterbury,

Connecticut.

It also noted that the teachers in the City of

Chicago had voted to strike unless certain demands were met.
In the Waterbury strike, the Superior Court has ordered the

^^Lieberman, op

.

cit .

,

p. 298.

Board of Education v. Public School Employees Union
N.W.

(2d) 797
67

(i95l)".

'Lieberman, op. cit ., p.

1|.0.

^^Portland Evening Express, April 3, 1968, p.

1.

,

67
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teachers to justify their strike action.

This may imply that

strikes are legal if they can be justified by the teachers.
At the moment, the weight of legal authority appears to
be that teacher strikes are illegal with or without anti-strike
laws.

This principle may be undergoing a change, however, and

only future decisions will establish more definite guidelines.
Right to organize

.

The right of teachers to organize

as a group or union for purposes of engaging in collective

bargaining has generally been upheld by the courts when no
threat of strike is present.

Thus in the Norwalk case cited

earlier, the court was asked to give an opinion on this

question, "Is it permitted to the plaintiff under our laws to

organize itself as a labor union for the purpose of demanding

and receiving recognition and collective bargaining?"

The

court's answer, in part:
The statutes and private acts give broad powers to
the defendant with reference to educational matters and
school management in Norwalk.
If it chooses to negotiate
with the plaintiff with regard to the employment, salaries,
grievance procedure and working conditions of its members,
there is no statute, public or private, which forbids such
>

negotiations.
.
If the strike threat is absent and the defendant prefers to handle the matter througih negotiations with the
plaintiff, no reason exists why it should not do so.°^
.

Sanctions

.

.

Sanctions constitute another means which

teachers use to enhance their bargaining power.

In 1962,

the NEA's Representative Assembly authorized the use of

sanctions and defined them as ’’appropriate disciplinary action

^^Norwalk Teachers' Association
138 Conn. 56^,' By A. 2d

v..

Boar d of Education ,
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by the organized profession.

Various types of sanctions can be applied by local,
state, or national associations.

Sanctions applied by local

associations include statements of censure, withholding of
contracts during negotiations) and avoidance of extracurricular
activities.

Sanctions applied by state associations may include

public statements of censure, including statements that con-

ditions in a school district are unsatisfactory; withdrawal
of placement services; requests that teachers not accept

employment in a system; and legal action to compel improvements
or equitable procedures.

Sanctions have been used in different ways around the

country since they were formally authorized in 1962.

They

have been used on a statewide basis in Utah and Oklahoma.
On a local level, sanctions have been used in such diverse
school districts as Little Lake, California; Waterbury,

Connecticut; Dade County, Florida; Asbury Park, New Jersey;
71

and Stratford, Connecticut.'

Sanctions have been imposed by the Maine Teachers

Association in Maine’s two largest cities, Lewiston and Portland.

In Portland, sanctions have been imposed twice within

the last two years.

Because of the implications for the rest

of the state, this local situation will bo reviewed in the
"^^National Commission on Professional Rules and Responsibilities, Guidelines for Professional Sanctions (Washington,
D.C.: National Education Association, 1963), p. 9.
71
Lieberman, op« cit ., p. 30^4- •.
'
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final section of this chapter.

Another form of sanctions is the withholding of salary
agreements.
tracts

»

Public school teachers holding continuing con-

such as Connecticut and Maine teachers^ after a pro-

bationary period, receive an annual salary agreement form or
notice which is entirely separate from the continuing contract.
Thus, teachers can refuse to sign the annual salary agreement

without Jeopardizing their employment status.

They simply

serve notice that the teacher considers himself under contract
to teach in the district, but is not signing the annual salary

agreement because the salary terms offered by the board are

unsatisfactory.

This technique was utilized in the first

Portland sanction two years ago.
The legality of the sanction has yet to be tested in
the courts.

Also the right of a teachers' union to negotiate

under the threat of sanction, or during a sanction has no
At least one state official thinks this is not

legal precedent.
the point.

The executive secretary of the New Jersey Education

Association expressed his views at a recent conference as
follows

Legality may not be the crucial issue. The argument
that an extreme sanction is legal while a strike is not is
not impressive. Both involve the withdrawal of service,
and in both the children miss certain expected schooling.
The extreme sanction--the resignation of teachers and
blackballing of the district even though it may be legal,
can have a far more devastating effect upon children than
In ray book any work
the typical brief teacher strike.
A strike is a
strike,
a
is
stoppage, legal or illegal,
strike.
a
is
sanction
sanction and an extreme

—

72 Ibid.

,

p. 306.
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Negotiation agreements

.

The legal authority of a

school committee to enter into a negotiation agreement with
a
teachers' organization, without state legislation is not

clearly established.

What little authority there is at the

present time suggests that the practice is legal if no threat
of strike is present and the items to bo negotiated are proper
ones, i.e., items which the school committee may properly

delegate to a third party.

It is the latter question which

has raised considerable question and disagreement.

The

definition of items which are negotiable will undoubtedly
need to be defined by the various state courts in keeping

with existing statutes.
The Norwalk case paved the way for negotiation agree-

ments.

Justice Jennings expressed the court's opinion on the

subject in the following manner:
.
The statutes and private acts give broad powers
.
to the defendant with reference to educational matters
and school management in Norwalk.
If it chooses to
negotiate with the plaintiff with regard to the employment,
salaries, grievance procedure and working conditions of its
members, there is no statute, public or private, which
It is a matter of common
forbids such negotiations.
knowledge that this is the method pursued in most school
systems large enough to support a teachers' association
It would seem to make no difference
in some form.
theoretically whether the negotiations are with a committee
of the whole association or with individuals or small
related groups, so long as any agreement made with the
If
CO imittee is confined to members of the association.
to
prefers
defendant
and
the
absent
threat
is
the strike
handle the matter through negotiations with the plaintiff,
no reason exists why it should not do so.
The claim of the defendant that this would be an
illegal delegation of authority is without merit. The
authority is and remains in the board.
.

73 Norwalk Teachers' Association v. Board of Education ,
138 Conn. 269, 83 A. 2d 482 (1951)
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A key point concerning negotiations agreements is that

of whether the school committee may terminate the agreement at

will.

Another is whether or not an agreement is considered to

be a legal contract.

As of 1965 » no court has declared a

collective agreement terminable at will by a public agency to
be illegal.

Whatever their form and regardless of their con-

tractual status, collective agreements in education are becoming
more common.

Existing legislation differs markedly in the scope of
negotiable items included.

Some statutes include only salaries

and other conditions of employment while others include educa-

tional objectives, content of courses and curricula, selection
pracof textbooks, in-service training, hiring and assignment
tices, salary schedules and noninstructional duties.'^
Of particular interest to Maine educators

mi^t

be the

Massachusetts
provisions of the recently enacted legislation in
The Massachusetts statute was originally

on the subject.

American
sponsored by the Massachusetts affiliate of the
Employees (AFL-CIO),
Federation of State, County and Municipal
After affecting some
not the American Federation of Teachers.

Massachusetts Teachers Assochanges in the proposed bill, the
co-sponsor. The bill, which
ciation joined with the AFSCME as a
including teachers, was signed
applies to all public employees,

into law in November

,

1965*

76

^^Lieberman, op. cit ., p. 328.
^ Ibl^.

,

pp .

W

^^Ibid., p. 49*

-4^9
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The statute guarantees employees the right to join

organizations and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing on questions of wages, hours and

other conditions of employment and to engage in other concerted activities.

Strikes are prohibited, but fact-finding

with preliminary investigations by the state board of conI

ciliation and arbitration is provided.
The State Labor Relations Commission is authorized to

I

conduct representation elections, to select exclusive bargaining
agents, to determine appropriate units of representation, and
j

I

to enforce the prohibited practices section of the statutes.
I

Employer practices which are prohibited include;

ii

interfering

with the rights of employees; dominating or interfering with

I

the formation, existence or administration of any employee

|!

Ii

If

organization; and refusing to bargain in good faith.

Employee

I

organizations are prohibited from restraining or coercing a
I

municipal employer in the selection of its representative for
I

purposes of collective bargaining, and refusing to bargain

,!

Ii

in good faith.
The State Labor Relations Commission is given the

!|

power to issue orders requiring the parties to cease and
desist from the practices prohibited by statute.

The Com-

mission is further authorized to impose penalties such as withI

drawing certification of an employee organization, ordering
reinstatement with or without back pay of a discharged employee,
I

I

'

i

or directing either party to pay the entire costs of

230

fact-finding.
The most difficult problem in drafting negotiation

agreements is now, and will continue to be, that of
defining

working conditions."

Does class size, selection of text-

books, free lunch time, qualifications for personnel,
in-

service training, hiring and assignment practices, etc.,
constitute working conditions or are these administrative matters

which cannot be negotiated even if the employer is willing to
negotiate such items?

These are questions which will eventually

have to be decided by the courts.
Crisis in Portland .

As stated earlier, Maine has no

legislation on the subject of collective bargaining for teachers
nor has there been any litigation as yet.

The City of

Portland, however, representing Maine's largest school district

with over 600 teachers, has had its problems in this area in
the past two or three years and they are not as yet resolved.

Recent events in Portland, while not necessarily providing

definitive guidelines for other Maine school districts, are

worth reporting in this study since they are current and, if
nothing more, may suggest procedures for both teachers and
employers which will prevent similar stalemates in future
negotiatipns.

Difficulties between the Portland Teachers Association,
an affiliate of the Maine Teachers Association, and the Portland

School Committee reached an impasse in 1965.

The major

^^Por the full text of the agreement see Appendix

E.
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disagreement was over a salary increase although the
teachers
had other grievances concerning class size, employment
pro-

cedures and curriculum concerns.

The refusal of the school

committee to adopt the salary schedule recommended by the
PTA

resulted in sanctions being imposed on the school system for
a period of about two months.

This local sanction was sup-

ported by the Maine Teachers Association.
One of the conditions insisted upon by the teachers for

lift of the sanction was an opportunity to enter into collective

bargaining with the school committee.

This was eventually agreed

upon, the sanction was lifted, and representatives of the

Portland Teachers Association and the Portland School Committee went to work in drafting an agreement.
In October, 1966, after many months of work, a

negotiations agreement, acceptable to both parties, and their
lawyers, was signed.

With optimism on both sides, it was

heralded as the beginning of a new era in public relations and
in cooperation between the school board and teachers in Maine's

largest public school system.
Key points of the agreement include the following:
"(1) The Portland School Committee recognizes the Portland
Teachers Association as the exclusive representative
of a majority of the certified personnel of this city.

”(2) The Portland Teachers Association recognizes the
Portland School Committee as the elected representative
of the people of Portland, Maine, and as the employer
of the certified personnel of the Portland Public

Schools.
"(3) The Portland Teachers Association agrees that much of
the preliminary work involved .in negotiations or all
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of the discussion in a specific area requiring
mutual understanding or agreement can be
conducted
between the Superintendent of Schools and representatives of the Portland Teachers Association.
"(

4)

”( 5

)

The Portland Superintending School Committee
recognizes the Portland Teachers Association for the
purpose of negotiating proposals concerning standards
for employing personnel, community support for the
school system, in-service training of personnel,
curriculum concerns, class size, teacher turnover,
personnel policies, grievance procedures, working
conditions, communication with the school system,
contracts and other items of concern to the extent
it is administrative or otherwise feasible.

Failing agreement between the Portland School Committee
and the Negotiating Committee of the Portland Teachers
Association, an impasse will be recognized.

"(6)

In the event that any matter being jointly considered
by the two parties is not settled in a mutually
satisfactory manner by the means provided by this
agreement, either party may request the assistance
and advice of a Board of Review.

”(7)

The Board of Review shall meet with the School Committee and the Portland Teachers Association, make
inquiries and investigations, hold hearings and take
such steps as it deems appropriate.
It shall, within
twenty days after the Board of Review holds its first
hearing, make findings of fact and recommend terms of
agreement.
These findings and recommendations are
to be made public.

"(8)

The report of such third party shall be advisory only
and shall not be binding on either party.

"(9)

This agreement shall take effect at the time of
signing the agreement and will remain in effect
until June 30, 1967* or as long as the Portland
Teachers Association is authorized to represent
a majority of the certificated teachers of Portland.
It shall be a continuing contract for a period of
one year for each succeeding year starting July 1st
unless changed as herein provided.

”(10) Either party desiring changes in this agreement must
notify the other party in writing prior to April 1st
of any negotiating contract year; however, changes
may be made at any time by mutual agreement. While
this is a continuing contract from year to year, if
’
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changes are to be made, thirty days' notification
shall be given by the party proposing the changes,
in which case the same procedure as outlined heretofore shall be followed,
"(

11 ) If there is any disagreement by the School Committee
or the Portland Teachers Association as to the
interpretation or application of the terms of this
agreement it shall be submitted to the Board of
Review.

After more than a year of continuous disagreement over

interpretation of the document, negotiations once again

reached an impasse.

Sanctions were imposed, salary talks

ceased and the School Committee initiated two court actions,
one to impose an injunction on the sanction, the other seeking
a declaratory judgement on whether the negotiating agreement

itself was legal.
As might have been predicted, disagreement centered on
the paragraph defining negotiable items.

number

14.

above, these include:

As pointed out in

standards for employing per-

sonnel, community support for the school system, in-service

training of personnel, curriculum concerns, class size, teacher
turnover, personnel policies, grievance procedures, working

conditions, communications within the school system, contracts,
and other items of concern to the extent it is administratively
or otherwise feasible.
The PTA interpreted this paragraph to mean that the

teachers association has a right to be consulted as changes

"^Negotiation Agreement Between the Portland School
Committee and the Portland Teachers Association, signed Oct. 24,
For the full text of the Agreement, see Appendix D.
1966.

2^k
are introduced into the school system.

The School Committee

held that the paragraph allows the teachers to ask for
negotiation of a particular item, but does not prevent the
School

••

Committee from introducing a unilateral change without prior

notification and consultation.
The disagreement came to a head over administrative

procedures in developing curriculum changes and setting up new

positions without discussions under the negotiating agreement.
In keeping with Article III-H of the agreement, a letter

request from the PTA to the School Committee for the appointment
and advice of a Board of Review concerning the interpretation
of the document was forwarded in November, 196?.

The School

Committee ignored this request and responded with a Superior
Court action for a declaratory Judgement that:
(a)

it is not permissible under Maine law for the
School Committee to have entered into the
agreement;

(b)

it is not permissible under Maine law for the
School Committee to comply with the agreement;

(c) under Maine law the agreement is illegal, ultra

vires and of no force and effect;
(d) it is not permissible under Maine law for the
School Committee to recognize the Association
as the exclusive representative of the certified
school personnel of the City of Portland;
(e)

under Maine law the School Committee cannot bargain,
negotiate or contract away its power, duty and/or
responsibility.

In response to this action by the School Committee,

the PTA voted overwhelmingly (551 to 44) to ask the MTA and

NBA to intervene.

On December 7# 1967* the announcement was
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made by the Executive Secretary of the MTA that sanctions
wore
once again in effect.

The Portland School Committee countered this move by

seeking a temporary injunction from the Superior Court on the
sanctions.

Meanwhile, the Governor reconvened the 103rd

Legislature in a special session on January 9, 1968.

Among

other bills introduced was one concerning collective bargaining

with teachers.
Possibly motivated by anticipated legislation, the

resignation of the Superintendent, the approaching deadline
for the now school budget, or all of these, both sides declared
a truce.

The Maine Teachers Association lifted the sanction

and the School Committee withdrew its action from the courts.

Both sides have agreed to scrap the existing agreement at the
close of the current school year and draft a new one.
As mentioned earlier in this section, the bill failed
to pass and a new one is being drafted for the lOL^th Legis-

lature to consider.

Whatever the outcome, the Judiciary can

look forward to a number of requests for interpretation in
this new field of activity in education.

While disconcerting to some, it is perhaps literary
Justice that this study of Maine School Law be concluded on a

note of uncertainty.

Still another need for future research

and updating of the facts is indicated.
Summary
Maine
It is Illegal to teach in the public schools of
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without a valid teaching certificate issued by the
State Department of Education.
Responsibility for establishing qualifications for certificates has recently been shifted
from
the Com-

missioner of Education to the State Board of Education
although
the Commissioner still retains the right to revoke
a certificate

under certain conditions.
The employment procedures for hiring teachers are

defined and must be strictly adhered to.

The superin-

tendent must nominate, the school committee must approve the
nomination, after which the superintendent ’’employs" the

teacher under such terms and conditions as he deems proper.
Teachers serve at their peril who obtain employment not in

keeping with the legal procedures.
An oral contract has been held to bo valid.

Also, no

formal action by a school committee in approving a nomination
is necessary, if subsequent action, such as approving pay

vouchers, is taken.
A contract cannot be breached simply because no formal

action by the school committee or superintendent is taken in
assigning a teacher to a particular position.

been held that

a

Thus, it has

principal's contract could not be invalidated

just because there were no written records of any formal

nomination by the superintendent or approval by the school
committee.

The fact that the principal was allowed to perform

his duties and paid for same for a portion of the school year

was considered sufficient proof that the school officials
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ratified the employment,
Maine teachers serve a probationary period
of up to
three years before being issued a continuing
contract.
School

committees are under no obligation to renew
a contract during
this period nor do they have to provide reasons
for such
action.
The question of permanency of employment
or "tenure”

under the continuing contract has not been adjudicated
by the
courts.

While teachers have the right of

a

notice at least

six months in advance, may request a hearing, and are entitled
to reasons for the termination of the contract prior to the

hearing, these "reasons” lack definition.

Unlike the dis-

missal statute which stipulates the reasons for which

a

teacher

may be dismissed, the contract statutes are silent on this
point.

The statutes are also silent on the matter of a teacher

terminating a contract.

In the absence of specific regulations

in the contract itself, a teacher may, presumably, terminate a
contract with a written resignation at any time.

The number

of days of advance notice is not defined.

Maine teachers enjoy the protection of a minimum salary
schedule.

Unlike some states, the minimum salary for each

step from minimum to maximum is set.

Private school teaching

has been held to count in total years of experience in de-

termining a teacher's salary.

Teachers also have an "equal

pay” clause for male and female teachers performing similar
duties and have a compulsory retirement system.
The field of collective bargaining is new in Maine
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although there are several negotiating
agreements in effect
around the state. The Maine courts have
not as yet been
called upon to determine the legality of a
teacher
strike

although the Maine Supreme Judicial Court is
currently considering the legality of a sanction imposed upon
a school

district by the Maine Teachers Association.
this field is anticipated in the near future.
to

which

Legislation in
The extent

a school committee may negotiate certain items
will

probably require judicial interpretation.
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CHAPTER X

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
The primary purpose of this study has been to identify,

analyze and summarize all existing decisions of the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court relating to public school education.
In the absence of Supreme Court rulings, or rulings from lower

courts on important legal principles, opinions from the office
of the Attorney General have been included.

So far as the

conwriter can determine, all such opinions, excepting those

cerned with strictly local problems have been included.

This

have come to
has been done because Maine school officials
so, perhaps, than
place great reliance on these opinions, more

in neighboring states.

included in
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court cases

from 1821 through 1968.
this study cover all pertinent oases
in number among the
They are more or less evenly divided
school districts,
major areas of school activity including
finance, property, pupils and teachers.

Evidently, there are

statutes since no one area has
no glaring deficiencies in the
As was noted
disproportionate amount of litigation.

received a

to
early court cases pertaining
in the introductory chapter,
have not always been included
statutes now amended or repealed,
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A few decisions from Maine Superior Court cases are

included.

It is extremely difficult to find such cases relating

to education.

These courts, not being courts of record, have

no uniform system of filing cases.

In visiting the offices of

the Clerk of Courts of three of the Superior Court Districts

in Maine, the writer found that court decisions are filed

either alphabetically, alphabetically by date, or alphabetically

by date by action, either civil or criminal.

Since these de-

cisions are not binding upon the Maine Supreme Judicial Court,
a compilation of such decisions would not appear to add suf-

ficient weight to the body of the law to justify the monumental
task of such an undertaking.

Legal opinions from other jurisdictions have been re-

ferred to frequently in this study.

While not binding upon

the Maine courts, it is hoped that they will provide some

insight into what the weight of authority appears to be else-

where and serve as guidelines in the absence of Maine decisions.
Opinions from the United States Supreme Court have been
cited where applicable.

Maine, containing a very small number

of integrating
of Negroes, has not had to face the problems

schools so troublesome elsewhere.

The writer has not seen the

problem or reviewing
necessity, therefore, of discussing this
widely reported elsewhere.
the many court cases which have been
a systematic
This study has endeavored to provide
as estaolished by
arrangement of the ruling legal principles,
an additional tool to
Maine judicial decisions, for use as
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assist those who serve public education in the state.

While no

substitute for the guidance of the town counsel, city solicitor,
or private lawyer, it is hoped that somewhere between the

initial decision-making process of the school official or teacher
and the necessity of seeking professional legal assistance, that
this document may find its appropriate place.
In conducting this study it has been necessary, of

course, to examine carefully all existing statutes relating to

education in Maine.

It is not the writer’s prerogative to

examine the statutes from the point of view of educational

philosophy, or for that matter to question or determine legislative intent.

Aristotle is credited with having said that,

”to interpret the law is to corrupt it."

said,

"...

A recent observer has

The opportunity to rephrase the old law creates

in many an irresistible impulse to create a better system with

more effective direction and regulation than was provided by
the old law."^

The conclusions concerning the statutes are

presented, therefore, as an attempt to describe the law, not
to change it.

The conclusions and recommendations to follow

as they
are separated into two categories, one on the statutes

during the
now exist, the other on general observations noted
study of the court decisions.
_qf
^Madaline Remmlein and Martha Ware, An Evaluation
Anderson
H.
Existing Forms of School Laws (Cincinnati: The W.
CompanyV 1959), P«
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The Statutes
The writer has found the language of the statutes

generally to be quite clear and without undue rhetorical
flourishes or ornamentation.

Paragraph construction leaves

something to be desired, however.

The new 1964 Revision

organizes Maine law under thirty-nine titles.

Education laws

are contained in Title 20.

The basic breakdown is by title,

part, chapter and section.

Many sections are long and in-

volved-,

covering many subjects in a single paragraph.

153 of Chapter 7 is typical of this style.

Section

In a single

paragraph, covering one and a half pages of single spaced
type (597 words), it covers such topics as:

the mechanics

of joint meetings for school unions; annual meetings; pro-

visions for an office for the superintendent of schools;

apportionment of costs; relative amount of service to be

performed by the union superintendent in each town; the
setting of salary; election of superintendent; discharge of
superintendent; provision for appeal by a discharged superintendent; qualifications of the superintendent; and conflict of

interest of school committee members.
The layman, who only occasionally peruses the statutes,
and
finds sections like this one extremely difficult to read

interpret.

A further breakdown by subsection or numbered

paragraph, by topic, would be an improvement.
the first
The 1964 Revision is noteworthy in that, for

Attorney General
time, the statutes are annotated and include

opinions.

Also, opportunity for the addition of new statutes

is provided by the use of odd-numbered chapters and sections.

Wide gaps between section numbers are provided.

Thus, Chapter

one pertaining to the Department of Education, while containing

just three sections, has space for fifty.

The State Department of Education periodically compiles
the State of Maine Laws relating to public schools and dist^^ibutes same in paperback form.

While the table of contents

is consistent with chapter titles, it is too broad in scope

and provides the researcher with little real help in finding
a

particular subject.

One interested in searching the law on

duties of school committee members, for example, might turn
to Part I (Administration and Organization) but then find that

further information is to be found in Chapter

7

(Supervisory

Units); Chapter 9 (Administrative Districts); Chapter 11 (Com-

munity School Districts); Chapter 13 (District Meetings);
Chapter 15 (Superintending School Committee); or possibly
Chapter 1? (Union Schools).

Then again, he may find his

answer in Chapter 101 (General Provisions); Chapter 103 (Duties
of Administrative Units); or possibly in Chapter 105 (Atten-

dance and Discipline).

While recognizing that it is fairly uniform procedure
table of conin state codes not to use page numbers in the
would
writer believes that the use of page numbers
tents, the

facilitate the process of looking up the law.

A reader seeking

the compilation.
Section 911, for example, must thumb through

section by section, rather than page by page, until it
is
found.

This is an awkward and time-consuming process which

could easily be corrected.

While this publication by the State Department also

includes an index* it is not all-inolusiv© and requires the

reader to search several headings for possible infomation.
One interested in the law on truancy, for example, would need
to search all of the following index headings to be certain

that all pertinent statutes were found:

absence; compulsory

school attendance age; certificate after absence from illness;

compulsory attendance in towns; compulsory education in unorganized territory; discipline; fines for truancy; juvenile
offenders; habitual truants; truancy; and truant officers.
As with the table of contents, entries in the index are

identified by section numbers only.
It is apparent from the foregoing examples that a

complete codification of the school laws, annotated, with a

comprehensive table of contents and indexing system would be
a

significant aid to the schoolmen of Maine and others in-

terested in educational legislation.

Consideration might also

be given to the adoption of a decimal system for easy identifies

tion of the statutes, and for a method of keeping the compilation up-to-date with pocket parts.
A final recommendation concerning the statutes is that

consideration be given to updating various terms now used to
identify school districts and school district officers.
some
all such terms now in use have legal justification,

While
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represent a holdover from earlier types of organization; and the
duties and responsibilities of these various districts, and
their officers, are not always the same.

Thus, school districts

are labelled in various ways as follows:

administrative units,

incorporated school districts, community school districts,
school administrative districts, school unions and supervisory
units.

The legislature, possibly concerned by this prolifera-

unit as.
tion of terms, has seen fit to define an administrative
,

responsible
all municipal or quasi -municipal corporations

.
for operating public schools.

„2

School officers are known as;

superintending school

now been
committees (as noted earlier, "superintending" has
school
removed), community school committees, community
duties and responsitrustees, and school directors. The legal
the same, yet
bilities of these various boards are essentially
statutes, and not always
defined in separate sections of the

identical
governmental units
Currently there are four basic
Maine: the city or town
responsible for public education in
system, two or more towns in
operating an independent school

a

community school district, and
supervisory school union, the
have
district. All of these units
the school administrative
pupils
to the state and to the
responsibilities
basic
same
the
and
the statutes of the duties
they serve. Uniformity in
officers.
school units, and their
various
the
of
responsibilities

Annotated (1961^), c.
^Maine, Revised Statutes,

par. 1.
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is suggested.

General Conclusions
compilation of
The conclusions that follow represent a
the course of
carefully considered observations made during

for the
They include a variety of topics, so,
subheadings which
convenience of the reader, are grouped under

this study.

correspond with the chapter titles.
The state and public education

.

If there has been any

this study, it has been that of
one recurring theme throughout
It
public school education.
state supremacy in the field of
that education is a state
has been pointed out repeatedly
are quasi -municipal corfunction, and that school districts
School
to, the state.
porations created by, and responsible

locally, are agents of
district officers, while elected

h

state and serve the state.

education is a state
While the legal concept that
the
established, the authority of
function has been clearly
it
and responsibilities as
duties
such
delegate
legislature to
confirmed by the
local level has been
the
to
desirable
deems
control
The concept of local
occasions.
numerous
on
courts
adminalthough in the new school
Maine,
in
strong
remains
are being
town school committees
local
districts
istrative
represent the district
who
directors
of
replaced by boards
committees.
by strictly local
of school systems
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Wh.il© there exists a dual responsibility for education

by local districts and a state department of education, no
serious conflicts between these two powers has arisen, at least
to the extent of reaching the courts.

Maine’s system of admin-

istering the public schools has proven to be satisfactory and
no major shift in the balance of power in this area seems

likely in the immediate future.
School district organization and control

.

Maine, as

most other states, has set up a system of strong local control,
in which the local school district officers have been given

almost total control of the car© and management of the local
schools.

Rules and regulations passed by local committees,

unless contrary to state statutes, have the force and effect
of law in the local district.

The legislature, not having

the time nor desire to promulgate regulations to cover all

local conditions, has enacted a minimum number of laws

affecting all school districts in the state.

The administra-

tion of a local district for the most part is left then, to
the local school committee or board of directors.
v;iil

The courts

not review a decision of a local board unless it is

illegal, arbitrary or discriminatory.
that a
It was recognized early in Maine's history
to
professionally trained school official should be employed
The position
carry out the policies of the local committee.
school administrator
of superintendent of schools, the chief

and his duties and
at the local level, has been established

\
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responsibilities are clearly established by statute.

While a local employee serving at the discretion of the
committee, the superintendent is considered by the courts to
be a public officer.

The legal status of the Maine school

superintendent is not entirely clear and perhaps should be

clarified by additional legal definition in the statutes.
School district reorganization

.

The evolution of school

district reorganization in Maine has been gradual.

The various

types of districts, beginning with the original school district

system whereby several districts, with their own school committees, served a single town, to the latest type, the school

administrative district serving several towns, have evolved
as conditions changed.

Continual refinements in the original Sinclair legisadministrative
lation providing for the formation of school
type ox
districts have been made to the point that this
Additional
organization is now the most popular in Maine.
transfer its membership
refinements such as allowing a town to
district to another, or allowing
from one school administrative
should be given attention by
two small districts to combine,
redistricting the
Also, the master plan for
the legislature.
last session of the legislature,
entire state, defeated at the
and consideration.
should be given continued study
principle of governIn Maine, the common law
Liability
to
liability for injuries suffered
mental immunity from tort
districts and
still applies to school
pupils, or other persons,
.
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their

omcers.

While this is also true in a majority of the

states, there appears to be a definite trend or pattern

developing around the country in which state legislatures
and state supreme courts are abolishing the immunity of school
districts.

This change in judicial point of view has come about

largely because of the opportunity for school districts to purchase liability insurance to protect its assets at a minimum
cost, yet provide recovery of damages where an injury has been

suffered.

The Maine Legislature might well consider such

legislat: on in the future.

As has been pointed out earlier,

the rule of immunity does not extend to their agents or employees,

or other persons under contract with such school districts.

The legal status of certain school employees, unpaid

volunteers, teacher aides and student teachers is not defined
in the statutes.

With the doctrine of governmental immunity

being increasingly questioned, and in view of the fact that a
recent enactment authorizing school committees and directors
to pay premiums on liability insurance for employees, it would

seem that a clear-cut definition of the legal status of all

persons dealing with public school pupils is in order.
School finance .

The courts have consistently upheld the

authority of the legislature to impose tax programs on a state-

wide basis for the support of public school education, if

uniformly applied, even though local municipalities or school
districts may not necessarily receive the same proportionate
amount in return.

From the very beginning, the legislature
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has demanded that local municipalities raise by taxation

minimum amount per pupil for school purposes.

a

These funds are

raised by a property tax.
At this time, the state reimburses local districts at
a

flat rate of 20 percent of the actual per pupil expenditure.

School administrative districts receive an additional 10 percent bonus.

The subsidy formula does not allow for differentials

based on local effort or ability to finance education.

In other

words, the richer school districts may spend more money for

a

quality program and receive the same percentage from the state
as the poorer districts.

It allows the wealthier districts to

provide better educational opportunities with less local effort.
This formula should be revised to provide more equitable oppor-

tunities for education in all districts, regardless of local

property valuation.
It is noted that the fiscal year for school districts

is the same as the calendar year, whereas the state and federal

governments operate on a July

1 to

June 30 basis.

This neces-

sitates double records and constant confusion over the actual
cost of budgetary items since they are prorated over two fiscal

years.

All parties concerned would benefit from a statutory

revision defining the fiscal year for municipalities and/or
school districts to be the same as

for the state and

federal

governments
The courts have upheld the right of school districts
to receive gifts and bequests.

A trust fund set up to benefit
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the pupils of a particular school is not invalid should this

school subsequently combine with another school as long as the

pupils for whom the original bequest was made continue to

attend the consolidated school.
While school committees or school directors have the

responsibility of compiling the annual school budget, the final

responsibility for approving the budget rests with the voters
city
of the district, or, in the case of cities, with the

council.

by
Once approved, the funds may generally be expended

for the total
the school committee in any manner deemed best

operation of the schools.
right of school
The courts have consistently upheld the
construction purdistricts to incur indebtedness for school

percent of the local
The current debt limit is 12-1/2
it is 12-1/2 perIn school administrative districts
valuation.
It has
all member towns.
cent of the combined valuation of
of a school district
been further held that the indebtedness
a
the town or towns included, since
is not the indebtedness of
corporation.
school district is a quasi-municipal
states which has no conMaine is one of the very few
the use of tax moneys for
stitutional provisions prohibiting
statutory authority to transport
sectarian purposes. There is
not
expense but the state does
private school pupils at public
its formula for reimbursement.
include this expenditure in
some school
exists in Maine wherein
An unusual situation
purpose of
sectarian schools for the
with
contract
districts

poses.
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iproviding secondary education.

Wiiile not as yet ch.allenged,

Ithis might well be considered a church-state conflict if reI

[viewed by the courts.

They may be called upon to rule whether

Ithis practice is contrary to the First Amendment.

School property

I

.

^

Although school committees and

directors are responsible for the management, custody and care

1

owned by the
of the schools, the school property itself, is

I

I

state.

property,
The legislature may control or dispose of such

inhabitants.
with or without the consent of the district or its
^

'

by eminent
School officials have the authority to take land
of a school.
domain procedures if necessary for the location
use of
it is common practice to permit community
V/hile

I

activities, a series of
school buildings for a wide range of
held that it is
Attorneys General opinions have consistently
buildings by any religious
illegal to permit the use of school

I

group
number of statutes
The legislature has enacted a
basis. Attendance is compertaining to pupils on a statewide
ages of seven and seventeen.
pulsory for all pupils between the
school on the basis of physical
Children may be excluded from
for
the extent of the handicap
or mental unfitness although
More definitive legislation
exclusion has not been defined.
Pupils

.

is noeded in this area.

reasonhas the right to make
The local school committee
This
concerning pupil behavior.
regulations
and
rules
,ble
regulations concerning dress
enact
to
authority
ncludes the
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and appearance.

Pupils may be temporarily suspended from school

for disorderly conduct or they may be permanently excluded by

formal action of the school committee.

The permanency of the

expulsion has never been defined and, in fact, pupils must be
readmitted upon repentance, after a reasoftaol© length of tim®,
although the length of time is not defined in the statutes.

Expulsion is legal only after an investigation and a hearing.
«

Corporal punishment is legal if deemed necessary by the teacher
in charge and not excessive.

Pupils must attend school in the district where their

father or legal guardian maintains his residence except that
public
pupils may attend schools outside their district, at
school.
expense, if the local district does not maintain a
be
Local committees may prescribe which subjects shall

long as they are
taught as well as the textbooks to be used so
The secular
not contrary to state-prescribed requirements.

study of the Bible may be included.

Transportation must be provided to all elementary
from the school
pupils who live at a "reasonable" distance
by the
This distance has never been defined
tJhey attend.
Transportation must
legislature and should be in the future.
district
a school administrative
be provided to all pupils in
regardless of grade level.

classification of pupils are
Legal definitions of the
defines
The most recent enactment
confusing in the Maine laws.
.

grades nine to twelve; a
containing
school
a
as
high school

junior high school as one containing any combination
of two or
more consecutive grades from six to nine; and an
elementary

school to include that part of the school organization
in which
is offered a program of studies preceding that offered
by an

approved secondary school.
For purposes of certification of teachers, on the

other hand, elementary is defined as sub-primary through
grade nine; junior high is six through 9; and secondary is

seven through twelve.
made to

hi^

Throu^out the statutes reference

is

school, secondary, junior high school, academy

and elementary school without any uniform definition as to

which grades are included.

While the writer recognizes that

there is disagreement among educators on this subject, the

plea here is for consistency within the state and within the
statutes, for purposes of state subsidies, accreditation,

certification and general understanding by Maine school people.
Teachers

.

The courts have held repeatedly that it is

illegal to teach in the public schools of Maine without

a

valid teaching certificate, be it a temporary permit or a
permanent license.

The responsibility for procuring such

certification rests with the employee not the employer.
Maine's certification laws are more stringent than those in

neighboring states.

In view of the ever-present shortage of

teachers in Maine, a review of the current regulations is
indicated, not for the purpose of lowering standards but for

providing more flexibility

V
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The employment procedures for hiring
teachers are well
defined and must be strictly adhered to.
The question of
permanency of employment or tenure under
the continuing contract has not been adjudicated by the
courts. While teachers
have the right of a notice and may request
reasons for the

termination of a continuing contract, these reasons
lack
definition.
Also, under the dismissal statutes,
the two

reasons for dismissal, "unfitness to teach," and
"services

deemed unprofitable to the school" have never been
defined
despite several court decisions in this area.

In view of

the increasing militancy among teachers and the active inter-

vention of state and national teacher organizations, the
logislature might clarify the statutes on contracts and dis-

missal with more specific language.
Collective bargaining for teachers has arrived in
Maine.

There are several negotiation agreements in effect

within the state.

been imposed.

Controversies have arisen and sanctions have

Two such sanctions are currently being challenged

in the courts by school committees.

The extent to which a

school committee may negotiate needs judicial interpretation.
This area probably represents the most urgent need for legis-

lative action in the field of education.

Several states have

already taken action and others are in the process.

This is

an area that the legislature can ill afford to ignore.
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Need for Further Research
The need for continuing research and study in the area
of school law is self-evident.

The law, or some aspect of it,

changes every time a court decision is rendered; whenever the

legislature convenes; or when a local school committee, or the
State Board of Education, as branches of the state government,
adopt new policies or regulations.
are constantly being made.

Interpretations of the law

Indeed, as this study is being

concluded, judicial decisions in Maine concerning teacher dismissal, tenure rights, corporal punishment and collective

bargaining rights are pending.
It has been the intent of this study to compile and

interpret judicial decisions,

sis

they affect education, from

the date of Maine’s entry into the Union of States to the

present time to fill a void which has heretofore existed.

A

foundation has been established upon which future researchers

may build.
study has been confined to public school education.

legal
Research is needed in the private school area. The
private school and the quasi-private academies

status of the

should be more clearly defined.

The legality of payment by a

parochial schools for
town of tuition funds to private and/or
may well raise the question
the secondary schooling of its pupils
The privately owned and
schools.
of public support of private
place in the Maine
operated academies have occupied a unique
Act permits them to
public school system. The new Sinclair
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become part of a school administrative district,
yet retain
their identity and status as a private school. There

is a need

in this area for research.
The subject of school district reorganization also

needs further study,

Maine is a very large state in area

but with a relatively small population which is concentrated
in the southwestern part of the state.

The Master Plan for

Reorganization needs refinement in order that small school
districts now in operation may join with other districts.

Provision should also be made for the transfer of towns from
one district to another.

also needed.

A uniform method of financing is

Currently there are over fifty Maine communities

not operating any schools at all.

from other districts.

They "buy" their schooling

The foregoing suggests the need for a

thorough study of Maine school district reorganization.
Finally, research is needed in the field of higher

education in Maine,

Historically, the teacher training in-

stitutions have been under the jurisdiction of the Commissioner
of Education and the State Board of Education.

The legislature

has been content to delegate its authority in this area and as
a result,

statutes pertaining to higher education are almost

nonexistent.

The "law" so far as teacher training institutions

are concerned is that which has been incorporated into the

minutes of the State Board meetings by way of rules and regulations or policy statements.
The University of Maine, on the other hand, which is
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in effect, a quasi-private institution, has received considerable attention from the legislature over the years.

change has just recently taken place.

A major

The special session of

the 103 rd Legislature (January, 1968) enacted legislation which

has effected a merger of the University of Maine and the five

State Colleges into one system under the direction of a

Chancellor and a new Board of Trustees entirely separate from
<the State

Board of Education.

The legal problems of this merger

are challenging but not beyond solution.
faculty,^

Salary status of

tenure rights, administrative responsibilities,

programs at the various campuses, and a multitude of other
problems require a speedy solution.

A study of the past

functions of the various institutions included in this merger,
along with recommendations for their future direction would

represent a distinct contribution to the state.

APPENDIX A
OPINION OF THE JUSTICES
OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
GIVEN UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION
OF ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION

3

260

QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED BY THE SENATE
IN AN ORDER DATED JANUARY 13, 1958

ANSWERED JANUARY

li;,

1958

SENATE ORDER PROPOUNDING QUESTIONS

ANSWER OF THE JUSTICES
To the Honorable Senate of the State of Maine

;

In compliance with the provisions of Section 3 of

Article VI of the Constitution of Maine, we, the undersigned
Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, have the honor to
submit the following answers to the questions propounded on

January 13

>

1958.

QUESTION (I):

Do any of the provisions of Sections 1 and 2 of

Legislative Document 1637 (An Act Relating to Educational Aid
and to Clarify the Procedure of Reorganization of School Admin-

istrative Units) delegate legislative power to the State Board
in violation of
of Education and the School District Commission
of
Section 1 of Part First of Article IV of the Constitution

Maine?

ANSWER:

We answer in the negative.

not the LegisThe problem raised here is whether or
which will control
lature has established adequate criteria
by the State Board of
the exercise of a sound discretion
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Education or School District Commissions.

We are satisfied

that these sections of the proposed Act furnish such standards.

We note no instance in which powers which can he properly

exercised only by the Legislature have been improperly delegated
to any subordinate agency.

QUESTION (II):

Must every city or town that is a participating

municipality in a school administrative district, consisting of
two or more municipalities to be created under the provisions of

Section 2 of Legislative Document

I 637

,

take into account its

proportionate part of the indebtedness incurred by such dis'

trict in computing the extent of its ability to create debt or

liability under the provisions of amended Section

of Article

IX of the Constitution of Maine?

ANSWER:

We answer in the negative.
A School Administrative District organized under the

proposed Act, is a "body politic and corporate" (Sec. 111-F),
is separate and distinct from the municipalities participating

in its creation.

It is a quasi-municipal corporation of the

familiar pattern of school, water, recreational, and sewerage
The indebtedness of School Administrative Districts

districts.

thus is not the indebtedness of such municipalities.

School District
120 Me. 15

»

,

131+ Me.

Ij.li+;

Hamilton

Kennebec Water Dist

QUESTION (III):

.

v.

Kelley

v.

Portland Pier Dist.,

v. Waterville^ , 96 Me. 231+*

Would a school administrative district,

created under
consisting of two or more municipalities to be

262
the provisions of Section 2 of Legislative Document 1637, be

subject in any manner to the provisions of amended Section 15
of Article IX of the Constitution of Maine limiting the amount
of debt or liability that may be incurred by cities and towns?

We answer in the negative.

ANSWER:

The Constitution reads in part, "No city or town shall

hereafter create any debt or liability, which
exceed

..."

.

.

.

shall

The limitation on municipal indebtedness applies

to cities and towns and not

1r>

other entities, or, as here, a

School Administrative District.

Our Court has so held in the

cases cited in our answer to QUESTION (II).

QUESTION (IV):

Do the provisions of Section 2 of the Legis-

lative Document 1637 which allow two or more municipalities to
join together to form a new municipality known as a School

Administrative District, which district after its formation
within
owns, operates, and controls all the public schools
VIII
the district, violate any of the provisions of Article

of the Constitution of Maine?

ANSV/ER:

We answer in the negative.

•

Article VIII of the
The issue arises from the words in
advantages of educaConstitution, "A general diffusion of the
of the rights and
tion being essential to the preservation
this important object,
liberties of the people; to promote
and it shall be their duty to
the legislature are authorized,
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require, the several towns to make suitable provision, at their

own expense, for the support and maintenance of public
schools;

..."
In Sawyer v. Gilmore , 109 Me. 169, at p.

in-

volving the constitutionality of the levy of a tax for the
support of schools, our Court said with respect to Article
VIII:
"Who is to determine what is suitable?
Clearly the
Legislature itself.
’Suitable' is en elastic and varying
term, dependent upon the necessities of changing times.
What the legislature might deem to be suitable and therefore necessary under some conditions, they might deem
unnecessary under others."
^

In 1876 , in an Opinion of the Justices, 68 Me, 582,

approving the constitutionality not of a particular bill but
in general of a school mill tax, the suitable provision Article

was referred to, and the Justices pointed out that the Legislature could do more.

'

In brief, the Constitution marks the

mandatory duty of the Legislature, but is not a prohibition

upon its powers.
Municipalities providing for their public school system
by the medium of School Administrative Districts will never-

theless thereby be making suitable provision for the support
and maintenance of public schools, and by their proportional

contributions to the expense incurred by such Districts will
the Conbe in compliance with both the letter and spirit of

stitution.

The Legislature, by making provision therefore,

requirements
will have satisfied the mandatory constitutional

imposed upon it.

QUESTION (V):

Do any of the prohibitions against the passage

of emergency legislation found in Section l6 of Part Third of

Article IV of the Constitution of Maine, prevent the passage
of Legislative Document 1637 as an emergency measure to become

effective upon approval by the Governor?
ANSWER:

We answer in the negative.
The Constitution reads, in part:

"An emergency bill shall include only such measures as^
are immediately necessary for the preservation of the public
peace, health, or safety; and shall not include (1) an infringement of the right of home rule for municipalities,
or an in(2) a franchise or a license to a corporation
dividual to extend longer than one year, or (3) provision
for the sale or purchase or renting for more than five years
of real estate."
The preamble to the Act sets forth that,

"...

it is essential

administrative units
that safe and adequate facilities for such
Evidence of such facts
be constructed without further delay."

would constitute a matter of public safety as

a

matter of law.

Legislature, not
Whether the facts so stated exist is for the

for us to determine.

Morris v. Goss

,

1^7 Me. 89,

9li.

As for

fulfill such requirements.
home rule, municipal plebiscites
corporate is not the granting
The creation of a body politic and
the meaning of the constituof a franchise or license within
Act contains no grant of any
tional prohibition. The proposed
more than to provide mechanics
franchise or license but does no
may initiate voluntary action
by means of which municipalities
Districts. Nor does the Act by
to form School Administrative
renting of real
a sale, purchase or
compel
or
produce
terms
its
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es't&.'to

within the intendment of the Constitution,

QUESTION (VI)

I

Does Section 111“L of Legislative Document 1637

any School
which provides for the financing of the operations of

violate
Administrative District to be created under this act
Maine?
Section 8 of Article IX of the Constitution of

ANSWER:

We answer in the negative.
The Constitution reads, in part:

assessed by
taxes upon real and personal estate, and assessed
authority of this state, shall
thereof.
equally, according to the Just value
"A13

requirements of the
The Act proposed observes the
adopting the state
Constitution for equal taxation by

valuation.

188.
Sawyer v. Gilmore, 109 Me. 169,

this
Dated at Augusta, Maine,

lllth

day of January, 1958

Respectfully submitted:
S/ Robert B. Williamson

S/ Donald W. Webber

S/ Albert Beliveau
S/ Walter M. Tapley»

Sullivan
s/ Francis W.
S/ F. Harold Dubord
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APPENDIX B

POLICY STATEMENT ON THE LIABILITY OP SCHOOL OFFICIALS
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Your question on the liability of school officials
for injuries incurred by pupils in extra-curricular activities
has been given further consideration. As you know, this is
a rather complicated legal question and must be considered
in the light of existing statutes, court opinions and commonly
accepted law.
^

Fundamentally, the support, operation and control of
schools is in the legislature.
The superintending school
committee members and school directors are public officers,
obtaining their authority from the statutes whereby the
legislature has delegated to municipalities and districts
the support and conduct of public schools under legislative standards. As public officers, the superintending
school committees and directors exercise administrative
and certain quasi- judicial functions.
It follows, therefore, that the same rules of law apply to committee members
and directors as apply to other public officers.
As for liability of public officers, the state may
not be sued without its consent, and it is generally held that,
in the absence of a statute, political subdivisions and governmental agencies may not be sued. There is a specific provision that a municipality may be sued for injuries resulting
from defects in public ways, but there is no corresponding
statute relating to injuries in connection with school
activities.
In the absence of such a statute, there would not
appear to be any right to sue a governmental agency such as a
school committee or Board of Directors,

While public officers may be held individually liable
in a civil action for what is called ministerial acts, they are
not usually responsible for acta which are discretionary in
character and the discretion is exercised honestly and in good
Now the question may be raised as to whether a comfaith.
mittee member or director is responsible for the acts of his
agents, i.e., teachers. The opinions I have read seem to indicate that they do not have to answer for either acts of
omission or commission on the part of agents.
There may be a question as to whether a superintendent
There has never been a case in
is a public officer or not.
a
point but attorney generals* opinions indicate that he is
his
schools,
of
nature
public
public officer, due to the
directors,
official relationship with the school committee or
statute.
and the definition of his duties by
public
In some states committee members and other
Maine law
but
injuries,
officers may be held responsible for
does not appear to have this force.
I

In summary, it would appear that school committee
members, directors and superintendents are considered to be
public officers, and as long as they are acting in an adminigtrative capacity, would not be responsible for injuries to
pupils, but that teachers acting in what is called a ministerial
capacity might be held liable for acts of omission or
commission.

.
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COPY (1965)

STATE OP MAINE

SUPERIOR COURT
CIVIL ACTION NO

CITY OP AUBURN et als.
vs

JOHN B. ANNETT et als.

Rulings and Order for Judgment.
The City of Auburn and the members of its City Council

in the role of plaintiffs and the individuals composing the

Superintending School Committee as defendants by declaratory
judgment process submit their request that this Court adjudge

whether with the City Council or with the Superintending School
Committee is invested the authority to fix the total maximum

expenditure of the Department of Education of the City of

Auburn for purposes of the annual budget.

It is clear that

an authoritative court judgment in this proceeding will termi-

nate an uncertainty and controversy within the purview and

purpose of M. R. S. A. T;

llj

#59$8

.

Resolution of this conflict will be afforded by means
of an ascertainment of the legislative will clearly and un-

mistakably expressed by the law-making power in the Charter
of Auburn, P. & S. L.

Lumber Co., 128 Me.

,

1,

1917> a. 201 , as amended, Prankfort v.
i|.,

and in the public statutes

respects not modified by the city charter.”
110 Me. 241

,

’in all

Lunn v. Auburn

243 .

"Towns (cities) are created by the statute

Thus

,
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created it becomes an institution of the State, established for certain public purposes, and for effecting
those purposes, it is invested with certain corporate
powers, and is charged with corresponding duties - all
either expressly or impliedly provided for in the statutes, and adapted to their peculiar nature."
Westbrook v. Peering 63 Me. 231 235 236
,

»

»

.

See, also Concord v. Delaney , 58 Me. 309, 315*

Municipalities must be required by the Legislature to

make suitable provisions at their own expense, for the support
and maintenance of public schools.
Art. VIII.

Constitution of Maine

See M. R. S. A., c. 103, T;

,

20, #851 et seq.

The inhabitants of the City of Auburn are a corporation.

Charter, Art.

1

.

The plenitude of corporate powers

granted by the Legislature to the City by the Charter and by
State laws is vested in the City Council!
"except as otherwise provided by this charter

-

-

-

-

"except that the general management, care and conduct of
the schools shall be vested in a school committee.

Examination of the Charter will dispense with all
above.
occasion for further attention to the first exception

Committee is the
By logical reduction then the School
or the City Council
one arbiter of public school appropriations
and the School Committee
is the ultimate appropriating agency
care and conduct of the
must exercise its general management,
the total public school
public schools within the limits of
'

appropriation by the City Council.
of the School Committee
The mayor is ex officio a member
from
10 other members chosen, 2
which consists of the Mayor and
Art. IV, sec ^J,.
sec.
each ward. Charter, Art - 111,
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Tho Charter defines the powers and duties of the
School

Committee as follows:
"The superintending school committee shall have
all
the powers, and shall perform all duties in regard
to
the care and management of the public schools of this

City wnich are now conferred and imposed upon the superintending school committee by the laws of this State,
except as otherwise provided in this charter." Charter
Art.

IV,

sec.

*

3

.

Logomachy as to the terms "management
duct" is inconclusive.

,

care and con-

Apart from financial powers and duties

much latitude remains for tho management, care and conduct of

public schools by the School Committee in the most important

educational aspects.

But there can be no denying that for a

completely comprehensive management, care and control of
public schools with full autonomy control of finances is
required.

The legislative intent as to the meaning of the

language, "management, care and conduct" is the decisive

criterion and the entire Charter and the public statutes must
be examined to discover the legislative intention as such has

been expressed.
"a doubtful corporate power, it has been said does
not exist; and when any power is granted, and the mode
of its existence is prescribed, that mode must be
strictly pursued." Frankfort v. Lumber Co ., 128 Me. 1,

ij..

Article VII of the Charter legislates concerning
"Business and Financial Problems" of the City.

Section 1

imposes a close and constant recordation of the financial

transactions and of the financial status of all departments
by the
of the municipality and a monthly report of such data

City Auditor to the Manager prior to Council meetings.
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Section

3

requires that monthly financial statements be pub-

lished by the Auditor.

Each of the municipal "boards" must

annually on a date fixed by the Council render to the Manager
a report of the

yearly transactions of that board.

Based upon

such returns the Manager prepares and publishes his annual
report which details receipts, expenditures, balance sheets
and such other financial information as may be required by
the Council.

At the municipal year’s end, the Manager "submits"

to the Council budget "estimates" for the ensuing fiscal year.

Such budget is compiled from detailed information supplied by
the municipal boards on blanks devised by the Manager.

The

budget must contain an exact statement of the City’s financial

condition and an itemized list of appropriations "recommended"
for current expenses and permanent improvement together with

comparative statements of expenditures for the current and

for the previous year.

The budget must present an itemized

than
statement of estimated revenue from all sources other

comparative
taxation, a statement of taxes required with
and any
figures from the current and from the previous year

other information required by the Council.
must be pubThe budget "estimates" of the Manager
to the Council.
lished within 2 weeks after their submission
place for a public hearing
The Council must fix a time and
notice of such hearing to
on that budget and give the public
passage by the Council of
be held at least 10 days before

the appropriate resolve.
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Within

a

month after the new fiscal year begins, the

Council must pass an annual appropriation resolve based on
the budget submitted by the Manager.

The resolve must be

itemized for each department in at least 5 respects, Salaries
and Wages; Other Services; Supplies and Materials; Fixed

Charges; Capital Outlay.

The total amount appropriated shall not exceed the esti-

mated revenue of the City.
Should the Council take no final action to prepare within the time set the annual appropriation resolve by a sort of

default the budget as submitted by the Manager is deemed to
have been finally adopted by the Council.
All moneys appropriated but not spent or owed must at

the municipal's year end be transferred to a reserve fund

except balances in the school fund.

Unexpended school balances

by State law must be carried forward and credited to school

resources for the ensuing year.

M.

R.

S« A.»

Tt

20) ^3453_*

The borrowing of money for the City and that to a

degree limited in form and purpose is entrusted to the Council.
construction
Bonds of the City for the acquisition of land, the
and other puband equipment of buildings, the paving of roads
may be issued upon
lic improvements under stated restrictions
public notice. Every
a 4/5ths’ vote of the Council after

provide for an
order for the issue of bonds or notes must
maturities and
annual tax levy to meet annual principal
interest.
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Money shall.be paid out only upon warrants on the city
treasury, issued by the Auditor and countersigned by the
Manager.
Save for procedural rules in Article II, #7, Article

VII contains all the budgetary and appropriative prescriptions.

The approach toward appropriate funds is to the City

Council through the Manager.
the "boards."

The School Committee is one of

The Manager submits to the Council budget

estimates from data gleaned from the boards and from other
sources
The foregoing paraphrase renders it eminently apparent
that after the informed estimates and the recommendations of
the Manager but by the City Council

quent to a notified public hearing

-

and then only subseare school funds from

the City fixed in amount and authorized.

The total amount

appropriated for all purposes by the Council must not exceed
the estimated revenue of the City.

The faculties for taxing,

borrowing, and appropriating are reposed in the City Council.
Only one budget is conceived and that is for resolution and

decision by the Council.

No finality for school budget fix-

of
ation is extended to the School Committee by any provision

the Charter.

School estimates and recommendations are not

treated as unique or distinctive.

A public hearing upon an

if such
assembled municipal budget would not be purposeful

budget were peremptory.

It is general information that school

budgets.
estimates are the major element of most

The
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conclusion must follow that the City Council are entrusted
by the Charter with a dutiful, prudential, sound and responsible discretion in the exercise of ultimate budgetary judgments.
In 1917 when the Auburn City Charter was granted the

public laws of Maine provided:
"The management of the schools and the custody and
care, including repairs and insurance on school
buildings of all school property in every town, shall
devolve upon the superintending school committee - (emphasis added)
R. S., 1916, c. 16, #37 >
,

The charter of 1917 afforded no powers of budgetary

fixation for the School Committee.

In 1917 municipal school

committees had no such powers under the public laws of this
State.

R.

S

.

,

1916,

c

.

16 .

The Legislature has for many years imposed by statute
an express and unrevised minimum of

80jz(

per inhabitant of

the State,
income from corporate school funds, grants from

be raised
donations, devises, bequests, and forfeitures to

corporation for the
and expended annually by every municipal
R. S., 1 916, c. 16, #l 6

support of its public schools.
M.

R.

S.

A.. T. 20

:

#851

i

.

duties and services in
AS for school physicians, their
population of less than 1+0,000, the

municipalities having a

appropriated by the
expenditure must not exceed the amount
#1131 throu gh
T. 20:
municipal government. M. R. S. A.,
#1^0 through
see also R. S.. 1916, c 161139
Districts the Legislature has
In school Administrative
-

.
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given to the directors the duty and power of preparing the
school budget but that budget must be approved by the voters
of the district at a district budget meeting as to items

dealing with the expenses necessary to operate the School
Administrative District, appropriations for the reserve fund
and capital outlay appropriation.

R.

M.

S.

A.

,

20

T.

:

#305

»

In Community School Districts the trustees and not the
school committee set the budget.

S. A.

R.

M.

T.

,

20

;

#355«

In Maine there has existed for many years a provision
as to liability for municipal, unpaid debts:

personal property of the residents and the real
estate within the boundaries of a municipality, village
corporation or other quasi -municipal corporation may be
taken to pay any debt due from the body corporate. The
owner of property so taken may recover from the municipality or Quasi -municipal corporation under Title lij.,
section l4-953
’’The

'

»

.. 89, #30,
1 B 33 , Chap. DLXXXVI. sec. 3Savage , (l885)» 77 M©» 212, 216, 2l8.
v.
Eames
Littlefield v. Greenf ield , 69 Me. 00 , 09.
P.

L.

Caldwell v.^Blake, 69 MeT 4^8, 4 67
Paul V. Huse 112 Me. I4l-9» 451I

.

.

,

responsibility
The City Charter concentrates fiscal
and authority in the City Council.

strictly and definitively limited.

The borrowing power is
Art. VII, #7, 8, .9.

_

The

.

exceed the estimated City
total amount appropriated shall not
an itemized statement of
revenue. The budget must present
statement of taxes is required,
all sources of revenue; a
The budget is subject to
with comparative figures, etc.
in 1917 was manifestly
public hearing. The Legislature
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intent upon commissioning the City Council with a stewardexacting
ship to be exercised over municipal finances under
debts.
rules particularly so as to municipal debt making and
Constitution of Maine fixes a municipal debt maxi-

The

Article IX, #l5

mum.

«

(see Art.
As to the correlation of the Charter of 1917
I| ,

in Bass v
sec. 3) and the statutes this Court said

111 Me. 390, 394

.

Bango r

_

j

,

(19114-):

law, that charters
"It must be regarded as settled
repealed by a
or narts of charters, of cities are not
stand together,
general law if the two can consistently to repeal the
Lie as the intention of the Legislature
and plain
charter or parts of charter is clear

direct superintending
The general laws of this State
of school superintendschool committees upon the nomination
and qualifications of teachers.
ents to regulate the salaries
add
the general instruction, may
direct
shall
committees
The
instruction, shall determine the
some optional courses of
hire truant officers and fix
purchase of text books, shall
half pay
grant leaves of absence with
may
compensation,
their
property,
and shall care for school
to certain personnel
the buildings.
repairs and insurance upon

n 02

(

7

tional

)

l8l

(

^

)

>

47 3

^

^

)

^

^

^

certain educaduty to effectuate
statutory
the
to
A.
discretion granted there
independent
the
and
purposes

and
construction of the Charter
a
Cossnittee
Por to the school
indicate that it was

involved, however,
the general statutes

for
Legislature that estimates
making
law
the
of
the will
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appropriations submitted on behalf of the School Committee may
be reduced whenever such estimates in the sound judgment of
the City Council exceed an amount reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of their purpose in consideration of the

educational needs of the City, the City’s financial condition
or means and the expenditures the City must make.
As the Connecticut Court said in Board of Education v .

Board of Finance

,

127 Conn. 3kS» 3^2, 16 A. 2d 601, 605:

”It is probably true that in many instances a board
of finance does not have as sound an understanding of
the educational needs of a town as does the board of
education and that therefore a decision by the former to
reduce an estimate submitted by the latter may not in
fact conduce to the best possible educational interests
of the people of the town; but, on the other hand, it is
more than possible that a board of education, less
familiar with the finances of the town or perhaps with
financial matters in general, if left without a check,
might incur expenditures which are not reasonably necessary to serve these interests and the expenses of
which the town could ill afford to meet. One purpose of
the legislature in establishing town boards of finance is
- - - - to afford a check against the incurring of such
It is also true that
expenses on the part of the town.
estimate of a board
an
where a board of finance reduces
is less than
appropriated
of education so that the sum
to be
purpose
the
is reasonably necessary to carry out
exerthe
in
served, or where it takes such action not
or
motives
cise of a sound judgment but from improper
to
seem
without sufficient understanding, there would
might
be no adequate remedy which the board of education

effectively invoke. The legislature, however, evidently
municipal
deemed it necessary in the interests of sound
powers we
the
finance
of
boards
finance to give to town
their judgexercise
not
do
boards
If such
have outlined.
the
ment intelligently, fairly, and disinterestedly,
a
wherein
unlcnown,
not
situation is one, unfortunately
duties
the
perform
properly
public official fails to
inherent
of his office, and the remedy is that
replace him by
to
theory of representative government,
the
by
about
If the result brought
another.
nice
a
produce
which are evidently designed to
do not a«^^fthe public
^powers between the two boards,where
no Justifiable
interests, there course is not,
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rights are involved, to seek to make the court arbiters
in a controversy essentially political, but to ask the
legislature to change or better define the respective
powers of the board.”
The Clerk shall enter the declaratory judgment that
the Auburn City Council has the final authority to fix the

total maximum expenditures of the Auburn Superintending

School Committee for the purposes of the annual municipal
budget.

Dated April 29

,

A.

D.

1965

.

/s/ FRANCIS W. SULLIVAN
Justice, Supreme Judicial Cour¥

APPENDIX D
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USE OF THE BIBLE IN MAINE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A Policy Statement of the State Board of Education

The 1963 decision of the United States Supreme Court

in the cases of Murray v. Curlett and Abington Township

v,

Schempp has aroused considerable concern in the minds of many
of our citizens and educators relating to the proper use of

the Bible in school curricula.

Statements on this topic have

been issued by the State Attorney-General, the Commissioner
of Education and the State Curriculum Committee.

It is evident

clarification is
that some further amplification and possible
statement has
needed. With this purpose in mind, the following
of school
been prepared to serve as a guide for the use

officials and teachers.
In the opinion the Court has stated:

"It might well

not complete without a study
be said that one's education is
relationship to the advanceof comparative religion and its
may be said that the Bible
ment of civilization. It certainly
literary and historic qualities.
is worthy of study for its
indicates that such study of
Nothing that we have said here
presented objectively as a
the Bible or of religion, when
education, may not be effected
part of a secular program of

Amendment."
consistent with the First
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Attorney -General Hancock has pointed out that religious

exercises as such are unconstitutional hut that

’’the

decision

does not prohibit the secular study of the Bible or of those

subjects in which the history of religion may be an integral
'

He has further advised that the decision does not pro-

part."

hibit the study of recitation in our schools of documents and
books containing references to God.
The Board is in accord with the statements relating to

report of the
moral principles which were enunciated in the
It is agreed that schools have a
State Curriculum Committee.
principles on
right and an obligation to teach those moral

which our government and society are founded.

It believes it

the moral strength of
is a function of education to mold
and respect such fundapupils so that they will understand

frugality, chastity,
mental principles as sobriety, industry,
truth,

justice and the Golden Rule.

nation was founded on the
The Board recognizes that our
and State; that religion as
principle of separation of Church
between every man and his Maker,
Jefferson wrote "is a matter
to
less the public, had a right
in which no other, and far
diversity of American
and that because of the

inter-meddle;"

provide a
function of the school to
beliefs, it is not the
This function is
sectarian religious instruction.

program of

the home.
reserved to the church and
AttorneyCourt's decision and the
in the light of the
evident that
however, it seems clearly
statement,
General's
-

2814

.

the study of the Bible or of religion is a proper part of a

program of secular education because knowledge thereof is
essential and desirable to an understanding of subject matter.
The Bible, therefore, is not excluded from school use, and it
is permissible to teach about the Holy Scriptures and different

religions.

Accordingly, the Bible may be used as a valuable

source of material in both literature and history.
The Bible is a library of books closely associated in

thought, philosophy and purpose.

It has had an influence upon

mankind in all realms of human activity, moral, aesthetic and
practical.

Its study will give pupils a richer background by

providing a better understanding of this great collection of
literature.

In anthologies or any collections of literary

masterpieces, portions of the Old and New Testaments are fre-

quently included for study.

Pupils should have this back-

ground to understand Biblical references in other great literary
works.
The Bible not only contains examples of great literary

value, but it has served as an inspiration for great music and

painting.

For example, Handel's "Messiah,' Michaelangelo

"Moses," and DaVinci's "Last Supper."

s

Through an understanding

to appreciate
of the Bible a pupil can increase his ability

the best in these fields.

Justice Jackson emphasized the

importance of such understandings when he wrote:

"Music with-

cathedral or painting
out sacred music, architecture minus the
eccentric and incomplete.
without the scriptural themes would be
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even from a secular point of view, yet the inspirational appeal
in these guises is often stronger than a forthright sermon.

Certainly a course in English literature that omitted the Bible

•

and other powerful uses of our Mother tongue for religious
ends would be pretty barren.

And, I should suppose it is

proper, if not an indispensable part of preparation for a

worldly life, to know the roles that religion and religions
have played in the story of mankind.

The fact is that, for

good or ill, nearly everything in our culture worth transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is saturated

with religious influences.

One can hardly respect a system

of education that would leave the student wholly ignorant of

the currents of religious thought that move the world society

for a part in which he is being prepared.”
It must be recognized, however, that there is a dis-

tinction between teaching about religion, with all the

necessary involvements thereto, and
nominationalism.

a

narrowly religious de-

The line of demarcation may not be clearly

defined but the teacher and school committee have

a

high de-

gree of latitude and must exercise the discretion vested in

them in each instance.

Some factors worthy of consideration

in proper use of the Bible would be the extent to which its

use is connected with the course of study, the extent to

which the exposition is recognized as the teacher's own
opinion with due allowances for others who hold different
to understand
views, and whether or not pupils are of a maturity
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implications,

Wh,ere th.e line is to be

drawn between the

proper* and the improper cannot be stated explicitly.

Teachers

and school officials have discretionary powers in this respect

and should use them wisely.
The premise that a school has a role in building

spiritual values is embodied in a resolution of the American

Association of School Administrators, adopted in
states that:

196iv,

which

"The public schools should play an important

part in building spiritual values and Association members

should take the lead in developing educational programs that
recognize the contributions of religion in the history and

development of this Nation and that encourage a deep and
genuine respect for religious freedom.

To do this the school

is urged to cooperate with the home, the church and other

community organizations."
In summary, the decision of the Supreme Court in the

Schempp and Murray cases does not alter the schools’ responsi

bility for proper use of the Bible in the public schools.
is a proper part of secular education.

School officials are

free to continue use of the Bible as a source book and to

utilize it as an integral part of appropriate courses.

Adopted:

May 22, I 96 4

I .

It
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Chapter 763
THE COMMONWEALTH OP MASSACHUSETTS
In the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-five

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE BARGAINING
AGENTS WITH POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OP THE COMMONWEALTH
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
in General Court assembled, and by the authority of the
same, as follows
:

SECTION 1 . Section four C of chapter forty of the General
Laws is hereby repealed.
SECTION 2
Chapter 149 of the General Laws is hereby
amended by inserting after section I78F the following eight
sections: -.

Section I78G
When used in this section and in sections
one hundred and seventy-eight H to one hundred and seventyeight N, inclusive, the following words shall, unless the context requires otherwise, have the following meanings;
.

—

"Municipal employer," any county, city, town, or district,
and any person designated by the municipal employer to act in
its interest in dealing with municipal employees.
^

"Employee," any employee of a municipal employer, whether
or not in the classified service of the municipal employer,
except elected officials, board and commission members, police,
and the executive officers of any municipal employer.
"Employee organization," any lawful association, organization, federation or council having as a primary purpose the
improvement of wages, hours and other conditions of employment.

"Professional employee," any employee engaged in work
which is predominantly intellectual and varied in character
as opposed to routine mental, manual mechanical or physical
work, which involves the consistent exercise of discretion and
judgment in its performance, of such a character that the
output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given time period, and which requires
knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning
customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher
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learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic
education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the
'performance of routine mental, manual or physical processes.
Section 178H
(1) Employees shall have, and be protected
in the exercise of, the right to self-organization, to form,
join or assist any employee organization, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing on questions of
wages, hours and other conditions of employment and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, free from actual
interference, restraint or coercion; provided, however, that an
employee organization recognized by a municipal employer or
designated as the representative of the majority of the employees
in an appropriate unit, shall be the exclusive bargaining agent
for all employees of such unit, and shall act, negotiate agreements and bargain collectively for all employees in the unit,
and shall be responsible for representing the interests of all
such employees without discrimination and without regard to
employee organization membership.
.

Whenever, in accordance with such regulations as may
be prescribed by the state labor relations commission, a
petition is filed with said commission by municipal employer
presented
alleging that one or more employee organizations have
of
majority
a
of
representative
a claim to be recognized as the
of
group
or
employee
an
employees in a specified unit, or by
subemployees or an employee organization alleging that a
colfor
represented
stantial number of employees wish to be
exclusive
as
lective bargaining by an employee organization
currently
representative, or that the employee organization
as the
certified or recognized by the municipal employer
a
represent
bargaining representative does not currently
majority of the employees in the unit, said
investigate such petition and, if it has
exists, shall provide
believe^that a question of representation
notice.
for an appropriate hearing upon due
is
the commission finds ^hat there
(3) If, after hearing,
(2)

_
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representative of the employees in the unit. In any election
where none of the choices on the hallot receives a majority
a run off shall be conducted, the ballot providing for a
selection between the two choices receiving the largest and the
second largest number of valid votes cast in the election.
*

*

(I4.)
The commission shall decide in each case whether the
appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining shall
be the municipal employer unit or any other unit thereof; provided, uniformed employees of the fire department shall be
in a separate unit and provided, further, that no unit shall
include both professional and non-professional employees unless
a majc rity of such professional employees vote for inclusion
in such unit.

Section I78I
The municipal employer and the employee
organization recognized or designated as exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate unit shall have the duty
to bargain collectively.
In such bargaining other than with
an employee organization for school employees, the municipal
employer shall be represented by the chief executive officer,
whether elected or appointed, or his designated representatives.
In such bargaining with an employee organization for school
employees, the municipal employer shall be represented by the
school committee or its designated representative or representatives
.

.

For the purposes of collective bargaining, the representative of the municipal employer and the representative of
the employees shall meet at reasonable times, including
meetings appropriately related to the budget making process,
and shall confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours
and other conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and shall
execute a written contract incorporating any agreement reached,
but neither party shall be compelled to agree to a proposal
In the event that any part or proor to make a concession.
is in conflict with any law,
agreement
vision of any such
ordinance or by-law shall prelaw,
such
ordinance or by-law,
If funds are necessary
remains.
vail so long as such conflict
for the necessary
request
a
agreement,
to implement such written
I
body.
legislative
the
to
appropriation shall be submitted
the
to
returned
be
shall
matter
such .request is rejected, the
parties for further bargaining. The preceding two sentencesin
committees
shall not apply to agreements reached by school
thirty-four
section
cities and towns in which the provisions of
of chapter seventy-one are operative.
If, after a reasonable period of
exis s
negotiation over“the terms of an agreement, a dispute
between a municipal employer and an employee
final
S ection 1781 .

(a)

days prior to the
if no agreement has been reached sixty

.
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date for setting the municipal budget, either party or the
parties jointly may petition the state board of conciliation
and arbitration to initiate fact finding.
(b) Upon receipt of such petition the board of conciliation and arbitration shall make an investigation to deterr
mine if the conditions set forth in paragraph (a) exist. If
the board finds that such conditions do exist, it shall initiate
Prior to such fact finding, or prior to fact
fact finding.
finding ordered by the state labor relations commission in
accordance with the provisions of section one hundred and seventy
eight L, the board of conciliation and arbitration shall submit to the parties a panel of three qualified disinterested
persons from which list the parties shall select one person to
serve as the fact finder and shall notify the board of conciliation and arbitration of their choice. If the parties
fail to select the fact finder within five calendar days of
receipt of the list, the board of conciliation and arbitration
shall appoint the person who shall serve as fact finder.

The person selected or appointed as fact finder may
establish dates and place of hearings which shall be where
feasible in the locality of the municipality involved. Any
such hearings shall be conducted in accordance with rules
established by the board of conciliation and arbitration.
Upon request, the board of conciliation and arbitration shall
issue subpoenas for hearings conducted by the fact finder.
The fact finder may administer oaths. Upon completion of the
hearings and within sixty days from the date of appointment,
extended by the board of conciliation and arbitration
\ijiO_ 0 ss
for good cause shown, the fact finder shall make written
findings of fact and recommendations for resolution of the
municipal
dispute and shall cause the same to be served on the
involved.
employer and the employee organization
(c)

or
Only employee organizations which are designated
one
section
recognized as the exclusive representative under
in inihundred and seventy-eight H shall be proper parties
tiating fact finding proceedings.
(d)

finding proceedings under this
municipal employer
section shall be divided equally between the
and said employee organization. Compensation of payment
finder shall be in accordance with a schedule
arbitration.
established by the board of conciliation and
construed to pro^f^ Nothinc: in this section shall be
®
hibit tL fact finder from endeavoring
appointed as fact finder.
in which he has been selected or
(e) The cost of fact

Section 178 k. The services of the available
oiliation and arbitration shall also bo
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\

employers and employee organizations for purposes of conciliation of grievances or contract disputes and for purposes of
arbitration of disputes over th,e interpretation or application
of th.6 terms of a written agreement.
Nothing in this section
shall prevent the use of other arbitration tribunals in the
resolution of disputes over the interpretation or application
of' the terms or written agreements between municipal
employers
and employee organizations.

Section 178 l
Municipal employers or their representatives
agents are prohibited from:— (1) interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in section one hundred and seventy-eight H; (2) dominating or
interfering with the formation, existence or administration of
any employee organization; (3) discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee because he has signed or filed
any affidavit, petition or complaint or given any information
or testimony under this section; (i^) refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with an employee organization which has
been recognized or designated as the exclusive representative
of employees in an appropriate unit; and (5) refusing to discuss grievances with the representatives of an employee organization recognized or designated as the exclusive representative
in an appropriate unit.
.

91*

Employee organizations or their agents are prohibited from
(1) restraining or coercing a municipal employer in the selection

of its representative for purposes of collective bargaining or
the adjustment of grievances; and (2) if recognized or designated
as the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate
unit, refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with a
municipal employer.

•

When a complaint is made to the labor relations commission
that a practice prohibited by this section has been committed,
the commission may issue an order dismissing the complaint or
may order a further investigation or a hearing thereon. If a
hearing is ordered, the commission shall set the time and
place for the hearing, which time and place may be changed by
the commission at the request of one of the parties for cause
Any complaint may be amended with the permission of^
shown.
The municipal employer, the employee organizathe commission.
tion 'or the person so complained of shall have the right to file
an ar 3wer to the original or amended complaint within five days
after the service of such complaint or within such other time
Such municipal employer, such
as the commission may limit.
persons shall have the right to
such
or
employee organization
appear in person or otherwise to defend against such coitplaint.
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In the discretion of the commission any person may be allowed
to intervene in such proceeding.
In any hearing the commission
shall not be bound by the technical rules of evidence prevailing
in the courts.
A transcript of the testimony taken at any
hearing before the commission shall be filed with the commission.
If, upon all the testimony, the commission determines that
prohibited practice has been committed, it shall state its
findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on the
party committing the prohibited practice an order requiring
it or him to cease and desist from such prohibited practice,
and shall take such further affirmative action as will comply
with the provisions of this section, including but not limited
to the withdrawal of certification of an employee organization
established by or assisted in its establishment by any such
prohibited practice.
If it is alleged that either party has
refused to bargain collectively, the state labor relations
commission shall order fact finding and direct the party at
fault to pay the full costs thereof. It shall order the
reinstatement with or without back pay of an employee discharged
or discriminated against in violation of the first paragraph of
If, upon all of the testimony, the commission
this section.
determines that a prohibited practice has not been or is not
being committed, it shall state its finding of fact and shall
issue an order dismissing the complaint.
a

It shall be unlawful for any employee to
Section 1?8M
engage in, induce or encourage any strike, work stoppage,
slowdown or withholding of services by such employees.
.

,

Section 1Y8N. Nothing in sections one hundred and seventyei^t F to one hundred and seventy-eight M, inclusive, shall
diminish the authority and power of the civil service commission, or any retirement board or personnel board established
by law, nor shall anything in said sections constitute a grant
employer.
of the right to strike to employees of any municipal
Section 9B of chapter 23 of the General Laws,
SECTION 3
acts of 193o,
as appearing in section 1 of chapter 345 of the
in
inclusive
is hereby amended by inserting after the word
hundred
one
of the chapter, sections
line 4, the words:
one hundred and seventy-eight L ol
and
and seventy-eight H
chapter one hundred and forty-nine.
.

—

,

Approved November 17

»
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